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SECTION ONE
PROFESSIONAL AUDIT
1. Overall Aims and Objectives
1.1 Prime Aim
To enhance my professional competence in clinical psychology and contribute 
my skills and knowledge to the development of the profession in Hong Kong, 
especially in the area of forensic clinical psychology.
1.2 Prime Objective
To produce a portfolio of clinical, academic and research work which will 
demonstrate increased competence in each of these three areas.
2. Academic
2.1 Aims
(1) To enhance academic competence in three specialist areas of clinical 
psychology.
(2) To provoke critical thoughts on the existing knowledge of and approaches 
to the current practice in clinical psychology.
(3) To provide academic support in terms of new skills and well researched 
theoretical frameworks to the existing service delivery in clinical 
psychology.
2.2 Objectives
(1) To complete the following three critical academic reviews.
(i) A study of the relationship between frontal lobe damage and criminality
(ii) A review of cognitive-behavioural therapy
(iii) A study of delusions
(2) To attend the following workshops.
(i) A three-day workshop on the assessment and treatment of sex offenders 
and the use of penileplethymograph conduct by Dr. Derek Perkins 
from Broadmoor Hospital, England in July, 1995.
(ii) A public lecture on neuropsychological testing given by Dr. Muriel 
Lezak on 13 November, 1995.
(iii) A three-day workshop on the application of the relapse prevention 
model to the treatment of drug addicts and sex offenders conducted 
by G.A. Marlatt and J.R. Gordon in April, 1996.
(iv) A four-day workshop on Advanced Intensive Professional 
Development organized by the Hong Kong Satir Centre for Human 
Development in April, 1996.
2.3 Rationale
Academic competence has been an essential component contributing to 
the growth of the profession of clinical psychology. Emphasis has been put on 
sound knowledge base for service delivery in the area of forensic clinical 
psychology in Hong Kong in recent years. The three academic reviews will help 
to update the expertise in the following areas:
(I) To understand the relationship between brain damage and criminality and its 
implication on the risk assessment and rehabilitation of offenders.
(2) To develop better treatment approach by examining the current status of 
the cognitive-behavioural therapy.
(3) To understand the nature of delusion and to provide evidence for the 
contribution of clinical psychology to the treatment of the disorder.
Issues such as risk assessment and programme evaluation have been 
some of the major concerns in the forensic field in Hong Kong. Hopefully, the 
above reviews will provide academic input and stimulation to the those issues. 
Views on the nature of psychotic disorders have been changing and the 
effectiveness of the cognitive-behavioural model in treating delusion as 
evidenced by some recent studies has signified a shift fi*om a medical 
perspective on the disorder to one which emphasizes psychological processing.
2,4 Plan
The plan is to start doing literature review on the three academic papers 
in the first year of the course and to write up and finish them by the end of 
1995. The reviews will be sent to the course tutor for comments and revision
will be made accordingly. They are submitted by the end of March, 1996 as 
part of the PsychD portfolio.
3. Clinical
3.1 Aims
(1) To make evident increased clinical competence in terms of integrating 
theories into practice and of demonstrating treatment effectiveness.
(2) To support psychological service development by setting up a systematic 
approach to treating sex offenders.
3.2 Objectives
To set up a self-help programme for sex offenders in Correctional 
Services Department. The aims of the programme are:
(1) To provide a closed environment for structured learning;
(2) To promote mutual help and support;
(3) To enable close monitoring on the participants’ progress; and
(4) To reduce the participants’ reoffending.
The programme is comprised of four modules and a treatment group 
and is based on the cognitive-behavioural model. The four modules are (1) Sex 
knowledge; (2) Cognitive distortions; (3) Empathy training; and (4) 
Heterosexual skills. Each group is compromised of about eight members and 
lasts for about twelve sessions. The group aims at challenging the members’ 
distorted cognitions, improving their empathy, and identifying their high risk 
situations and coping strategies through group discussion and role-plays.
3.3 Rationale
The significance of setting up a self-help programme for sex offenders is 
expressed in the following:
(1) It is the first time a systematic approach with a clear theoretical orientation 
is applied to the assessment and treatment of sex offenders in Correctional 
Services department and in Hong Kong. Such an approach can facilitate 
the application of skills demonstrated to be effective in the literature in a 
systematic fashion and can facilitate research on treatment programme 
effectiveness.
(2) The centralization of usefiil resources and the grouping of the sex offenders
in an enclosed area can facilitate more effective use of resources and 
maximize the effect of learning
(3) The self-help format of the programme helps to save clinical psychologists’ 
time from addressing the same problem from time to time by setting up 
easy-to-monitor self-learning courses for sex offenders to take,
3.4 Plan
The time table for setting up the self-help programme for sex offenders 
is briefly described as follows:
(1) Planning stage: From end of 1994 to mid 1995
During the planning stage, various modules are set up and a suitable 
venue is identified and built to suit the purposes of the programme.
9(2) Trial period: From mid 1995 to early 1996
During the trial period, sex offenders are recruited to join the 
programme. A pamphlet is printed to explain to them the purpose and content 
of the programme. Various content of the different modules are assigned to the 
participants according to their needs and their progress is closely monitored by 
clinical psychologists and some built-in evaluation measures. The participants 
are also assigned to treatment groups. The programme is reviewed regularly 
and the modules are revised and new modules added to the programme during 
the trial period.
(3) Full implementation period: From mid 1996 onwards
Upon constant reviews, feedback from participants, and initial 
evaluation of effectiveness, the programme is frilly operated from mid 1996 and 
data on the changes of the participants and the effectiveness of each component 
of the programme are carefrilly collected to facilitate evaluation and research.
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4. Research
4.1 Aims
(1) To increase research competence in order to develop the services offered by
forensic clinical psychology.
(2) To increase the knowledge relating to the assessment and treatment of 
offenders by conducting empirical research on the area.
4.2 Objectives
(1) To present in the form of the original MSc dissertation which studied the 
effect of therapeutic communities on offenders’ self-esteem.
(2) To conduct a research study on the attitudes of sex offenders. The 
cognitive factors relating to sexual assault are identified within two 
theoretical fi’ameworks and the nature of their influence on sexual 
offending behaviour is subject to empirical validation.
11
4.3 Rationale
The reason for conducting the research project on the attitudes of sex 
offenders as part of the study plan is to ascertain the nature of cognitive factors 
involved in the commission of sexual offences and to examine the validity of 
some of the theoretical models which explain the relationships between attitude 
and sexual offending behaviour. The results will have the significance of 
redefining the role of cognitions in sexual assault and will shed light on the 
fiiture direction of treatment programmes based on the cognitive-behavioural 
orientation.
Presently, the assessment and treatment of sex offenders are among the 
services given high priority in Correctional Services Department in Hong Kong. 
Research of this kind will certainly help the Department to understand this 
group of offenders in a new light and to improve the efficacy of the present 
treatment approaches.
The improvement in research skills is also an asset to the development 
of forensic clinical psychology in Hong Kong. There are many areas of the field 
such as drug addiction and stealing behaviour that need to be better understood 
through research.
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4.4 Plan
The time table for the research project is as follows:
(1) Literature review and the writing up
of the research proposal Jan. - July, 1995
(2) Data collection and analysis Aug. - Dec., 1995
(3) Writing up Jan. - Mar., 1996
Both the MSc dissertation and the present thesis will be submitted to 
the University as part of the PsychD portfolio by the end March, 1996.
SECTION TWO
ACADEMIC AUDIT
PsychD in Clinical Psychology 
Conversion Programme
Critical Review I
A study of the relationship between frontal lobe damage
and criminality
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Introduction
Many medical professionals and social scientists were intrigued by 
Thomas Szasz’s (1960) bold attempt in arguing that mental illness does not 
stem from identifiable neurological defects. He advocated that there is no 
identifiable disease process in most mental illnesses and viewed such illnesses as 
stemming from social processes. With the recent developments in morbid 
anatomy and pathology and the technological advances in computerized 
tomography and brain imaging, structural brain pathology in many mental 
disorders has been demonstrated and rendered Szasz’s argument less tenable.
It has been suggested that antisocial behaviour could be expressed by 
disruption of the normal neural mechanisms which mediate and control 
behaviour. Consequently, criminal populations have been studied to yield 
evidence for gross or specific neurological damage or dysfunction which may 
account for their antisocial conduct. An important proposition emerged from 
such area is that criminals are characterized by frontal lobe damage or 
dysfimction. This paper reviews the studies so far done on these people and 
examines critically the arguments both for and against the proposition. 
Evidence is gathered to support a predisposition model for the link between 
frontal lobe damage and criminality. The model emphasizes the interaction
16
between biological aspects and a person’s psychosocial variables which 
contributes to criminal behaviour.
Frontal lobe dysfunction and behavioural change
Various fimctional changes have been suggested to be the results of 
damage to the frontal system (Stuss & Benson, 1986). The heterogeneity of 
symptoms is impressive and opposite extremes such as agitation and 
indifference are incorporated in one syndrome. The variety and apparently 
paradoxical nature of the syndrome descriptions may be related not only to 
inadequate definitions of the behaviour but also to the fimctional specificity of 
different regions of the frontal lobe with other brain regions (Fuster, 1989).
The contrast in behaviour between patients with orbitofrontal and 
dorsolateral frontal lesions may provide insight into the variety of symptom 
expressions (Weiger & Bear, 1988). Orbitofrontal lesions cause an increase in 
impulsive or inappropriate activities and antisocial acts. The orbitofrontal lobes 
are involved in deciding the appropriate time, place, and strategy for 
environmentally elicited anger and are important in maintaining sustained 
aggression. Patients with orbitofrontal lesions respond to trivial stimuli with 
outbursts of anger that pass quickly without a trace of remorse because the
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capacity for self-criticism mediated by this region is depleted or diminished. On 
the other hand, dorsolateral frontal lesions lead to apathy. Patients Wth lesions 
affecting both the dorsolateral convexity and the orbital surface may show 
mixed syndromes in which impulsivity alternates with apathy.
The frontal lobe is unique among cortical areas in having the greatest 
variety of connections to three independent but functionally linked limbic 
systems: the primary cortical limbic lobe, a subcortical system and a peripheral 
visceroendocrine system (Nauta, 1973).. It should include all structures anterior 
to the central fissure including for example the candate, anterior putaman, and 
anterior thalamus. The functions of the prefrontal cortex and its proximity to 
the motor regions of the brain through premotor regions make it the ‘‘final 
common pathway”, integrating information from various brain areas for the 
proper motor response (Bianchi, 1922). The position of the frontal lobes as a 
final collection point for information related to both the external sensory and 
internal limbic (feeling) world - and the role of the frontal lobes in motivation, 
organization and integration, and motor expression - make this extremely 
important in understanding individual subjective reactions and external 
behaviour (Stuss, Gow & Hetherington, 1992).
Stuss and Gow (1992) propose that the primary change after frontal 
lobe pathology is a disorder of personality, a change in the stable response
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patterns that define an individual as a unique self. According to them, 
dysfunction of personality includes cognitive abilities, with a disorder of self- 
reflective awareness. Benson and Stuss (1990) have described three clinical 
syndromes with fi*ontal lobe lesions - confabulation, reduplicative paramnesia, 
and capgras syndrome - that provide a basis for fiirther understanding in 
personality. Each represents a disorder of reality testing and a failure to be self- 
critical, suggesting higher order prefrontal malfunction.
Selective damage to the fi*ontal lobes changes the stable responses to 
the environment. Although more modular fimctions may be intact, the 
appropriate and timely implementation of these may be impaired. The frontal 
lobe patient may know exactly what to do or how to behave. When asked what 
the appropriate emotional response should be, the patient knows exactly what 
to say. Without superordinate control, the cues activating behaviour are 
automatic, immediate, and overtly controlled by the environment (Shallice, 
1988). Consequently, in a real-life situation, the patient fi*equently behaves 
inappropriately. These impairments result in disturbances of what Gardner 
(1983) has called the personal intelligence - the intelligences that allow one to 
fimction appropriately in response to internal emotional and external culturally 
defined social cues.
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Hence, disorders of social behaviour and personality which characterize 
most of the criminal population may suggest frontal lobe dysfunction (Grattan 
& Eslinger, 1990). They include deficits such as vulnerability to interference, 
impoverished judgment, and an inability to self-correct and self-monitor. In the 
following section, empirical research studying the relationships between frontal 
lobe damage and criminal behaviour is examined.
Frontal lobe dysfunction and crime
There are a number of studies which support the proposition that 
criminal behaviour is linked to frontal lobe damage. This section discusses the 
significance of these studies on our understanding of the role of frontal lobe 
damage in committing crimes.
Damage to the frontal lobe constitutes the frontal lobe syndrome which 
denotes argumentativeness, lack of concern for consequences of behaviour, 
loss of social graces, impulsivity, distractibility, shallowness, lability, violence, 
and reduced ability to utilize symbols (Silver & Yudofslay, 1987). The frontal 
lobe is made up of the prefrontal cortex and the more posterior part of the 
frontal cortex. The former is the most anterior or front part of the frontal lobe 
and is centrally involved in abstract cognitive fimctions and higher intelligence.
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planning, behavioural inhibition, and the regulation of emotion and affect, 
functions which have superficial relevance to criminal behaviour. The posterior 
part is more concerned with orientation, sensory, and motor functions. The 
prefi'ontal cortex can be divided into medial, dorsolateral, and orbitoffontal 
cortex. The orbitofi*ontal cortex is speculated to be of potentially greater 
relevance to antisocial and violent behaviour. The frontal lobe’s close 
coimection with the limbic system suggests that it is not only involved in 
important cognitive process such as learning and memory but also in emotional 
and aggressive behaviour.
Neuropsychological studies
Most studies on the relationships between frontal lobe dysfimction and 
criminal behaviours employ neuropsychological methods. The general 
assumption behind such studies is that there are not discrete and clear lesions 
(structural damage) to be found in isolated cases of crime, but there are 
individual differences in the quality of functioning of different parts of the brain, 
that such dysfunction is in part measured by neuropsychological tests, and that 
such differences may potentially predispose an individual to commit criminal 
and antisocial acts (Raine & Venables, 1992).
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Yeudall and Fromm-Auch (1979) studied 86 violent criminals and 79 
normal controls using the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Test Battery 
(HRNTB) and found significantly more anterior neuropsychological 
dysfunction in the violent group.
Violent crimes were found by Bryant et al. (1984) in 73% of their 
subjects classified as brain damaged compared to 28% of those classified as 
normal. Using the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Batteiy (LNNB), 
significant impairments were found in violent relative to non-violent groups on 
the LNNB tasks that have been described by Luria (1980) as associated with 
adult-onset fi*ontal lobe disorders.
Schalling (1978) reported two studies that found deficits in fi'ontal lobe 
functioning in psychopaths using the Porteous Maze (Schalling and Roasen, 
1968) and the Necker Cube (Lidberg et al, 1978). Newman et al. (1987) 
yielded strong support for response perseveration in criminal psychopaths using 
a card-playing task incorporating monetary rewards. Similar results were 
obtained by Gorenstein (1982) by using the Wisconsin Card Sort Test 
(WCST), Necker Ciibe reversals and a sequential matching memory task.
However, not all the studies on the subject are on the affirmative side. 
Virkkunen et al. (1976) found no increase in criminality in a follow-up of 507
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Second World War Finnish soldiers with damage to either frontal or temporal 
lobes. One possible explanation for the negative results offered by Raine and 
Venables (1992) is that the authors did not break dovra frontal lobe lesions into 
those affecting prefrontal areas as opposed to more posterior posterior frontal 
areas. As mentioned earlier, the prefrontal cortex is of greater relevance to 
criminal behaviour.
Hare (1984) and Hoffinan et al. (1987) failed to replicate the results 
yielded by Gorenstein (1982) which showed response perseveration in 
psychopaths. Sutler and Allain (1983) found no difference in perseveration 
between psychopaths and controls on the WCST. Raine et al. (1991) even 
discovered significantly better performance on the WCST in a group of 
psychopathic conduct-disordered adolescents relative to conduct-disordered 
controls.
It has been argued that failures to observe perseveration errors on the 
WCST in psychopaths may be due to the fact that orbitofrontal (rather than 
dorsolateral) dysfimction provides the major basis for psychopathic personality 
and lesions to the region do not produce cognitive deficits. In other words, 
while the WCST is more sensitive to dorsolateral frontal lesion, the 
orbitofrontal cortex has been recognized as having stronger relevance to 
psychopathy (Weingerger et al., 1986; Raine et al., 1992). It is possible that
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some of Gorenstein’s (1982) subjects suffered from lesions affecting both areas 
and there is dissociation between an individual psychopath’s verbalizations 
about the correct prosocial life strategies that h^she should adopt and his/her 
actual discordant antisocial behaviour, a feature which has been termed 
“specific loss of insight” (Cleckley, 1976).
Another explanation for the above contradictory results would be the 
possibility that frontal lobe damage was only linked to criminality in an indirect 
way. In fact, there was still a significant proportion of variance in criminal 
behaviour that was not accounted for by the results of the neuropsychological 
tests in the above and numerous other studies. It is reasonable to suspect that 
frontal lobe damage on its own is inadequate in contributing to criminal actions 
and that it interacts with other factors such as personality and social variables in 
predisposing an individual to committing a crime (Raine, 1992).
Other issues in interpreting the results of neuropsychological tests were 
the imperfect nature of the assessment instruments themselves and our 
incomplete understanding of how the brain actually functions. For instance, the 
exact nature of the relationship between response perseveration and the extent 
of frontal lobe damage is still unclear. It would be imprudent to readily accept 
the differences in the results on the WCST as indicative of the presence or 
absence of frontal lobe dysfunction and hence of criminality.
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Brain imaging studies
Support for frontal damage in offenders can also be found in a number 
of brain imaging studies. Wright et al. (1990) applied the technique of 
computerized tomography (CT) on 18 paedophiles, 12 incest offenders, 34 
rapists and 12 controls and found smaller left frontal and temporal areas in sex 
offenders. Hendricks et al. (1988) studied the regional cerebral blood flow 
(CBF) in 16 cliild molesters and 16 normal controls and found greater 
reduction of CBF among the experimental group. Raine (1993) compared 22 
murderers with 22 normal controls using positron emission tomography (PET) 
and concluded that there was a selective prefrontal dysfimction in murderers. 
Volkow and Tancredi (1987) found that violent patients (n=4) suffered from 
left temporal dysfimction and hypofrontality using the same technique.
Further support for the notion of frontal deficits in relation to 
aggression and violence was provided by Goyer (1992) who studied 17 
personality-disordered subjects (largely borderline and antisocial personality 
disorder) on PET. The subjects were also administered a questionnaire 
measuring life history of aggression. A significant negative correlation (r = -.52,
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p<.03) was observed between aggression scores and glucose metabolism in the 
frontal activity in those with relatively higher scores.
Although evidence has been strong from brain imaging studies, there is 
no one-to-one relationship between a score on a given neuropsychological test 
or a finding on a PET or CT scan, on the one hand, and criminal behaviour, on 
the other (e.g.. Boll, 1985). This is especially so with chronic brain damage 
known or suspected to have been present for some years before the assessment 
is conducted (Davison & Neale, 1994). The reason for these sometimes loose 
relationships have to do with such factors as how the person has, over time, 
reacted to and coped with the losses brought about by the brain damage. And 
the success of efforts to cope have, in turn, to do with the social environment in 
which the individual has lived. Such a view further substantiates the validity of 
a predisposition model which takes into account the various environmental and 
individual factors.
Heterogeneity of criminals
Although there is support that criminality is linked to frontal lobe 
dysfunction, it is too speculative to see criminals as a homogeneous group. 
Some neuropsychological studies have shown that frontal dysfunction might be
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specific to particular groups of offenders. Yeudall et al. (1982) failed to find 
differences between violent and non-violent delinquents on the HRNTB and 
twelve other neuropsychological tests. Moffitt and Henry (1991) suggested that 
while adult violent offenders showed consistent evidence for 
neuropsychological dysfimction, including frontal dysfimction, evidence for 
such dysfunction in juveniles was mixed. A possible explanation for such age 
effects is the lower level of maturity of the fi’ontal lobe in adolescents. Raine 
(1993) suggested that frontal lobe dysfimction might be of greater relevance to 
relatively milder forms of antisocial conduct in either juveniles or young adults.
An extensive study of frontal dysfunction reported by Moffitt (1988) 
using self-report measures of delinquency and a neuropsychological test battery 
on 750 13 years old normal male and female children in New Zealand showed 
that female antisocials might be more characterized by frontal dysfunction than 
males. The sex difference in the effect of frontal lobe dysfunction might be due 
to the suggestion that female antisocials required a stronger biological 
(neuropsychological) predisposition to antisocial behaviour for such behaviour 
to override socialization forces against the expression of such behaviour in 
females.
Frontal lobe dysfimction may also be of particular relevance to a 
subgroup of criminals having both schizotypal and psychopathic features
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(Raine, 1992). It was suggested that schizoid personality constitutes a 
syndrome which clearly represented the genetic relatedness between 
schizophrenia and psychopathy and which was in part determined by 
dysfimction of both orbitofrontal and dorsolateral areas of the frontal lobes, 
with orbitofi*ontal cortex contributing to the psychopathic-like personality 
features (Elliot, 1978) and dorsolateral prefi’ontal cortex contributing to the 
cognitive and social withdrawal features of schizotypal personality (Buchsbaum 
et al., 1990). Such was agreed by Hare (1984) who postulated that schizotypal 
psychopaths showed greater evidence of neurological impairment.
It is reasonable to suggest that specific groups of the offending 
population are more associated with their firontal lobe dysfimction. Some of the 
factors are sex difference, age effects and the manifestation of schizotypal 
features among offenders. It is important to scrutinize individual differences in 
determining and defining the relationship between frontal lobe dysfimction and 
criminality.
A related issue here is the problem of identifying who the criminal 
population are. Various methodologies have been employed including self- 
report, criminal records and psychiatric diagnosis. It is doubtful how these 
approaches agree with each other in defining criminality. The validity of such 
approaches is also questioned. Future research on the relationship between
28
brain pathology and criminal behaviour needs to address this issue in addition 
to the separate treatment of the specific groups of criminal population.
Predisposition theory
It is argued that fi'ontal lobe dysfimction leads to criminality is too 
speculative. The individual differences in the quality of functioning of different 
parts of the brain are still far fi*om clear; and criminality is a term yet to be 
qualified. Different types of offenders at different ages with different sexes have 
different implications on the nature and extent of fi'ontal lobe deficits found in 
an individual. It is suggested that frontal lobe dysfunction is best viewed as a 
predisposition to criminality rather than such dysfimction in and of itself, 
causing criminality.
The above suggestion can be illustrated by the predisposition model for 
the link between prefrontal dysfunction and violence postulated by Raine 
(1992). He suggested that (1) there are a number of pathways by which 
prefrontal dysfunction can contribute to violence; (2) the greater the prefrontal 
dysfimction, the greater the likelihood that several of these pathways will be 
activated; and (3) the more pathways that are activated, the greater the risk for 
serious violence. These pathways can be viewed at neurophysiological.
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neurobehavioural, personality, cognitive, and social levels. At a 
neurophysiological level, reduced prefrontal ftinctioning could result in a loss of 
inhibition normally exerted by the frontal cortex on phylogenetically older 
subcortical structures which are thought to play a role in facilitating aggression 
(Weiger & Bear, 1988). At a neurobehavioural level, damage to prefrontal 
cortex in clinical patients has been found to result in behavioural changes that 
include risk-taking, rule-breaking, emotional and aggressive outbursts, and 
argumentative behaviour, which in turn could predispose to more violent acts 
(Mesulam, 1986). At a personality level, frontal damage has been found to 
result in impulsivity, loss of self-control, immaturity, lack of tact, inability to 
modify and inhibit behaviour appropriately, and poor social judgment which 
could predispose to serious violence (Luria, 1980). At a cognitive level, poor 
concentration, divergent thinking, and reasoning ability could result in school 
failure, employment failure, and economic deprivation, thereby predisposing to 
a criminal way of life which in turn could predispose to violence. At a social 
level, the loss of intellectual flexibility, concept formation skills, problem­
solving skills, and reduced ability to use information provided by verbal cues 
resulting from prefrontal dysfimction (Kolb & Wishaw, 1990) could impair 
social skills essential for formulating non-aggressive solutions to fractious 
interpersonal encounters. Thus, while prefrontal function may be related to 
violence, it may be essentially a predisposition only, requiring other 
environmental, psychological, and social factors to enhance or diminish this
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biological predisposition. Such a heuristic standpoint helps to shed light on the 
relationship between frontal lobe damage and criminality.
Conclusion
There are studies from neuropsychology and brain imaging supportive 
of the relationship of frontal lobe dysfunction and criminal behaviour. 
However, there is a need to define more clearly the nature of a particular 
offender group when evidence for such a relationship is examined. Variables 
affecting the nature of the relationship include the maturity of the prefrontal 
cortex, sex difference, schizotypal personality disorder, use of violence, sexual 
deviance and age. It is fiirther argued that the predisposition model applies to 
clarifying the relationship between frontal lobe damage and criminality and that 
an individual is predisposed to criminal behaviour at different levels which 
include the neurophysiological, neurobehavioural, personality, cognitive and 
social levels. Finally, individual differences should receive greater attention in 
any future research on the quality of the relationship taking into consideration 
the person’s environmental as well as biological / genetic aspects.
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Introduction
Cognitive-behavioural therapy has become the focus of attention among 
clinical psychologists and other mental health professionals in Europe, North 
America, and many Asian countries. Such phenomenon can be attributed to the 
strong empirical appeal of the therapeutic approach, its unique contribution to 
the understanding of human fimctioning or dysfimctioning with high face 
validity, and the clarity and efficacy of its application to a wide variety of client 
groups. It is a proactive form of treatment which draws the advantages of both 
the directive and non-directive form of intervention. In other words, it sets out 
clear guidelines for a client to follow but at the same time upholds greatest 
respect to the person’s individuality and personal choice. It is suggested that 
the psychotherapy world is no longer what it was; today, it is cognitive theory 
that is the dominant paradigm, and cognitive-behavioural therapy the dominant 
psychotherapy (Warner, 1991).
This paper reviews the recent development and the success of the 
therapy in various settings. It also scrutinises its inadequacies in terms of its 
theoretical orientation, definition of terms, mechanisms of change, and ethical 
stance including its multicultural applications. Areas for improvements are also 
suggested.
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Recent development
Cognitive-behavioural therapy originates from Beck’s (1967) cognitive 
therapy. Since Beck (1963) argued that depression was a thinking disorder, the 
role of cognition in mental disorders and their treatment has attracted 
enormous attention from mental health professionals. Cognitive therapy has 
since then been developed based on the proposition that how one thinks 
determines how one feels and behaves. Since cognitive therapy incorporates 
many techniques used in behavioural therapy such as functional analysis applied 
to internal experiences and behavioural experiments, it is referred to as 
cognitive-behavioural therapy in lots of literature (e.g. Dyck, 1993), rendering 
the distinction between the two terms often unnecessary.
Three levels of cognition are recognised in various forms of disorders, 
namely, automatic thoughts, schemata, and cognitive distortions (Beck, 1967). 
Automatic thoughts are those readily available in one’s consciousness. They are 
“automatic” because they typically arise spontaneously, frequently are very 
fleeting, and may go unrecognised unless the person is directed to deliberately 
monitor them. Schemata are basic beliefs that one holds about herselfrhimself 
and about the world. They form the backbone of a person’s information 
processing and determine when and how to assimilate new information to a
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schema or to accommodate a schema to new information. Cognitive distortions 
or biases function between dysfunctional schemata and automatic thoughts and 
transform new information into the already biased schema before taking it into 
a person’s consciousness. Examples of such distortions are overgeneralisation, 
selective abstraction, personalisation, and catastrophization.
Cognitive-behavioural therapy upholds that maladaptive thoughts are 
testable hypotheses and they can be tested by behavioural experiments and 
verbal procedures (Beck & Weishaar, 1989). The focus of the therapy is on a 
person’s thought processes and the techniques are to shift one’s information 
processing and basic beliefs. Such techniques included collaborative 
empiricism, Socratic dialogue, and guided discovery.
To Beck (1993), cognitive therapy is best viewed as the application of 
the cognitive model of a particular disorder with the use of a variety of 
techniques designed to modify the dysfunctional beliefs and faulty information 
processing characteristic of each disorder. To fiirther conceptualise an 
individual’s cognitions and to fit such cognitive processes into the complex 
reciprocal interrelationships with the person’s feelings, behaviour, and resultant 
consequences, as well as with physiological and social-cultural processes, 
Meichenbaum (1993) considered three guiding metaphors to explain one’s 
thought processes: (1) Conditioning as a metaphor - an individual’s cognitions
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could be viewed as covert behaviours subject to the same “laws of learning” as 
are overt behaviours; (2) Information processing as a metaphor - an 
individual’s cognitions could be conceptualised as consisting of a number of 
processes, including decoding, encoding, retrieval, preattention and attention, 
attributional biases, and distorted mechanisms, the last in the form of cognitive 
errors; and (3) Constructing narratives as a metaphor - humans actively 
construct their personal realities and create their own representational models 
of the world.
Meichenbaum (1993) argued that it is not as if there is one reality and 
clients distort that reality, thus contributing to their problems; rather, there are 
multiple realities, and the task for the therapist is to help clients become aware 
of how they create these realities and of the consequences of such 
constructions. Thus, the process of collaborative empiricism, Socratic 
questioning, and guided discovery is also a process of experiencing and re­
constructions. The metaphor of a constructive narrative to explain clients’ 
problems has a number of important theoretical and practical implications for 
the development of cognitive-behavioural therapy: (1) The therapist is viewed 
as a co-constructivist helping clients to alter their stories; (2) The therapist 
helps clients to cognitively reframe stressful events and to “normalise” their 
reactions; (3) The therapist not only helps clients to break down global 
stressors into behaviourally prescriptive events so they can use problem-solving
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and emotionally palliative coping techniques, but also helps them build new 
assumptive worlds and new ways to view themselves and the world; and (4) 
One can look at therapeutic interventions in a different fashion, e.g., finding 
therapeutic suggestions fi’om the way that teachers teach narrative writings 
(Meichenbaum, 1993).
Meichenbaum’s proposition reflects the gradual shift among cognitive- 
behavioural therapists fi'om the rationalist perspective (that reality exists and 
that dysfunction is a reflection of the extent to which an individual’s current 
cognitive and behavioural fimctioning is inconsistent with that reality) to the 
constructivist perspective (in which it is assumed that objective reality can be 
represented in different ways, and that human dysfunction is a reflection of 
faulty adaptation to an interpersonal, contextual framework) (Mahoney, 1988; 
Dobson & Pusch, 1993). As a result, there is a rising need to focus upon either 
early development experience or social interventions to supplement the former 
focus within cognitive therapy on cognitive change as the primary pathway to 
patient change (Hollon et al., 1987). However, such shift remains largely 
implicit. Further attention is needed to address the impact of the shift on the 
clarity and credibility of the cognitive theory and on the empirical validation of 
the revised treatment approach.
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Does it work?
Psychologists are most concerned about whether cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (CBT) works. Research studies have generally yielded results in favour 
of the effectiveness of the approach. Dobson’s (1989) meta-analysis of 27 
studies on the treatment of depression involving 34 comparisons of cognitive 
therapy with either some other forms of treatment or a wait-list control found 
that cognitive therapy outperformed pharmacotherapy, behaviour therapy, and 
other psychotherapies. A combination of cognitive strategies and behavioural 
techniques has been proven effective in treating a wide variety of disorders 
including panic disorders (Clark et al., 1991) and personality disorder (Beck et 
al., 1990).
A substantial amount of research studies supported the effectiveness of 
CBT for generalised anxiety, panic disorder, and eating disorders, Butler, 
Fennell, Robson, and Gelder (1991) reported a controlled clinical trial of 57 
patients meeting criteria for generalised anxiety disorder and fiilfilling an 
additional severity criterion. Individual treatment of 12 sessions duration 
showed a clear advantage for CBT over behaviour therapy and a waiting-list 
control. There was no attrition from the CBT group, although patients were 
lost from the behaviour therapy. Sokol, Beck, Greenberg, Wright, and
46
Berchick (1989) conducted an uncontrolled study at the Centre for Cognitive 
Therapy in Philadelphia showed a complete cessation of panic attacks in all of 
the patients involved in the study. These gains were maintained at 1-year 
follow-up. Fairbum et al. (1991) reported that CBT with bulimia patients was 
more effective than both interpersonal psychotherapy and a simplified 
behavioural version of CBT, and Agras et al. (1992) found that a combination 
of maintenance imipramine and CBT produced better long-term results than 
imipramine alone, cognitive therapy alone, or placebo.
Beck et al. (1992) compared cognitive therapy with supportive 
psychotherapy based on Roger’s non-directive therapy in the treatment of panic 
disorder. The cognitive therapy was highly effective with 94% becoming panic- 
fi-ee, compared to 25% in the supportive therapy group. Patients in the latter 
group were offered cognitive therapy, which 94% elected to have, and at the 
one-year follow up 79% were panic free, compared to 87% in the original 
cognitive therapy group.
Beck (1993) fiirther argues that cognitive therapy is not effective only 
in the short-term relief from an emotional distress but also in the prevention of 
relapse. Hollon and Najavitis (1988) found that the relapse rate for cognitive 
therapy was about 30%, as compared with a relapse rate in excess of 60% for 
the pharmacotherapy group in the treatment of depression on one-year and
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two-year follow up. Ost and Westling (1995) reviewed some recent studies on 
the efficacy of the CBT on treating panic disorder and found that they yielded 
on the average 88% (range 85-94%) panic free patients after 12-15 sessions 
and the effects remained at follow-up 6-24 months later with a mean of 85% 
(range 83-87%) panic free.
Thackwray et al. (1993) compared behavioural and cognitive- 
behavioural interventions for bulimia nervosa and found, amount his female 
bulimic subjects, at 6-month follow-up, 69% of the cognitive-behavioural 
group, 38% of the behavioural group, and 15% of the non-specific self­
monitoring group were abstinent from binge eating and purging.
Nowadays, the horizon of CBT has been broadened (Dyck, 1993) to 
encompass areas like drug abuse, personality disorders, sexual deviance, 
marital problems, and even psychotic disorders. The therapy has developed 
both a comprehensive framework for understanding a range of psychological 
disorders and a collection of specific therapies for treating those disorders. It, 
among the most well-known psychotherapies, has sought first to define the 
idiosyncratic character of different disorders and then to adapt treatments to 
the defining characteristics of the disorders (Beck, 1993). However, as much as 
CBT has contributed to our knowledge of mental disorders and their treatment, 
the gaps in our knowledge remain large (Dyck, 1993).
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While it appears that the percentage of psychologists ascribing to the 
cognitive-behavioural perspective is going up (Norcross et al., 1989; Warner, 
1991), there is growing concern about the credibility of the approach’s 
superiority in therapeutic outcome and its theoretical problems (Dobson & 
Pusch, 1993; Dyck, 1993). In fact, the result of a recent meta-analytic review 
reported by Dobson et al. (1991) suggest that some of the early optimism 
regarding the clear superiority of cognitive therapy for treating depression has 
been brought into check. The review included all comparative outcome studies 
for depression to the end of 1990 which included Beck’s cognitive therapy as 
one of the treatment modalities. The results were tabulated across outcome 
measures and addressed both post-treatment and long-term efficacy. Based 
upon the Beck Depression Inventory effect size, the results indicate that 
cognitive therapy is more effective than behaviour therapy and wait-list control 
groups in treating depression, but no more effective than pharmacotherapy or 
combined cognitive-pharmacotherapy, at both post-treatment and follow-up. 
When the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression is used as the outcome 
measure, cognitive therapy demonstrates superiority over the wait-list control 
group only. Indeed, when one examines the effect sizes reported in the review 
as a fonction of the year of publication, it becomes apparent that the 
comparative effectiveness of cognitive therapy is gradually eroding and is
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characterised by a “sliding effect size” phenomenon (cf. Dobson & Pusch, 
1993).
A large scale study of the general effectiveness of treatments was 
reported by Elkin et al. (1989) which was part of the National Institute of 
Mental Health (NIMH) Treatment of Depression Collaborative Research 
Programme. One of the aims of the study was to examine the effectiveness of 
two specific forms of psychotherapy (CBT and interpersonal psychotherapy 
[IPT]) for treating nonbipolar, nonpsychotic depressed outpatients. Two 
hundred and fifty patients were randomly assigned to one of four 16-week 
treatment conditions: IPT, CBT, imipramine hydrochloride plus clinical 
management, and placebo plus clinical management (PLA-CM). Patients in all 
treatments showed significant reduction in depressive symptoms and 
improvement in functioning over the course of treatment. In analyses carried 
out on the total samples without regard to initial severity of illness, there was 
no evidence of greater effectiveness of one of the psychotherapies as compared 
with the other and no evidence that either of the psychotherapies was 
significantly less effective than the imipramine plus clinical management. 
Comparing each of the psychotherapies with the placebo plus clinical 
management condition, there was limited evidence of the specific effectiveness 
of IPT and none for CBT. The authors conducted secondary analyses on their 
data in which patients were dichotomized on initial level of severity of
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depressive symptoms and impairment of fimctioning and found that significant 
differences among treatments were present only for the subgroup of patients 
who were more severely depressed and functionally impaired. There was some 
evidence of the effectiveness o f IPT with these patients and strong evidence of 
the effectiveness of imipramine plus clinical management. In contrast, there was 
no significant differences among treatments for the less depressed and 
functionally impaired patients. It was suggested that CBT, though not very 
different from IPT in the more severely depressed patients, did not do well 
enough across the board, to demonstrate significant superiority to PLA-CM.
Nevertheless, the general lack of differences between the two 
psychotherapies, together with the good results for the PLA-CM condition may 
suggest some common factors in different types of psychologically mediated 
treatment (Frank, 1973). The cognitive theorists have yet to show that 
cognitive processes have an important role to play in those factors.
It seems that CBT has to take the above challenges seriously into 
consideration and to meet those challenges by reconstructing its theoretical 
conceptions such as the interactions between emotional, social and personality 
factors (such as autonomy Vs sociotropy), and the mechanisms by which other 
therapies produce similar end results. There is also a need to account for the
51
presence of non-respondents as well as the absence of a negative cognitive shift 
(i.e. the role of protective factors).
Limitations
The general optimism in the competence of CBT as both a theory for 
mental disorders and an effective treatment which the model has enjoyed for 
more than two decades is on a decline. CBT has to redefine its boundaries and 
some of its concepts which had no need to be elaborated in the past. Among 
the issues it has to address are:
1. Why does CBT sometimes fail?
The issue of how and why CBT is sometimes a failure despite its widely 
supported effectiveness has been raised. Treatment “success” has always been 
defined in relative rather than absolute terms; sometimes the success is defined 
by the degree of improvement in an individual case, and sometimes by the 
percentage of cases that improve with treatment; improvement is also defined 
relative to some control condition, whether the control is an individual baseline, 
a no-treatment control group, a placebo group, or some competing treatment 
group. Dyck (1993) argued that if we instead of making comparisons of this
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kind we evaluate treatment outcome against a more rigorous standard such as 
complete remission of symptoms or improvement in all cases, then we find that 
CBT is fi“equently an ineffective treatment.
One factor that is found to have undermined the effectiveness of CBT is 
the failure to assess the more negative thoughts, to deal with the more 
interpersonal difficulties, and to pay extra effort to mmntain the therapeutic 
relationship in “difficult” depressed patients (Hayes et al., 1992). The point is 
there is no a priori method of ascertaining who these “difficult” patients are. If 
we are unable to determine in advance whether a particular case vill respond to 
CBT, we remain ignorant of some key characteristics of the disorder in 
question.
CBT has been found to be less effective with people who are severely 
depressed and those with high level of cognitive dysfunction (Rude & Rehm, 
1991; Sotsky et al., 1991). Severe interpersonal disturbance such as chronic 
marital discord and family dysfunction (Coyne, 1990; Keitner et al., 1992) has 
also been found to be related to poorer outcome in CBT for depression. A 
poorer response to treatment for depression and a less favourable prognosis for 
long-term outcome were identified in coexisting personality disorders (Frank et 
al, 1987).
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In such cases, cognitive therapists may have failed to adequately modify 
the procedure they were implementing to make it specific to the unique 
combination of problems being treated. It may well be the failure of CBT to 
address the totality of a person’s actual problem.
2. Why are other treatment models equally effective?
CBT may also have difficulty in accounting for its success. Although 
cognitive theory has been most successful in the area of descriptive 
psychopathology, i.e. in identifying the cognitive symptoms of various mental 
disorders, its explanations, even on the familiar topic of depression, remain 
largely uncorroborated (Haaga et al., 1991). What has made CBT appealing in 
the first place may come to a stand still when another treatment (say behaviour 
therapy) for a given disorder is equally effective. The possibility is that some 
mechanism common to both treatment is responsible for their mutual treatment 
effects, whether or not that mechanism has been recognised by the proponents 
of either therapy system. In other words, the possibility exists that neither 
treatment is effective for the reasons given, but both are effective for some 
unknown reasons such as the therapist’s personal qualities.
An example of the above is a recent study conducted by Ost and 
Westling (1995) who compared the effectiveness of applied relaxation (AR)
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and CBT in the treatment of panic disorder. Thirty-eight patients with no or 
mild avoidance were treated individually for 12 weekly sessions. The results 
showed that both treatments yielded very large improvements, which were 
maintained, or furthered at follow-up. The proportion of panic-free patients 
were 65 and 74% at post-treatment, and 82 and 89% at follow-up, for AR and 
CBT, respectively. Two possibilities emerged: (1) any effective treatment for 
panic disorder, irrespective of its focus, works via a cognitive change; (2) non­
specific factors are responsible for the treatment results (unfortunately, the 
design of the above study did not include a no-treatment control group). The 
former challenges CBT as a unique treatment model contributing to any change 
in the disorder (i.e. changing the patient’s misinterpretations of bodily 
sensations (Clark, 1989) is not the only alternative in bringing about cognitive 
changes); and the latter questions the validity of the cognitive model.
Dyck (1992) argues that CBT is effective not because it is “cognitive”, 
but because it is “behavioural”. The suggestion is that cognitive techniques are 
effective because they incorporate the conditions necessary for shaping 
adaptive behaviours and for extinguishing maladaptive behaviours, whether 
those behaviours are ‘thinking behaviours” or more overt behaviours. Such 
position is endorsed by James (1993) who argues that mainstream cognitive 
and cognitive-behavioural theories are fundamentally flawed and should be 
discarded in favour of a behavioural explanation of the relationship between
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cognition and behaviour. It seems that cognitive-behavioural therapists are yet 
to demonstrate the mechanisms which actually make CBT as an unique 
approach more effective than other therapies.
3. Ambiguous conceptualisation of cognitive variables
Another criticism on CBT relates to the ambiguous conceptualisation of 
some important cognitive concepts. Successful operationalising and testing of 
cognitive etiologic models have so far been difficult. For instance, although 
Beck (1976) has stated that depressogenic and other schematic rules develop as 
a fonction of learning in concrete situations, he has not clearly defined the 
specific determinants of learning, nor what exactly it is that must have been 
learned for a person to become depressed or otherwise disturbed, nor the 
extent to which what has been learned must typify a person’s experience for the 
experience to be pathogenic.
Segal and Shaw (1988) comment that cognitive assessment appears to 
have become a more purely phenomenological assessment enterprise. In fact, 
difficulties in the ability to define and measure cognitive constructs have been 
recognised since the advent of cognitive-behavioural models (Meichenbaum & 
Cameron, 1981; Mischel, 1981). The problem becomes more prominent when 
the constructivist perspective is incorporated within cognitive therapy. Critics
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from behaviour therapy which is rooted in its scientific tradition hold the 
position that contemporary theories which make the assumption of cognitive 
primacy and which propose untestable models involving unobservable variables 
(such as the unverifiable self-representations of subjective internal states) can 
be seen as efforts to shore up an unsatisfactory paradigm (Lee, 1993). Lee 
(1993) argued that cognitive oriented theories are untenable as scientific 
theories because they do not provide unambiguous definitions of cognitive 
variables, there are no satisfactory methods for the measurement of the 
hypothesised variables, and the nature of the interactions among these variables 
are not specified. She further argued that the essential vagueness of cognitive 
means that one cannot make any firm prediction about the behavioural effects 
of any specific combination of the hypothesised cognitive variables.
Classical behavioural theory holds that cognitions may mediate 
behaviour but argues that they exercise a mediating influence on behaviour by 
way of their function as discriminative stimuli (James, 1993). In other words, 
cognitive events acquire discriminative-stimulus properties against a 
background of environment-behaviour interaction, eventually serving as rules 
that encode contingencies of reinforcement. It seems that the fiiture direction of 
CBT should aim at a better conceptualisation of schemata, self-representation, 
automatic thoughts, and other cognitive variables. Cognitive-behavioural 
therapists should also devise assessment tools with stringent requirements on
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their construct validity and scientific respectability in order to preserve the 
integrity of CBT as a credible therapy.
4. How are cognition and emotion related?
Up till now, the theoretical understanding of the cognition-emotion is 
undeveloped at best (Izard, 1993). Beck (1976) has argued that ‘the specific 
content of the interpretation of an event leads to a specific emotional response.’ 
He later shifted his position by suggesting that cognitions have priority only in 
terms of how we organise clinical data more generally (Haaga et al., 1991). 
Nevertheless, the predominant belief among cognitive-behavioural therapists is 
that causing a change in a person’s cognitions causes a change in that person’s 
emotions. Despite its success in treating emotional problems, there are 
questions that remain unanswered (Dyck, 1993): (1) What factors limit the 
causal relationship? (2) Are cognitions and emotions in fact part of the same 
system? And (3) Is the relation affected by individual differences in 
temperament?
In fact, the relation between emotions and cognitions has been a much- 
debated topic in the past two decades. The two main opposing positions in this 
debate are those of cognitively oriented emotion theorists, who hold that 
cognitions (cognitive appraisals) are necessary for emotions (e.g., Lazarus,
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1982, 1984, 1991), and those of noncognitive or “independent systems” 
theorists, who deny this claim and hold instead that cognitive appraisals and 
emotions are independent in principle (e.g., Zajonc, 1980, 1984; Zajonc et al., 
1989).
Zajonc (1984) holds the view that there are circumstances under which 
affect precedes cognition and that affective arousal that does not entail prior 
cognitive appraisal exists. He regards Lazarus’ (1982) challenge to his position 
of emotion being independent from cognition as based entirely on an arbitraiy 
definition of emotion that requires cognitive appraisals as a necessary 
precondition. He points out that Lazarus’ definitions of cognition includes 
forms of cognitive appraisal that cannot be observed, verified, or documented 
and that his proposition cannot be falsified. The view of an affective primacy 
and independence is proposed by Zajonc (1984) and is claimed to be derived 
from a series of findings and phenomena, including the existence of 
neuroanatomical structures allowing for independent affective process.
Lazarus (1984) defended his position by arguing that Zajonc (1984) is 
wrong about his epistemological position and wrong that the empirical 
evidence supports the primacy of emotion or its independence from cognition. 
He asserts that cognitive activity is a necessary precondition of emotion 
because to experience an emotion, people must comprehend - whether in the
59
form of a primitive evaluative perception or a highly differentiated symbolic 
process - that their well-being is implicated in a transaction, for better or worse. 
He postulates a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion and 
emphasises the process of obtaining meanings out of an adaptational encounter, 
especially meanings having to do with the personal significance for well-being 
of what is going on (which defines the concept of appraisal). The essence of 
such a cognitive approach is that emotion is largely a learned response, 
especially as regards meaning - that is, it is a response to changing or recurrent 
judgements about oneself in the world (Lazarus, 1991).
The major weakness of Lazarus’ position is Ws difficulty with defining 
what appraisal is (Reisenzein & Schonpflug, 1992). Lazarus and Smith (1988) 
concede that there is today a good deal of ‘confusion about what is meant by 
appraisal’ (p. 282). Part of the confusion concerns the nature of the evaluative 
appraisal components - Are all of these components just special types of belief 
(i.e., beliefs having evaluative contents), or is there at least one evaluative 
appraisal component essential to an emotion that is a mental state entirely 
different fi"om belief? (Reisenzein & Schonpflug, 1992). According to 
Reisenzein and Schonpflug (1992), the failure to consider seriously the 
necessity of distinguishing clearly between evaluations (the evaluative 
component being a mental state that is fundamentally different from beliefs) and 
(evaluative) beliefs may have been a major reason why many cognitively
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oriented emotion theorists found it necessary to postulate a nonappraisal 
component, such as perceived physiological arousal (e.g., Mandler, 1984), a 
felt action tendency (e.g., Arnold, 1970; Frijda, 1986), or centrally generated 
feelings of a Wundtian (1896) or Cannonian (1927) variety (e.g., Oatley & 
Johnson-Laird, 1987; Pekrun, 1988) as at least an additional indispensable 
component of emotion, resulting in “hybrid” theories of questionable validity. 
As a result, the reasoning of many emotion theorists that there must be 
something else to emotion other than just cognitive appraisals becomes 
plausible because it seems counterintuitive to think that emotions are just 
special types of beliefs (Frijda, 1986).
Reisenzein and Schonpflug (1992), basing their arguments on Stumpf s 
(1899) cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion, criticise contemporary cognitive 
emotion theories of constituting attempts to either reduce emotions to beliefs 
(e.g., Solomon, 1976) or to subsume all affective phenomena under emotions 
(e.g., Lazarus, 1982). It was suggested by Stumpf (1899) that (1) the mind 
does not just consist of intellectual representations (beliefs) and action 
tendencies, on the one hand, and raw feels, on the other hand, but that there are 
fiirther types of intentional states (emotions as representational mental states 
which are fundamentally different from beliefs) such as desires and wishes of 
various kinds, as well as approvals and disapprovals, and (2) that not all 
affective phenomena may turn out to be emotions on closer examination.
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The central issue in the cognition-emotion debate is the question of 
whether or not cognitions (cognitive appraisals) are necessary for emotions. 
Ambiguities still exist regarding the nature of cognitive appraisals and the types 
of necessity under discussion - it could either be (1) that of causal necessity - 
the only causal pathway to the elicitation of emotions in the intact organisms is 
through cognitive appraisals (Lazarus, 1982, 1984) Vs there were additional 
natural noncognitive pathways of emotion elicitation (Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc et 
al., 1989), or (2) that of definitional necessity - that cognitions belong to the 
defining features of emotions (i.e., emotions are fimctionally defined with 
regard to their cognitive causes) (Stumpf, 1899), and that appraisals are 
component parts of (e.g., Lazarus et al., 1980; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987) 
or are identical with (e.g., Solomon, 1976) emotions. Unless such ambiguities 
are resolved satisfactorily, CBT would still be based on an incomplete theory.
5. Limits to flexibility
Beck (1993) cited the potential of CBT to expand into a wide variety of 
mental disorder previously less explored by therapists including personality 
disorder (Beck et al., 1990; Turner, 1989; Williams, 1988) and thought 
disorders (Perris, 1989; Kingdom & Turkington, 1991; Halford, 1991). 
However, more work needs to be done at the theoretical level to strengthen the
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case for using cognitive-behavioural techniques with people with personality 
disorder and psychotic problems as cognitive theory is predicated upon the 
assumption that people are able to test reality accurately. Psychotic patients, 
for instance, have been shown to have significantly more impaired perspective 
than non-thought disordered patients, poorer perspective regarding their own 
verbalisations, and less likelihood of viewing their bizarre verbalisations as 
stronger than their non-bizarre verbalisations (Harrow et al., 1989). The 
cognitive theory may have to be altered to incorporate the notion of trust in 
this particular instance. While it is not surprising that cognitive therapy requires 
adaptation when working with different forms of dysfunction, the reciprocal 
impact of those modifications on conceptual models is even more difficult to 
gauge (Dobson & Pusch, 1993). The application of cognitive therapy to 
psychotic conditions and other “recent extensions” suffers fi*om a lack of 
empirical validation and theoretical reconstruction. More outcome data are 
clearly needed. Dobson and Pusch (1993) opine that the optimism of cognitive 
theorists and therapists may need to be tampered by the empirical outcome 
literature and recommend continued research on outcomes and cognitive 
therapy processes.
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6. Risk of integration
Beck (1991, 1993) recently nominates cognitive therapy as the 
integrative therapy and views cognitive change as a common factor operating 
across effective treatments. He asserts that the cognitive model can be used as 
the framework for the selection of techniques from a variety of other 
psychotherapies. In fact, CBT has begun to address issues that have received 
greater emphasis in other orientations, such as defensive processes, the 
therapeutic relationship, affective arousal, and early experiences (Robins & 
Hayes, 1993). There have been attempts to integrate cognitive and gestalt 
approaches, and cognitive and interpersonal perspectives on human dysfunction 
and treatment (Safran & Segal, 1990). It is predicted that CBT will incorporate 
theoretical concepts and techniques from other approaches to enhance its 
therapeutic flexibility and clinical competence. However, Dobson and Pusch 
(1993) argue that integration of this kind can be premature because the field 
does not have a clear understanding of the causal change processes with a 
realistic position; and expressed concern about the consequences that theory 
will be unable to keep pace with practice. There is a need to identify the active 
ingredients of CBT, mechanisms of change in the patient, and the interaction of 
therapy components and patient variables before such integration can become 
fiuitfiil.
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7. Cultural considerations
In recent updates on the states of cognitive therapy (Beck, 1993), 
rational-emotive therapy (Ellis, 1993), and cognitive-behaviour modification 
(Meichenbaum, 1993), Hays (1995) found no recognition of the need for 
special attention to ethnic, racial, or other cultural minority groups. She fiirther 
argued that there exist subtle biases in CBT towards values supported by the 
status quo. For instance, although CBT’s emphasis on self-control fits with the 
Euro-American value of personal autonomy and may even be seen as 
empowering, it can also imply placing blame on the individual for problems that 
are primarily a result of unjust societal conditions (Ivey et al., 1993). 
Kantrowitz and Ballou (1992) suggest that a cognitive-behavioural orientation 
reinforces a view of the world and a way of interacting that are stereotypically 
Euro-American and Masculine. For example, assertiveness is a personal quality 
which is highly valued in Western culture and the mechanism of change in 
CBT. However, it is an alien concept in Chinese culture which upholds the 
virtue of harmonious relationships and places less value on personal 
independence. The culturally responsive practice of CBT demands that the 
client’s values be recognised and respected and problems must be defined in 
relation to the client’s cultural norms (Tanaka-Matsumi & Higginbotham, 
1989).
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Stevenson and Renard (1993) perceive a holistic perspective as 
including the consideration of cultural-specific strengths and coping strategies. 
It is important that CBT should become more attentive to cultural influences 
and minority groups and encourage the recognition of an even more diverse 
range of helping strategies.
The need to consider the implication of cultural elements on cognitive 
theories was further elaborated by Kleinman and Good (1985) and Becker and 
Kleinman (1991) in their study of depression. According to Jenkins, Kleinman 
and Good (1991), models of depression based on studies of patients in Western 
psychiatric settings cannot be unquestioningly generalised to non-Westem 
societies. They argue for an approach to emotion as an essentially cultural 
integration of bodily experience and communication and postulate that culture 
is of profound importance to the experience of depression, the construction of 
meaning and social response to depressive illness within families and 
communities, the course and outcome of the disorder, and thus to the very 
constitution of depressive illness.
Kleinman and Good (1985) regard dysphoria - sadness, hopelessness, 
unhappiness, lack of pleasure with the things of the world and with social 
relationships - as having dramatically different meaning and form of expression 
in different societies. For instance, the suffering of individuals appears against
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the background of cultural images of suffering. While suffering is a permanent 
positively valued feature of cosmology in Buddhist cultures (Obeyesekere 
(1985), Jenkins (1988) show that suffering is associated with a culturally 
profound sense of tragedy in Latin American cultures.
Jenkins, Kleinman and Good (1991) refer to one of the difficulties in 
cross-cultural research on depression as the problem of narrative context. 
Kleinman (1988) argues that peoples express symptoms differently across 
cultures. Referring to their research project conducted in the Department of 
Psychiatry at the Hunan Medical College in China interviewing 100 patients 
who carried the diagnosis of neurasthenia as outpatients, Kleinman and 
Kleinman (1985) were intrigued by the fact that neurasthenia - a diagnosis 
invented in North America and popular in the first third of this century 
throughout the West but now no longer officially sanctioned or used in the 
United States and also much less fi*equently encountered in Western Europe - 
was the most common psychiatric outpatient diagnosis for neurotic disorders in 
China, whereas depressive disorder - the most frequent psychiatric outpatient 
diagnosis in the West and indeed one of the leading diagnoses in primary care 
in the United States - was, at the time of their study, hardly diagnosed at all in 
China. They suggest that neurasthenia and depression could be understood as 
distinctive cultural construals of the same psychobiological state in which 
Chinese and American cultural values influenced both lay and professional
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constructions of distress (the former is a socially suitable and culturally 
approved diagnostic category in Chinese society). They explain that the core 
principles of the Chinese cultural tradition centre on the harmonising of 
interpersonal relations, the sociocentric orientation of the sel£ and for these 
reasons the constitution of affect as moral position in a social field of reciprocal 
behaviour. Denial of dysphoria is also of course a mental and safe position to 
hold in an ideological context in which depression signifies potentially 
dangerous political implications: disaffiliation, alienation, potential opposition.
In fact, Geertz (1984) found that individuals with a more sociocentric 
sense of self are considered to be more relationally identified with others than 
are individuals with a more egocentric sense of self, who view themselves as 
more or less unique, separate persons; and the former have often been 
associated with non-Westem cultural tradition, the latter with more 
industrialised nations.
According to Kleinman and Good (1985), Beck’s cognitive theory 
offers an unfijlfilled cultural analysis of depression. The cognitive 
psychotherapists have argued that cognition and discourse are central to any 
understanding of depression, and that the depressed make mistaken or 
abnormal judgements about characteristics of their environment and 
themselves. Kleinman and Good (1985) argue that, given the extent of the
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cultural patterning of cognition, we would expect disorders of interpretation 
would take distinctive forms in various cultures,
Beeman (1985) further challenges Beck’s view that depression arises 
from an individual’s social and communicative patterns as if they were 
“objects” isolated from the reality of everyday life - cognitions and cognitive 
schemas somehow possessed by the individual like a tumour or cyst, and 
discards the view as an erroneous conceptualisation. According to him, the 
borderland between cognitive psychiatry and anthropology illustrates the 
importance of cross-cultural investigations to determine which of the “logical 
mistakes” central to the discourse and cognition of the depressed (as identified 
by Beck) are universal, which are specific to the Western culture, and whether 
alternative “mistakes” (pathologies of interpretation) may be characteristic of 
the culture-specific discourse of the depressed of other countries. He criticises 
the failure of cognitive therapists to recognise the interactive context of 
discourse and even suggests that Beck does not appear to deal with the 
question of the genesis of depression. He argues that the social context of 
depression seems to be an inordinately important factor in determining the basic 
nature of depression itself, and by extension, means for its permanent cure. In 
face of the above criticisms, cultural consideration needs to be an important 
agenda in any future development of CBT.
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In sum, CBT has been criticised in terms of its efficacy as a treatment 
model, its distinction from other models such as behaviour therapy, its validity 
as a theory in explaining human behaviour, its ambiguous concepts, its 
theoretical stance concerning the nature of relationship between cognitions and 
emotions, the risk of its rapid expansion, and its lack of cultural considerations. 
The future development of CBT must rethink its position and subject itself to 
stringent empirical and theoretical scrutiny in order to retain its attractiveness 
and competence as a preferable treatment approach.
Conclusion
CBT is a treatment approach that “arrived” at a pivotal point in the 
history of psychotherapy, that had early treatment success, and that had the 
conceptual flexibility to permit adaptation of the basic theoretical and practical 
principles to allow expansion beyond its first focal topic areas (Dobson & 
Pusch, 1993). This paper has outlined the development of CBT and the 
empirical validation of its treatment efficacy. The model was criticised on (1) 
failure to account for its treatment inefficacy; (2) failure to explain why other 
treatment models are equally effective; (3) ambiguous conceptualisation of 
cognitive variables; (4) lack of theoretical understanding of the cognition-
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emotion relation; (5) limits to the conceptual flexibility of cognitive theory; (6) 
therapeutic integration; and (7) multicultural applications of CBT.
The recent development of CBT appear to be well ahead of the needed 
research to support these developments (Dobson & Pusch, 1993) and the shift 
in the theoretical underpinnings of cognitive therapy away from a realistic 
position and towards a constructivist position (Mahoney, 1990) may bear the 
risk of empirical and scientific confiision. Process and outcome research is 
called for to justify its present theoretical position and to render empirical 
support to its treatment efficacy.
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Introduction
Empirically little has been studied on delusional beliefs despite the 
presence of a rich literature oil social and cognitive mechanisms responsible for 
normal beliefs and attitudes (Oltmanns & Maher, 1988). Two reasons were 
given to account for such neglect. First, there is a long-held preference for 
investigating broadly defined syndromes, such as schizophrenia, encompassing 
many symptoms among psychopathologists (Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 
1994). Second, the definitional problem of a delusional belief has not been 
resolved (e.g., Garety, 1985). According to Garety (1985), although some 
recurrent themes have emerged from attempts to define a delusional behef, a 
concise and universally accepted definition has not been forthcoming. Efforts 
are being made to challenge the widely held conviction that the delusions of 
psychotic patients are determined by qualitatively different processes from 
those responsible for the kinds of beliefs held by ordinary people. The present 
paper attempts to review such challenges (e.g., Chadwick & Lowe, 1990; 
Chadwick & Lowe, 1994; Bentall et al., 1994; Alford & Beck, 1994) and to 
discuss the impact of such change of perspective on delusions on their 
assessment and treatment.
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Definitions of delusions - a traditional approach
Garety and Hemsley (1994) held the view that the pervasive definitions 
of delusion derive from the work of the German phenomenologists of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most importantly among them Jaspers 
(1913). According to Jaspers (1913), delusions are characteristically (1) held 
with extraordinary conviction, with an incomparable subjective certainty; (2) 
maintained imperiously to other experiences and compelling counter­
arguments; (3) their content is impossible; and (4) underlying all delusional 
judgements is a transformed experience of reality. He distinguished between 
over-valued or delusion-like ideas, which arise from the individual’s 
personality, mood or circumstances, and primary delusions, which are 
‘understandable’ and which were said to arise from fimdamental changes in 
personahty and the perception of meaning (c.f. Walker, 1991). Garety and 
Hemsley (1994) regarded • that such distinction between “primary” and 
“secondary” delusions has been extremely influential in psychiatry, although it 
continues to lack an empirical basis.
A brief examination on some modem textbooks of psychiatry lends 
some support to Garety and Hemsley’s (1994) claim. Mullen (1979), in 
Essentials of Post-graduate Psychiatry, wrote about delusion as an abnormal
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belief. According to him, delusions arise from disturbed judgements in which 
the experience of reality becomes a source of new and false meanings. He also 
stated that delusions usually have attributed to them the following 
characteristics: (1) They are held with absolute conviction; (2) they are 
experienced as self-evident truths usually of great personal significance; (3) 
they are not amenable to reason or modifiable by experience; (4) their content 
is often fantastic or at best inherently unlikely; and (5) the beliefs are not shared 
by those of a common social or cultural background.
Gelder, Gath and Mayou (1989), in Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry, 
took a similar stance and defined a delusion as a belief that is firmly held on 
inadequate grounds, is not affected by rational argument or evidence to the 
contrary, and is not a conventional belief such that the person might be 
expected to hold given his educational and cultural background. They regarded 
such belief as not arrived at through normal processes of logical thinking.
Both of the above views seem to be endorsing the Jasperian distinction 
between primary and secondary delusions in terms of the criterion of being 
understandable. Definitions in diagnostic systems also assume a dichotomy 
between delusions and normal beliefs. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 
Third Edition - Revised (DSM3II-R, American Psychiatric Association, 1987) 
asserts, ‘Delusion is a false belief based on incorrect inference about external
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reality and firmly sustained in spite of what almost everyone else believes and in 
spite of what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the 
person’s subculture.’
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition (DSMIV, 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) defines delusions as erroneous beliefs 
that usually involve a misinterpretation of perceptions or experiences. Both 
manuals emphasise the falsity of a delusional belief and abnormal reasoning 
which render the quality of delusions different fi’om normal behefs. Garety and 
Hemsley (1994) found that the Present State Examination (Wing et al., 1974), 
unlike the diagnostic and statistical manuals, allows for fiill delusions and 
“partial delusions”, which while definitely present, are expressed with doubt, 
and also preserves the tradition of a primary / secondary distinction.
Winter and Neale (1983) argued that the distinction between primary 
and secondary delusions is neither reliable, nor of any proven diagnostic 
significance. Mullen’s (1979) and Gelder, Gath and Mayou’s (1989) definitions 
encounter a number of difficulties. First, there is evidence (e.g., Strauss, 1969) 
that many delusions do not show absolute conviction. Second, while delusions 
are said to be “not affected by rational argument”, criteria are not laid down for 
assessing this: should the interview present compelling counter-arguments, and
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in such a context, what counts as “compelhng” (Garety & Hemsley, 1994)? 
Recent research on the modification of delusional beliefs using cognitive 
approaches (e.g., Chadwick & Lowe, 1994) posed serious challenge to the 
above views. Third, the assessment of the “fantastic” or “bizarre” or 
“unconventional” nature of the content of a delusional belief presents problems. 
Some studies have failed to achieve satisfactory inter-rater reliability only on 
ratings of bizarreness (Kendler et al., 1983; Junginger et al., 1992).
Problems with falsity and deviance of delusional beliefs which are 
defining conditions in both DSMHI-R and DSMIV were discussed by Moor 
and Tucker (1979). They argued that false beliefs are common, and if having a 
false belief were a sufficient condition for having a delusion, then many, if not 
most, people would be delusional. Spitzer (1990) suggested that some 
delusional statements, while they do make truth claims, are unfalsifiable in 
practice. Moreover, it has long been recognised that certain delusions may be 
true, whether coincidentally or as a consequence of the delusion itself: 
delusions of jealousy may fall into this category.
In fact, the criteria adopted in the DSMHI-R definition have been 
disputed individually: a delusion need not be false (Brockington, 1991); it need 
not be held with absolute or unshakeable conviction (Brett-Jones, Garety, & 
Hemsley, 1987; Watts, Powell, & Austin, 1973); and it need not be based on
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incorrect inference (Garety, 1991). Assumptions on the dichotomy between 
delusions and normal beliefs have rendered delusions being defined on the basis 
of empirical claims of discontinuity. Such assumption have been challenged by 
a radical and exciting call to define delusions as points on a continuum with 
normality, the position on this continuum being influenced by dimensions of 
delusional experience such as degree of belief conviction and the extent of 
preoccupation with the behef (Strauss, 1969).
A changed perspective
In response to Jaspers’ (1913) absolutist position regarding the 
distinctiveness of delusions from normal beliefs, Strauss (1969) argued that 
delusions (and hallucinations) are not discrete and discontinuous, and that they 
may be better (and more accurately) conceptualised as points on a continuous 
distribution fi*om the normal to the pathological. He reported that interviews 
with 119 patients yielded about one-half as many questionable delusions as 
definite ones even when using the Present State Examination categorisation, 
which allowed for partial delusions. He further proposed that symptoms should 
be described and rated in terms of the extent of deviation from normal 
functioning along a variety of dimensions.
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Thus, Strauss (1969) has offered a new promising approach to defining 
(and indeed to measuring) delusional beliefs by treating them as points on a 
continuum with normal functioning, with position on this continuum being 
determined by factors (or dimensions) such as the client’s degree of belief 
conviction and the amount of time spent preoccupied with the belief There was 
thus a shift of emphasis away from defining a delusion according to whether the 
conviction was absolute, the belief unmodifiable, and so forth (Chadwick & 
Lowe, 1994).
There is increasing support for a multidimensional view of delusions. 
Kendler, Glazer and Morgenstem (1983), who designed and implemented a 
scale to measure five aspects of delusional thinking, including conviction and 
preoccupation, and found that for 52 delusional clients, no two dimensions 
correlated highly. Garety (1985) and Brett-Jones, Garety and Hemsley (1987), 
who pioneered a reliable methodology for measuring different aspects of 
delusional thought over time, found no consistent pattern of change among the 
different dimensions.
Hence, there is a growing preference for a dimensional view in which 
delusions are not viewed as discrete and discontinuous with normal beliefs, but 
as sharing characteristics with the latter, so that for any given dimension (belief 
strength, preoccupation, systématisation, etc.), a delusion may be placed at any
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point along the continuum. Many delusions will, it is predicted, lie at extreme 
points on some, but not all, identified continua (Garety & Hemsley, 1994).
Another major thought that has changed the traditional view on 
delusions is Maher’s (1974; 1988) preposition that a delusion can be regarded 
as a normal attempt to make sense of an abnormal perceptual experience. In 
other words, delusions are rational theories formed to explain abnormal or 
unusual experiences (Maher, 1988). He argued that the reasoning processing 
that produces delusions does not differ from that which produces so-called 
“normal” behefs; it is just that bizarre perceptions demand bizarre explanations.
An important theme in the literature on delusions is their irrationality. 
For many, the hallmark of delusions is “incorrigibility”, being “not amenable to 
reason”. The significance of Maher’s argument lies in the fact that it gives 
reason to suppose that there are common processes involved in the formation 
and maintenance of delusional and normal beliefs alike (e.g., Garety & 
Hemsley, 1994) and that at least some delusions are open to modification (e.g., 
Chadwick & Lowe, 1994).
The changing perspectives triggered by Strauss’ (1969) position on 
delusions being points on a continuum with normal beliefs and Maher’s (1988) 
argument on the rationality of a delusion that The cognitive processes whereby
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delusions are formed differ in no important respect from those by which non- 
delusional beliefs are formed” (pp 20) have posed a serious threat to the 
complacency of the traditional definition on the area enjoyed by most medical 
professionals and psychologists for many years. While such changes have 
promised a better understanding of the phenomenon and given directions for 
better treatments of it along theories on cognitive processing, views regarding 
the nature and formulations of delusions among modem theorists remain 
discrepant.
Recent formulations
Chadwick and Lowe (1990; 1994) developed a cognitive approach to 
measuring and modifying delusions and employed structured verbal challenge 
and reality testing as their interventions. Significant changes in their subjects 
(n=12) were noted on their level of belief conviction, preoccupation, and 
anxiety at the end of the treatment and at one-month follow-up. They based 
their theoretical perspective on delusions on (1) the literature on verbal self­
regulation which was derived from Vygotsky’s (1962) account and some recent 
research on the role of language in the regulation of behaviour; and (2) Maher’s 
(1974; 1988) work on delusional beliefs. A paradigm case quoted from Maher 
would be delusion that was secondary to auditory hallucinations, the argument
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here being that the hallucinations puzzled and perhaps distressed the individual 
concerned, and so he or she searches for a meaningfiil explanation of them. The 
delusion would arise from this effort after meaning, and would be invested with 
the psychological force of having rid the individual of the sense of 
bewilderment (see Chadwick & Lowe,1994).
Chadwick and Lowe’s (1994) position advocates that delusions, like 
other beliefs, alter our relation to the environment because they organise and 
structure future experience. Recognising Maher’s theory - i.e. that in delusions 
the primary underlying motivation is attributional, and that they may be thought 
of as an attempt to make sense of particular events, and its agreement vrith the 
writing of Vygotsky (1962) and Luria (1961) who charted the developmental 
process by which language gradually acquires and drive behaviour, Chadwick 
and Lowe (1994) claimed that it has been their integral part of their approach 
to challenging delusions that the person be encouraged to construe his or her 
delusion as a reaction to, and attempt to make sense of, particular events, and 
that an alternative perspective from which to understand these events be 
supplied and evaluated.
However, Maher’s contention that delusions reflect rational attempts to 
make sense of anomalous experiences, and that the reasoning processes of 
deluded patients are normal has been challenged by some cognitive theorists
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(e.g., Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994). Garety (1991) suggested that 
people with delusions appear to show bias in their attributional style, in their 
judgement of covariance, and in their probabilistic reasoning. It is also argued 
that although anomalous perceptions do seem to play a role in some delusional 
states, particularly delusional misidentifications (Ellis & Young, 1990), it is 
clear that delusions can occur in the absence of perceptual abnormalities and 
that perceptual abnormalities do not necessarily lead to delusional beliefs 
(Chapman & Chapman, 1988).
In line with Strauss’ (1969) preposition that the delusions of psychiatric 
patients can be regarded as existing on a continuum which runs from the 
ordinary beliefs of daily living through to the bizarre and impossible beliefs of 
the most disturbed patients, Bentall and colleagues (1994) stated that the social 
and cognitive processes involved in normal belief acquisition and maintenance 
might be fruitfully investigated in psychotic patients in terms of their content- 
specific information processing biases.
Bentall and Kaney’s (1989) and Kaney, Wolfenden, Dewey and 
BentaU’s (1992) studies of the attentional biases (Oilman & Krasner, 1969) of 
the deluded, depressed, and normal subjects using an emotional stroop task and 
recall of stories with threatening themes respectively yielded results suggestive 
of a similar pattern of information biases between deluded and depressed
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patients. However, whereas the schemas underlying the biases in depressed 
patients concern negatively toned material, those underlying the biases of 
deluded patients also concern material relating to personal threat. In a study of 
attributional processes in patients, Kaney and Bentall (1989) found that their 
deluded subjects made excessively external attributions for negative events and 
excessively internal attributions for positive events, whereas their depressed 
subjects made attributions in opposite way. Caudido and Romney (1990) 
replicated the results and found that depressed paranoids did not differ from 
non-depressed paranoids on attributions for negative events, although they 
were less inclined to make extreme internal attributions for positive events.
In a study of deluded subjects’ reasoning, Bentall, Kaney and Dewey
(1991) discovered that deluded subjects tended to be excessively confident 
about their social judgements when compared with normal controls, and, in 
comparison, depressed subjects tended to be relatively lacking in confidence. 
Kaney and Bentall (1992) investigated contingency judgements in deluded 
subjects by exposing three groups of subjects (deluded, depressed and normal) 
to two computer games which were pre-programmed so that, irrespective of 
the subjects’ responses, they tended to win points on one game and lose points 
on the other. They found that depressed subjects were sadder but wiser (Alloy 
& Abramson, 1979) - claiming little control in either condition. The normal 
subjects, on the other hand, showed a self-serving bias, claiming little control in
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the lose condition but substantial control in the win condition. The self-serving 
bias was significantly more evident in the deluded subjects in comparison with 
normals.
Bentall (1994) suggested that persecutory delusions reflect an 
exaggeration of cognitive biases observed in normal individuals, particularly in 
response to threat. Bentall and colleagues (1994) fiirther argued that the 
tendency to attribute the cause of negative events to external factors which is 
believed to maintain self-esteem through the abrogation of responsibility 
(Taylor, 1988) is significantly more marked in people with persecutory 
delusions, and that such delusions can be seen as an extreme method of 
maintaining self-esteem. Their hypothesis is also supportive of Zigler and 
Click’s (1988) claim that paranoid is a form of camouflaged depression.
Based on a model of self outlined by Higgins (1987) which directly 
addresses the interactions of different domains of the self-concept, Bentall and 
colleagues (1994) hypothesised that, whereas depression is characterised by a 
gulf between self-perceptions and self-ideals, persecutory ideation can be 
thought of as resulting from the struggle to reduce this gulf to a minimum. On 
this view, when self-ideal discrepancies are activated by negative life events or 
stimuli, deluded patients actively minimise perceived differences between the 
actual-self and the ideal self at the expense of perceiving others as having a
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negative view of themselves. They further argued that the extreme self-serving 
attributional biases of deluded people reflect and maintain this cognitive 
organisation which were supported by studies on the comparison of deluded 
subjects’ responses on the Pragmatic Inference Task (PIT) (Winters & Neale, 
1985) and the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) (Peterson et al, 1982) 
(e.g., Kinderman et al, 1992) - when required to make implicit explanatory 
judgements on the PIT, deluded subjects tended to blame themselves for 
negative outcomes, but when required to make explicit attributions for blame 
via their responses on the ASQ, they tended to blame others and not 
themselves for negative outcomes.
Bentall et al.’s (1994) contention that persecutory delusions are 
associated with cognitive biases has received support from Garety and Hemsley 
(1994) who hypothesised that a deficit in reasoning is one causal factor in 
delusion formulation. They took the view of Chapman and Chapman (1988) 
that although the theory of delusions as accounts for anomalous experience is 
plausible, it is becoming clear that abnormal experience is not a sufficient 
condition, and may not even be necessary. They asserted,
‘The accumulating evidence for a judgmental bias in some 
deluded subjects also cast doubt on the determinant role of 
abnormal perception in all cases of delusion formation. Some
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deluded subjects are excessively influenced by current 
information, and make less use of past learned regularities in 
making inferences. They “jump” to perceptions and to 
conclusions and express high conviction about their 
judgements.’ (pp. 127)
According to Hemsley (1993), models of normal cognition accept that 
perception is dependent on an interaction between the presented stimuli and 
stored memories of regularities in previous input. The latter result in 
“expectancies” or “response biases” (c.f. Broadbent, 1971). As Fleminger
(1992) has emphasised, abnormal beliefs, once formed, generate expectancies 
which may result in further misperceptions. He suggested that such 
misperceptions will be less likely when there are “strong links between sense 
data and memory.”
Bayesian inference (Fishchoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983), which provides 
a general framework for evaluating beliefs in the normal population, has been 
adopted in exploring the reasoning style of deluded subjects (e.g., Hemsley & 
Garety, 1986; Garety & Hemsley, 1994). Employing a probability inference 
task, two studies have demonstrated that deluded subjects require less 
information before reaching a decision (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988; 
Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991). The second of these also indicated that
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after certainty is reached, deluded subjects are more likely to make a dramatic 
change in probability estimate following an item of disconfirmatory 
information. This is consistent with those models of schizophrenia which 
emphasise greater influence of immediate environmental stimuli compared with 
the effects of prior learning (Hemsley, 1987).
Taken together, the above arguments and empirical findings suggest an 
abnormal reasoning style in some deluded subjects in addition to well 
established perceptual disturbances. Thus, there has been a move away fi’om 
Maher’s (1988) view of delusions as essentially a product of normal reasoning, 
serving as explanations which the deluded individual uses to account for 
abnormal perceptual experiences.
In defending Maher’s position, Chadwick and Lowe (1994) raised two 
issues. First, although under certain experimental conditions people with 
delusions appear to show biases in their attributional style, in their judgement 
of covariance, and in their probabihstic reasoning, it is sometimes difficult to 
interpret such findings vis-à-vis rationality. They argued that deluded subjects 
in the Huq, Garety and Hemsley’s (1988) study using a probability inference 
task actually showed “jumping to conclusions” which was nearer optimum 
reasoning than the caution displayed by other subjects. They also argued that it 
is not always clear how specific findings in analogue studies might apply to
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delusional thinking. For instance, how might it be estabhshed if delusions are 
formed on the basis of less information than, say, religious beliefs or depressive 
beliefs? Second, they argued that the evidence is for bias, not deficit; it might 
reasonably be informed that the observed bias is a consequence of delusional 
behaviour, rather than the delusion being a consequence of the bias.
Chadwick and Lowe (1994) cautioned that debate about the rationality 
of delusions runs the risk of obscuring the main value in Maher’s theory - that 
is, that in delusions the primary underlying motivation is attributional and that 
they may be thought of as an attempt to make sense of particular events. 
Viewing delusions in this way has some interesting implications. One is that 
although delusions may not be culturally shared, they are grounded in external 
events. In an important sense the person, not a hidden pathology, constructs 
the belief. A related implication, which was shown by Chadwick and Lowe 
(1994) in their study of using verbal challenge to change their subjects’ 
delusion, is that people can presumably describe some, or perhaps all, the 
experience (“evidence”) their delusions were invoked to explain, and their 
account might shed light on the process of delusion formation.
It is emphasised by Chadwick and Lowe (1994) that a belief regulatory 
potency does not hinge on its accuracy, nor on the degree to which it is the 
result of reason, nor on its adaptive value. In fact, general studies of human
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learning (e.g., Lowe, 1979; Lowe, 1983; Home & Lowe, 1993)) have shown 
that the mles people form about contingencies of reinforcement are often not 
based on correct inference and do not produce optimum responding, yet they 
exercise a unique control over behaviour and are extremely resistant to change.
Chadwick and Lowe (1994) also challenged Zigler and Click’s (1988) 
defended depression theory by showing an observed connection between a 
weakening of paranoid delusions and a reduction in Beck Depression Inventory 
scores. They found that their subjects whose paranoid delusions were 
weakened by their cognitive interventions reported lower depression scores at 
the close of therapy and for six months there after. They, based on such 
evidence, suggested that, in that short-term at least, the weakening of paranoid 
thinking does not precipitate either increased depression or, it might be 
inferred, low self-esteem. Thus, such proposition casts doubt on Bentall et.al.’s 
(1994) argument that persecutory delusions (and perhaps other delusions as 
well) are associated with cognitive biases, which serve the function of 
protecting the individual against feelings of low self-esteem.
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Conclusion
The role of abnormal reasoning in delusional beliefs would probably 
stimulate further debate among modem theorists who are interested in the 
formation and maintenance of delusions. There may be an intriguing association 
between deficits in reasoning in terms of cognitive biases and perceptual 
anomalies - for instance, could both possibly result from a common cause? 
Certainly, further research is needed to unveil the mechanisms behind the 
“nonfortuitous coincidences” (Arieti, 1974) perceived by deluded people. What 
has been supported at the present stage of knowledge is that delusions are 
dimensional (Garety & Hemsley, 1994) rather than all-or-nothing and they are 
multidimensional (Kendler, Glazer, & Morgenstem, 1983) rather than simply 
expressed or measured in terms of conviction (e.g., preoccupation, subjective 
distress or low self-esteem may also be included as outcome measures when 
change in delusions is being assessed). It has also been agreed that delusions 
exist on a continuum which mns from the ordinary beliefs of daily living 
through to the bizarre and impossible beliefs of the most disturbed patients 
(Strauss, 1969).
The various models reviewed in this paper are largely descriptive in the 
sense that they formulate the key characteristics of delusions in terms of well-
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understood psychological mechanisms. However, they are yet to acquire the 
explanatory power which leads to predictions about the performance of 
deluded subjects on experimental tests and points to possible aetiological 
pathways to delusional thoughts.
Neurological specificity has been found to play a crucial role in the 
emergence of psychotic symptoms (e.g., Schmajuk & Thierre, 1992). In the 
case of delusions, neuropsychological abnormalities may limit the kind of 
information which can be processed by the individual. For instance, Ellis and 
Young (1990) argued that delusional misidentifications, such as the Capgras 
syndrome, may reflect neurological deficits affecting systems involved in facial 
recognition, although these authors have also acknowledged that cognitive 
biases may be additionally necessary for the development of these kinds of 
delusions (Young, 1992). Sackheim (1986) even speculated that damage to the 
right hemisphere of the brain may result in the disinhibition of defensive 
cognitive biases which, he argues, are implemented by lefl-hemisphere 
structures. It is apparent that biological and psychological models of delusions 
are converging in intriguing ways (Hemsley, 1993), and their relationships need 
to be further specified in fixture research.
Psychological treatment of delusions has claimed much success. Both 
Alford and Beck (1994) and Chadwick and Lowe (1994) have reported studies
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that have demonstrated the effectiveness of adopting a cognitive approach to 
the modification of delusions. General principles such as collaborative 
empiricism (Alford & Beck, 1994) and specific techniques such as verbal 
challenge (Chadwick & Lowe, 1994) and the treatment of psychological 
reactance (i.e., too direct an approach might serve simply to reinforce 
delusional beliefs; see Chadwick & Lowe, 1990) have been suggested. 
Nevertheless, efforts are yet to be made to explore the limitations of the 
cognitive approach in such context and the issues of “private events” - that 
client might simply acknowledge that their beliefs seem implausible to others 
without really doubting that they are true; that is, they might demonstrate 
“perspective” (Harrow, Rattenbury, & Stoll, 1988). Future research in this area 
should attempt to secure a more wide-ranging validation, across individuals and 
settings and throughout the different phases of the modification procedures. 
The role of culture in understanding and treating delusions has also to be 
studied. A recent study conducted by Kim and colleagues (1993) on 
schizophrenic delusions among Koreans, Korean-Chinese, and Chinese is one 
of the few but interesting well controlled transcultural studies.
The present discussion endorses the point made by a number of authors 
upholding the advantages of studying particular psychopathological phenomena 
such as “delusions”, either because they are interesting in their own right 
(Persons, 1986) or because the broadly defined syndromes have little
108
demonstrated scientific validity (Bentall, Jackson, & Pilgrim, 1988; Bentall, 
Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994).
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I. Introduction
This report outlines the setting up of a self-help programme for sex 
offenders in one of the penal institutions, namely, Siu Lam Psychiatric Centre, 
in Hong Kong. The rationale for the establishment, the process of designing 
and implementing the programme, its content, and the evaluation mechanism 
are described. The strength and weaknesses of such a programme are 
discussed.
II. Background
A working group on the assessment and treatment of sex offenders was 
set up in Correctional Services Department in Hong Kong four years ago. The 
present author has been a core member of the group since its establishment. 
The initial job of the working group was to study the literature on the treatment 
of sex offenders. A theoretical framework based on the cognitive-behaviour 
model was adopted. A battery of psychological tests were standardized and 
integrated into a comprehensive assessment package. Various treatment 
modalities such as role-playing, debates, and homework assignments were 
attempted and reviewed, and valuable experiences were gains from such 
attempts. The concept of a self-help programme was developed early last year
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which incorporated several components which were held as essential in many of 
the cognitive-behavioural programmes in the literature and revealed as effective 
in the author’s clinical experience. This paper focuses on the design and 
content of the self-help programme,
III. Rationale
Behavioural approaches to the treatment of sex offenders such as 
procedures aimed at changing supposedly deviant sexual preferences (e.g., 
Barlow, 1972, 1973) or at reducing sexual arousal (Bond & Evans, 1967) have 
been queried due to their simplistic notions as to the aetiology and maintenance 
of sexual offending behaviour (Marshall & Barbaree, 1990). Others factors 
such as social incompetence and cognitive distortions were suggested to 
encourage or facilitate the expression of such deviance and its related offensive 
behaviour (Quinsey & Marshall, 1983). With the inclusion of social-skills 
training (Marshall, 1971) and modification of distorted cognitions (Abel, 
Mittelman, & Beck, 1985) in the traditional behavioural therapies, the 
cognitive-behavioural approach is nowadays understood to be quite 
comprehensive in terms of the range of problems addressed in treatment (Abel 
& Rouleau, 1986; Marshall & Barbaree, 1990).
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With a view that sex offenders in Hong Kong shared similar cognitive 
and behavioural deficits of those described in the literature, treatment 
programmes in the past three years have been focused on the sex offenders’ (1) 
cognitive distortions; (2) victim empathy; and (3) relapse prevention skills. The 
theoretical orientation was largely based on the cognitive theory and a simple 
model of sexual offending behaviour (called the cognition-empathy model) was 
proposed by the author and his colleague. The model is described in Table 1 
which postulates that sex offenders are low in the level of victim empathy and 
high in the level of cognitive distortions.
Table 1: The cognition-empatliy model
hi#i Victim empathy
Distorted sex attitudes
low high
low
Sex offenders
The literature supportive of the importance of the two concepts is as
follows:
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(1) Distorted sex attitudes
It has been suggested that sex offenders’ attitudes and beliefs are 
important components of the psychological processes leading to their sexual 
assaulting behaviours (Marshall, Laws, & Barbaree, 1990). Abel et al. (1984) 
found that sex offenders tend to use self-statements that allow them to deny, 
rationalize, minimize, and justify their behaviour. Burt (1980) discovered that 
attitudes supportive of rape were significantly associated with rape myth 
acceptance, sex-role stereotyping, and adversial sexual beliefs.
(2) Empathy
Empathy is generally defined as the ability to feel what others feel and 
to understand how others feel and think (Ross & Fabiano, 1985). It is the basic 
assumption of many treatment programmes for offenders, especially those for 
sex offenders, that low empathy is predictive of higher incidence of delinquency 
or repulsive behaviours, where as high empathy is predictive of less likelihood 
of transgression (Ellis, 1982; Williams & Finkelhor, 1990).
However, the model was developed on the basis of literature review 
and clinical experience and has not yet been subjected to empirical scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, the two variables have been found to be clinically significant in
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the assessment and treatment of sex offenders. For example, most of the 
offenders who had participated in our empathy training groups using role-plays 
and discussion were struck by how ignorant they were about their victims’ 
feelings.
Having gained experiences from working with them in various ways 
using various approaches (such as working with them individually and in 
groups, in their own institutions where labeling effect was strongly felt and in a 
quiet and undisturbed setting), it was felt that they could benefit most from an 
enclosed enwonment where a small group of sex offenders could learn and 
share their experiences in group discussion and to concentrate on their learning. 
It was also anticipated that the use of a self-help format could have the 
following advantages:
(1) To enhance the active participation and self-reliance of the offenders;
(2) To have high quality materials and manuals ready to choose from in setting 
up personal programmes for the participants;
(3) To save clinical psychologists’ time by standardizing the procedure, 
monitoring system, and evaluation process of personal programmes; and
(4) to facilitate overall programme evaluation and related research.
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IV. Procedure
A proposal was submitted to the Headquarters of Correctional Services 
Department to seek approval for the programme. The proposal included the 
programme’s objectives, content, proposed venue, selection of members, and 
implication on manpower. Some of the points are outlined in the following 
paragraphs.
The objectives of the programme were listed as:
(1) To provide a closed environment for structured learning;
(2) To promote mutual help and support;
(3) To enable close monitoring on the participants’ progress; and
(4) To reduce the participants’ reoffending.
The content of the programme included personal study programmes 
(PSP) in terms of homework assignments such as reading literature, keeping 
diaries, watching videos, and listening to tapes. The PSP was designed 
according to the need of an individual participant. There were four modules 
from which the PSP derived its course materials. They included (1) empathy 
training; (2) cognitive restructuring; (3) heterosexual skills; and (4) sex
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knowledge (it was included in the PSP because improper sex knowledge was 
often found to be associated with myths concerning sexuality such as the size 
of the male penis and with afiective disturbance such as guilt relating to 
masturbation). Besides the PSP, there was also a treatment group in which 
discussions, role-plays, and mutual support took place. Each participant was 
seen regularly by a clinical psychologist to have his progress monitored and 
personal problems addressed. A unit meeting was held every week by a 
psychologist assistant which discussed daily matters that affected the running of 
the programme and resolved conflicts among the participants. There would be 
no more than ten participants in the unit at one time. The venue was chosen to 
be at Siu Lam Psychiatric Centre where the present author is working. All sex 
offenders perceived by clinical psychologists as having the need to go through 
the programme and the ability to learn independently were eligible for 
participation. When they finished their programmes, participants were 
transferred back to their respective penal institutions and would continue 
treatment with their clinical psychologists.
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V. Content
5.1 Personal Study Plan (PSP)
There were four modules from which the PSPs were derived to suit 
each participant’s needs. The design of each PSP was based on the results of a 
thorough assessment of an individual participant’s deficits in each of the four 
areas conducted by a clinical psychologist. The four modules are briefly 
described in the following :
5.1.1 Sex knowledge
Literature, videos, and audio tapes which were informative of the 
following were chosen for individual participants:
a. Sexual organs and their fimctions
b. Sexual development and maturation
c. Menstrual cycle
d. Semen, emission, ejaculation
e. Masturbation and sexual fantasy
f. Psychological effects of pornography
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g. Sexual intercourse
h. Other forms of sex
i. Birth control
j. Conception and pregnancy 
k. Unwanted pregnancy and abortion 
1. Childbearing and childbirth 
m. Sexually transmitted diseases 
n. Sexual responses and dysfunction 
o. Infertility 
p. Aging and sex 
q. Physical problems and sex 
r. teaching children about sex 
s. Paraphilias 
t. Sexual violence 
u. Homosexuality
V. Gender identity problems
The participants’ clinical psychologists would check with them how 
much they had understood and acquired the knowledge. Pre-/post-treatment 
measures were indicated on the Sex Knowledge Subscale on the Multiphasic 
Sex Inventory (Nichols & Molinder, 1984) which was a 24-item scale relating
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to sexual anatomy and physiology. A checklist was being designed to measure 
more specific knowledge relating to the above.
5.1.2 Cognitive restructuring
The participants were asked to complete a booklet which was 
comprised of four sections. Within each section there were explanation, 
illustrations, relevant reading materials such as newspaper cuttings, and 
exercises facilitating them to identify and challenge their distortions and to 
replace them with proper attitudes. Their responses on each exercise and to the 
training were carefully checked and monitored by clinical psychologists. The 
four sections were briefly described as follows:
Section One: Uuderstaudiug and ideutificatiou of distorted sex attitudes
The nature and types of cognitive distortions was explained in the 
section. Examples illustrating the meaning of distorted sex attitudes were given 
to the participants. Exercises such as going through various articles to identify 
such attitudes were introduced. They were then asked to identify ten of their 
sex related attitudes. After that, they had to examine their attitudes to see if 
they fell into the categories of (1) lack of evidence, (2) overgeneralisation, (3) 
misattribution, or (4) justification.
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Section Two: Identification of the source of distorted sex attitudes
The participants were helped to identify the various sources of distorted 
sex attitudes such as newspapers, magazines, books and peer influence. They 
were asked to identify the sources of their distorted sex attitudes and develop 
awareness of the influence of such sources on their thinking and behaviour.
Section Three: Relationship between distorted sex attitudes and sexual 
assault
The cognitive model of sexual offending behaviour was explained and 
examples were given to illustrate how cognitions led to offending behaviour. 
They were asked to identify the cognitive variables (automatic thoughts) that 
were involved in their own sexual offences.
Section Four: Correction of distorted sex attitudes
The participants were asked to challenge their own distorted thoughts 
involved in the offences and to replace them with more proper attitudes. Their 
responses were monitored by a clinical psychologist to make sure that proper 
attitudes were acquired.
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The pre-/post-treatment evaluation was conducted by administering the 
Cognitive Distortion / Immaturity Scale and the Justification Scale on the 
Multiphasic Sex Inventory and the Sex Attitude Scale which was developed by 
the present author and his colleague and being standardized.
5.1.3 Empathy training
The general objectives of the empathy training was (1) to help sex 
offenders to understand the short- and long-term impact of their assaulting 
behaviour on the victims (the cognitive aspect); (2) to increase their skills in 
interpreting other people’s emotions and behaviour correctly (the behavioural 
aspect); and (3) to increase their ability to feel for their victims (the affective 
aspect).
Participants were asked to perform the following tasks as part of their 
training;
(1) to read literature on the impact of sexual assault on victims;
(2) to listen to audio tapes and watch video cassettes in which real victims or 
actresses role-playing the victims talked about their feelings and suffering*;
 ^The tapes were from a joint project between Correctional Services Department and Social 
Welfare Department named “Video/Audio Tape Production on the Impact of Sexual Assaulf 
headed by the present author.
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(3) to keep a diary focusing on how other participants evaluated their 
behaviour in the Unit (in order to enhance their sensitivity to the thinking 
and feelings of others);
(4) to vmte a hypothetical letter to one of their victims; and
(5) to role-play their victims in the treatment group.
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index was used to measure the 
participants’ changes in empathy. An empathy scale measuring more 
specifically the offenders’ victim empathy was being designed.
5.1.4 Heterosexual skills
This module was designed for participants who had skill deficits in 
interacting with women. The content included assessment of and discussion on 
their loneliness, shyness, social interaction skills, self-image, and understanding 
of women. Simple scales specifically designed to measure the above 
components (such as the level of eye contact on a 5-point scale; a multiple 
choice for the reasons of loneliness and a self rating on its extent; and a self­
esteem scale containing items like T am useless most of the time’) were used to 
indicate the extent of pre-/post-treatment improvement. However, they have 
not been standardized and attention was only paid to the changes on individual 
items of the scales.
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5.2 Treatment group
The group was part of their self-help programme and was aimed at (1) 
promoting mutual support; (2) facilitating social learning through sharing of 
experiences; (3) providing stimulation by encouraging the participants to 
challenge each other’s distorted thinking in a supportive environment with 
proper guidance; and (4) enhancing the participants’ empathetic skills through 
role-plays and discussion. The structure of the group was comprised of six to 
eight members and a clinical psychologist. There were ten to twelve sessions 
with the frequency of about two sessions per week. The content of the group 
included the following:
(1) Introduction and orientation
(2) Sharing of personal information and present offences
(3) Explanation of the cognitive-behavioural model in explaining sexual 
offending behaviour
(4) Identification and restructuring of each member’s distorted thoughts 
through group discussion and suggestions
(5) Role-playing the vignettes of their offences with themselves being the 
victim and others being the perpetrator and the victim’s fiiends or 
relatives.
135
(6) Identifying high-risk situations in which the members would be likely to 
relapse and discussing effective strategies of coping.
VI. Evaluation of the programme
The programme has been carried out for about one year and there were 
about thirty participants who either have finished or are still undergoing 
treatment in the programme. The participants were asked to write down what 
they had learned when they finished their programmes and a content analysis of 
their writing suggested that they were especially impressed by the victim 
empathy training and that they had improvement on most of the areas covered 
in their PSPs. A comparison between the means on the MSI and other scales 
such as the Sex Attitude Scale and the various social skills measurements 
showed that the participants improved mostly on their sex knowledge, social 
skills, motivation for treatment, and openness about their deviance. Significant 
change in their cognitive distortions was not apparent. However, more 
systematic research on the effectiveness of the programme was yet to be 
carried out. Inadequacies of the present self-help programme were:
(1) The present programme presented only a limited scope of variables which 
were related to sexual aggression. Issues like anger, power, and emotional
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problems were not addressed. Hence, the programme was not yet a 
complete substitute for individual therapy.
(2) The pre-Zpost-treatment measures were either non-standardized or non­
specific. Further improvement on the reliability and validity of the 
measures was needed to prove that programmes of this kind were worth 
pursuing.
Vn. Conclusion
The self-help programme for sex offenders was the first attempt to 
assess and treat sex offenders in a systematic way with a sound theoretical 
orientation. It has been proven clinically veiy useful and effective. The self-help 
format was also found to have the advantage of making better use of limited 
resources. The fiiture development includes (1) the refinement of the existing 
measurement tools in terms of their psychometric properties; (2) the addition of 
modules covering areas like anger management and social skills (such as 
assertiveness or decision-making skills); and (3) to develop strategies to 
motivate those sex offenders who perceived no need to receive treatment and 
who refused to enter treatment due to other reasons to participate in the 
programme.
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RESEARCH AUDIT
STUDY ONE
THE ATTITUDES OF SEX OFFENDERS
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Abstract
It is Wdely accepted that the offenders’ attitudes and beliefs are 
important components of the psychological processes leading to a sexual 
assault (e.g., Marshall. Laws, & Barbaree, 1990; Hanson, Gizzarelli, & Scott,
1994). Attitudes towards women such as negative social attitudes towards 
women, beliefs in rape myths, and sex-role ideology favouring restricted roles 
for women, have been proposed to be linked to sexual aggression in males 
(Stermac, Segal, & Gillis, 1990). However, counter evidence has also been 
provided about the differences among different types of sex offenders and 
between sex offenders and non-sex offenders on attitude measurements (e.g. 
Overholser & Beck, 1986; Hayashino, Wurtele, & Klebe, 1995). Haywood, 
Grossman, Kravitz and Wasylim (1994) suggested that research into 
assessment of rationalizations and cognitive distortions among sex offenders 
has been limited. The present study is an empirical attempt to ascertain the 
differences in sex attitudes held by three groups of sex offenders, namely, child 
molesters, rapists and flotteurs in Hong Kong and to compare their attitudes 
with those of non-sex offenders and a group of college students. Four of the 
Multiphasic Sex Inventory’s validity scales (Nichols & Molinder, 1984), the 
Attitude Towards Women Scale (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973), the 
Hanson Sex Attitudes Questionnaire (Hanson, Gizzarelli, & Scott, 1994), and
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the Semantic Differential: 16-Scale Technique (Horley & Quinsey, 1994) were 
employed to measure the subjects’ attitudes towards sex, women, and self. 
Two cognitive models, namely, the Social Learning Model of Cognitive 
Factors in Sex Offenders (Murphy, 1990) and the Information-processing 
Model of Social skills (McFall, 1990) were adopted in the study. It was found 
that paedophiles perceived women more negatively than did rapists and 
frotteurs on the Semantic Differential. Otherwise, results suggested no 
significant differences among the subjects on most cognitive variables. The 
limitations of the two cognitive models are discussed. The efficacy of 
attitudinal variables in predicting sexual assaulting behaviour is questioned.
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‘What disturs human beings is not things themselves, 
but their opinion about things.”
-Epictetus (c.50-125 AD)
(c.f. Xenakis, J., 1969)
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I. Introduction
“The only features common to all mental disorders is the 
loss o f common sense (sensus communis) and the 
compensatory development o f a unique private sense 
(sensus privatus) o f reasoning. ”
- Immanuel Kant
It has been postulated by many researchers that sex offenders’ attitudes 
and beliefs are important components of the psychological processes leading to 
their sexual assaulting behaviours (Marshall, Laws, & Barbaree, 1990). Some 
of them have found that sex offenders tend to use self-statements that allow 
them to deny, rationalise, minimise and justify their behaviour (e.g., Abel, 
Cunningham-Rathner, Rouleau, Kaplan, & Reich, 1984; Stermac & Segal, 
1987). Other studies put their emphasis on the attitudes supportive of rape such 
as rape myth acceptance, sex-role stereotyping, and adversial sexual beliefs 
(e.g., Burt, 1980). A variety of beliefs and cognitions have also been reported 
to be associated with men who engage children in their sexual activities (e.g., 
Hanson, Gizzarelli, & Scott, 1994). It has been suggested Yochelson and 
Samenow (1976) that sex offenders suffered from thinking errors that were 
typical of criminals. Among the “criminal thinking patterns” they described are
147
impulsiveness, perfectionism, concrete and compartmentalised thinking, 
irresponsible decision-making, and the perception of themselves as victims.
According to Segal and Stermac (1990), within the area of sexual 
assault the dominant theoretical construct of deviant sexual arousal has, up till 
recently, held sway over competing etiological accounts such that it has 
contributed to development of a number of unimodal theories which leave little 
room for additional explanatory constructs. As the explanatory power of 
models based solely on the role of deviant sexual arousal becomes increasingly 
questioned (Baxter, Marshall, Barbaree, Davidson, & Malcolm, 1984), the 
need for multimodal models, which integrate other factors implicated in the 
commission of sexual assault, becomes apparent. In such a context, examining 
the role of cognition in sexual assault and attempting to fashion a link to the 
social antecedents from which the specific attitudes, beliefs, or processing 
styles which sex offenders utilise in their interactions with potential victims may 
be particularly fiiiitfiil. It is also important to try to map out the role of 
cognition in the maintenance or reinforcement of continued offending once this 
behaviour is established or, conversely, to provide clues to the process of 
recidivism, once an individual has been able to refrain from sexual misbehaviour 
(Pithers, Marques, Gibat, & Marlatt, 1983).
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The growing interest in the attitudes of sex offenders also stems from 
the recognition that changing the attitudes and beliefs which foster and 
maintain an assaultive disposition is a necessary, though no sufficient, step in 
treatment (e.g. Knopp, 1984; Malezky, 1987). Aveiy-Clark (1983) asserted 
that sex offenders consistently engage in irrational thinking and that they should 
be trained in cognitive restructuring, problem-solving, assertiveness, and 
empathy skills. Pithers (1990), in arguing against the impulsivity hypothesis, 
suggested that sexual aggression is a thoughtfiil rather than an impulsive act. 
He proposed that cognitive restructuring should be part of the relapse 
prevention programme with sexual aggressors. It has been agreed by many 
therapists that reduction in sex offenders’ denial and cognitive distortions may 
be a primary positive outcome in preventive therapy against relapse (Miner, 
Marques, Day, & Nelson, 1990) and that continued denial and cognitive 
distortion are prognostic of poor treatment outcome (Simkins, Ward, Bowman, 
& Rinck, 1989). Given that an increasing number of treatment programmes are 
incorporating cognitive elements, or procedures, it is necessary to have a well- 
articulated position on the role which cognitive factors play, not only for the 
effectiveness of these treatment elements to be maximised, but also to be able 
to specify what meaningful cognitive change following treatment would look 
like (Segal & Stermac, 1990). Murphy (1990) further argued that until we 
could clearly measure and define the types of cognitive distortions used by
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various offenders, it would be impossible to determine the impact treatment 
might have on such distortions or even the need for such programmes.
Despite the increased attention on the functional links between 
cognitive factors and the commission of sexual offences and on the above 
clinical impression that sexual offenders are different on particular factors from 
other groups of men or women, empirically there is little known about how 
deviant sexual cognitions are initiated, how they are shaped and maintained, 
how they develop into fixed cognitive structures, or how they are used to form 
imagery scenarios and future offences (Marshall, Laws, & Barbaree, 1990). In 
particular, little systematic research exists exploring the relationship between 
the way in which men view women in the society and the extent in which they 
find sexual aggression towards women acceptable (Quinsey, 1984). Research 
into the assessment of rationalisations and cognitive distortions among sex 
offenders has also been limited (Haywood, et al., 1994). Segal and Stermac 
(1990) explained that cognitions in sexual assault remains largely unstudied 
because psychosocial investigations of sexual assault have yet to experience the 
“cognitive revolution” which has permeated the study of other behaviours (e.g., 
unipolar depression, Segal & Shaw; anxiety disorders, Ingram & Kendall, 
1987).
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Segal and Stermac (1990) pointed out that most of the cognitive factors 
identified have been the products of accessible and fairly surface-level 
fiinctions. They suggested a greater degree of specificity in the types of 
predictions which are made regarding the particular cognitive deficits of sex 
offenders. Such proposition received support fi'om the extensive social 
psychological research on the relationship between attitudes and behaviour 
which has typically found that specific attitudes were better predictors of 
behaviour than are general attitudes (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). It has been 
suggested that research detailing specific cognitive factors associated with 
molesting is important not only for treatment of sex offenders but also possible 
prevention of sexual aggression (Hayashino et al., 1995).
Attempts have also been made to examine variables that influence the 
processing of information in a more automatic fashion (e.g., Hollon & Kriss, 
1984). The processes involved can be contrasted to processing of a more 
controlled fashion in which the person actively chooses to focus on specific 
aspects of the stimulus array and to exclude others (Ingram & Kendall, 1986; 
Shiffiin & Schneider, 1977). Examples of the former (cognitive operations) are 
reading of women’s cues in heterosexual interactions (Lipton, McDonel, & 
McFall, 1987) and construing of the personal qualities of self and others 
(Howells, 1978; Horley & Quinsey, 1994), whereas the latter (cognitive 
products) includes self-statements like “Children enjoy having sex with adults.”
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It has been argued that some strong effects of attitude can and do occur when 
the actor is not attentionally focused on the attitude (Greenwald & Banaji,
1995). It is along this line that the present was designed.
Past research studies on this area have been criticised as lacking a 
theoretical model based on which their variables were explained and results 
analysed. Segal and Stermac (1990) suggested that a theoretical framework has 
yet to be established with respect to the role of cognitive factors in sexual 
assault. They fiirther argued that without such as theoretical framework, those 
studies which have examined cognitive factors have done so in a relatively 
unsystematic fashion, and in cases where differences have been documented, 
these differences have yet to be incorporated into a more synthetic framework.
In view of (1) the importance of ascertaining the nature of the 
“distorted” attitudes of sex offenders; (2) the need to measure the specific 
cognitions possessed by this group of offenders; (3) the desirability of 
examining the more automatic level of cognitive processing; and (4) the 
importance of integrating different variables into a theoretical framework, the 
present study is specially designed to address the issues in an empirical and 
systematic manner. The battery of tests used in the study included (1) a global 
measurement of attitude towards women (Attitude Towards Women Scale); 
(2) a measurement of specific cognitive distortions which are self-statements
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used by offenders to deny, minimise, justify, and rationalise their behaviour 
(Multiphasic Sex Inventory validity scales); (3) a measurement of offenders’ 
specific attitudes towards sexual entitlement, fiustration, affairs, sex / affection 
confusion, sexy children, and sexual harm (Hanson Sex Attitudes 
Questionnaire); and (4) a less focused examination of offenders’ construing of 
themselves and others (Semantic Differential). The Social Sexual Desirability 
subscale of the MSI served as a validity scale controlling for the subjects’ social 
desirability.
The primaiy interest of the present study was in the differences in 
attitudes among different types of sex offenders, namely, (1) paedophiles; (2) 
rapists; and (3) frotteurs. The reasons for choosing the three groups were 
twofold: (1) they were generally classified as different types of paraphilias (for 
a detailed account for rape being classified as paraphilia, please refer to Abel 
and Rouleau, 1990) with different forms of sexual expression; and (2) just 
rapists and frotteurs accounted for 78% of all sex offenders in Hong Kong 
(statistics fi’om Correctional Services Department, Hong Kong on 30 January,
1996). This was the first time these groups of sex offenders are compared and 
the results would add knowledge to (1) our understanding of the specific 
cognitive variables linked to the commission of each type of offence; (2) the 
possibility of integrating cognitive variables into a theoretical framework; (3) 
different levels of cognitive processes in sexual offending behaviour; and (4)
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our competence in designing specific and effective treatment programmes for 
different types of sex offenders. Sex offenders as a group were also compared 
with a group of non-sex offenders and another group of college students to 
stimulate fiirther thoughts on the attitude issues.
154
II. Literature review
“I  think so just because I  do think so. ”
- Two Gentlemen o f Verona
2.1 The relationship between attitudes and behaviour
Despite the popularity of attitude research, the relationship between 
attitudes and behaviour remains the topic of considerable debate. Although 
some researchers are optimistic about the attitude-behaviour relationship, 
scepticism about the magnitude of attitude-behaviour correlations continues. 
Wicker (1969) reviewed 47 empirical studies of attitudes and behaviour and 
argued that attitude-behaviour correlations are rarely above .30 and that 
attitudes, therefore, rarely account for more than 10% of the behavioural 
variance. He concluded that attitudes are generally “unrelated or only slightly 
related to overt behaviours” (p. 65) and that there was “little evidence to 
support the postulated existence of stable, underlying attitudes within the 
individual which influence both his verbal expressions and his actions” (p. 75). 
The argument has challenged the assumptions about the predictability of overt 
behaviour fi’om verbal reports of hypothetical, intrapsychic, dispositional 
constructs and has emphasised situational factors as determinants of behaviour
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(Kraus, 1995). Wicker’s claim has received support from the suggestion of 
McGuire (1985) who wrote that his “own dismal bottom line is that only within 
quite limited circumstances do attitudes account for more than 10 percent of 
behavioural variance” (p. 253).
On the other hand, encouraging results regarding the attitude-behaviour 
correlations have also been yielded by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977). They 
reviewed 109 studies that reported 142 attitude-behaviour correlations and 
concluded that all 26 studies that corresponded in their target and action 
elements and used appropriate measures of attitudes and behaviour yielded 
correlations greater then .40, whereas 26 of the 27 studies with low 
correspondence yielded nonsignificant correlations. They argued that attitude- 
behaviour correlations will be high if the attitude and behaviour measures 
correspond in their “target” and “action” elements. Attitude measures that 
specify a target and no specific action should predict behaviour measures that 
specify a target but no specific action; similarly, attitude measures that specify 
both a target and a specific action should predict behawour measures that 
specify both a target and a specific action. However, it has been argued that the 
effect sizes for the correspondence effect are significantly heterogeneous, as are 
the attitude-behaviour correlations at the highest and lowest levels of 
correspondence (e.g., Kraus, 1995). There are also exceptions to the 
correspondence principle. For example, Schifter and Ajzen (1985) found that
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attitudes towards losing weight in the next six weeks and towards trying to lose 
weight in the next six weeks did not significantly correlate with actual weight 
loss six weeks later (attitude-behaviour correlation = .10). Similarly, attitudes 
and behaviour can be highly correlated even when the measures do not 
correspond. For instance, Genther and Taylor (1973) found that attitudes 
towards desegregation significantly predicted aggression towards Whites as 
well as Blacks in a lab experiment (attitude-behaviour correlation = .51).
Kraus (1995) conducted a meta-analysis which addressed the predictive 
validity of attitudes. He reviewed 88 studies published in English-language 
journals prior to 1990 and found that their attitude-behaviour correlations was 
approximately normal. The correlations themselves ranged from -.10 to .91, 
with the mean being .38 and the median being .33. The combined significance 
level fi'om the meta-analysis suggested that attitudes significantly predict fiiture 
behawour. However, sceptics would argue that this meta-analysis finds that 
attitudes, on average, account for only 14 percent of the variance in behaviour, 
essentially supporting the conclusions of Wicker (1969) and McGuire (1985).
It is beyond the scope of the present study to ascertain the nature of the 
relationship between attitudes and behaviour. It is hoped that, by examining the 
role of various attitudinal variables in sexual aggression, more knowledge and 
support could be added to either side of the current debate on the captioned
157
issue. It has been the impression of many experienced clinicians that attitudes 
are an important predisposing factor leading to sexual assaults. In the present 
study, it is hypothesised that different types of sex offenders possess attitudes 
that are unique to their assaulting behaviour and that are different from non-sex 
offenders and the normal population.
2.2 The impulsivity hypothesis
Traditionally, sexual aggression has been interpreted as impulsive acts 
and treatment has been focused on helping the offenders to cope with their 
impulses (Pithers, 1990). Even in many recent clinical reports, the term 
“impulsivity” often appears regarding the nature of the sexually aggressive 
behaviour. Many aggressors, seeking to minimise their responsibility for 
offences, would have their therapists to believe their behaviours are the product 
of irresistible impulses overwhelming their self-control.
Offenders have numerous incentives to misrepresent their acts as 
impulsive rather than as the product of active planning and intention. Some try 
to convince us they had not thought about sexual abuse prior to performing it, 
since this might permit them to appear less culpable legally or less disordered 
psychologically. Thus, many offenders who will admit performing the abuse
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claim that they did so only because they were intoxicated, and they assert that 
their real problem is alcoholism. Others believe that crimes compelled by 
uncontrollable impulses might gain them a less punitive sentence, possibly a 
verdict of guilty but insane.
Sexual offences may appear impulsive upon first inspection. In reality, 
many offenders carefiiUy plan offences so that they appear to occur without 
forethought. A review of antecedents to sexual assault by Pithers, Kashima, 
Gumming, Beal, and Buell (1987, 1988), more than half of the samples of 64 
rapists (56%) and 136 paedophiles (51) appeared emotionally overcontrolled. 
Some of these men left hostile interactions without expressing any affect, and, 
as they brooded about the incident over time, their rage grew. Some offenders 
in this sample had harboured hatred fi'om a single event for a decade. Although 
they failed to express anger at the appropriate moment, continual augmentation 
of the emotion eventually led to an explosive assault later in time. Since the 
sexual abuse was far removed in time fi'om the instigating event, it appeared 
situationally noncontingent, or “impulsive.” In reality, however, the act was not 
impulsive at all, only delayed.
Although victims may be selected opportunistically, the act itself has 
generally been nurtured for a considerable time in the offender’s most secret 
fantasies. The sex offender’s deviant fantasies are tantamount to planning
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sessions for refinement of fiiture behaviours. According to Pithers (1990), the 
compulsivity of the sexual aggressors’ deviant fantasies differentiates them 
fi'om those of nonoffending men, who may experience a deviant fantasy 
momentarily but reject any thought of acting upon the impulse of a disgusting 
notion. Such a reinterpretation of the impulsivity hypothesis highlights the 
significance of the premeditational process of sex offenders in their final 
aggression, and, perhaps, in the progression of their sexual deviance.
2.3 The concept of sex attitude
The attitude concept has played a central role in both scientific and lay 
attempts to understand human thought and behaviour. The word “attitude” and 
the words fi'om which it is derived have been used in everyday language for 
more than a millennium (Allport, 1935). Attitude research emerged as a 
significant part of the social sciences in the past two decades. The 
computerised database PsychLit indexes more than 34,000 studies published 
since 1974 that address attitudes in some way. There are three reasons 
contributing to the popularity of the attitude construct. First, attitude provides 
a fi-amework for research on phenomena such as information processing, social 
influence, and individual differences. Second, attitude measures had become 
more quantitative and more reliable yet also easier to construct and administer.
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Third, with the growing interest in the cognitive-behavioural model in 
understanding and changing human behaviour, researchers are eager to find out 
the exact relationships between cognitive variables and behavioural 
expressions.
The most fimdamental assumption underlying the attitude concept is the 
notion that attitudes, in some way, guide, influence, direct, shape, or predict 
actual behaviour (Kraus, 1995). Attitudes are often interpreted as social 
cognitions which also encompass areas such as concept of self and stereotypes, 
and they are favourable or unfavourable dispositions towards social objects, 
such as people, places, and policies (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). According to 
Hoffinan (1981), social cognition is based on shared cultural belief systems and 
cultural stereotypes. General attitudes towards women or beliefs regarding the 
acceptability of sexual aggression represent the most generic and accessible 
level of cognition regarding sexual assault (Segal & Stermac, 1990). These 
cognitive factors are sometimes construed as learned beliefs or values or 
constructs that ‘govern’ a class of behaviour (Horley & Quinsey, 1994). Three 
approaches are identified in describing the role of these factors in sexual abuse 
(Murphy, 1990).
First, sex offenders’ attitudes are expressed in cognitive distortions 
(Abel, Becker, Cunningham-Rathner, Rouleau, Kaplan, & Reich, 1984;
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Stermac & Segal, 1987) which are self-statements sex offenders use to deny, 
minimise, justify, and rationalise their behaviour. These cognitive factors are 
not seen as direct causes of deviant sexual behaviour, but as steps offenders go 
through to justify their behaviours which serves to maintain their behaviour.
The second approach is derived from a more feminist perspective 
towards rape which describes attitudes supportive of rape, such as rape myth 
acceptance, sex-role stereotyping, adversarial sexual beliefs, and acceptance of 
interpersonal violence against women (Burt, 1980; Malamuth, 1986). Some 
etiological significance of these beliefs is implied in this approach. Attitudes are 
seen as one of the possible causative factors in sexual aggression.
The third approach to cognitive factors is drawn from the 
criminological literature epitomised by Yochelson and Samenow’s (1977) 
description of thinking errors. They proposed a number of lifelong patterns of 
distorted thinking by individuals who engage in criminal behaviour, and that 
such errors of thinking tend to be pervasive in the offender’s life and not 
limited to sex offending.
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2.4 Social learning model of cognitive factors in sex offenders
One thing the three approaches have in common is that they all deal 
with the way individuals perceive (or misperceive) and attend to environmental 
cues, as well as the way they process information and the way each individual 
evaluates or misevaluates the consequences of the behaviour. Murphy (1990) 
developed a social learning model of cognitive factors in sex offenders by 
adapting Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory which provides a model 
incorporating some aspects of the above approaches. Bandura described three 
major cognitive processes, and a number of subcategories within each of these 
categories, that allow individuals to basically disengage the normal self- 
evaluative processes that tend to modulate human behaviour. They are (1) 
making reprehensible conduct socially and ethically acceptable; (2) 
misconstruing the consequences of the behaviour; and (3) devaluating or 
attributing blame to the victim. Table 1.1 outlines the general categories and 
specific subcategories and the corresponding statements made by some sex 
offenders. This model serves as a conceptual fi-amework for clinicians to 
understand the types of beliefs or attitudes held by sex offenders.
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Table 1.1: A Social Learning Model of Cognitive Factors in Sex offenders 
General category and specific process Specific sex-offender statement
Justifying reprehensible conduct
Moral justification 
Psychological justification
Palliative comparisons 
Euphemistic labelling
Misperceiving consequences
Minimising the consequence 
Ignoring the consequence 
Misattributing the consequence
Devaluating and attributing blame to 
the victim
Dehumanisation 
Attribution of blame
“It was sex education”
“My offence occurred as a result of my 
wife’s lack of understanding; my 
drinking, my drug abuse”
“But I never had intercourse with the 
child”
“I was only fooling around,” “I was only 
playing”
“The child didn’t suffer”
“I don’t care”
“If the parents (or the Social Services) 
had been more sensitive, the victim 
wouldn’t have so many problems”
‘She was a vhore any way” 
‘Most women want to be raped’
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2.5 Information-processing model of social skills
Sex attitudes have often been reviewed in the larger context of 
investigations of heterosexual social skills and social competence (Segal & 
Stermac, 1990). The common rationale for inclusion of cognitive measures in 
these studies is that a comprehensive assessment of social skills requires that 
behavioural, physiological, and cognitive aspects of performance be assessed 
(Erickson, Luxenberg, Walbek, & Seely, 1987). One aspect of this assessment 
involves the measurement of the cognitive component of heterosexual 
interaction which is thought of as predictive of or associated with sex 
offenders’ (rapists in particular) social competence (e.g., Overholser & Beck, 
1986; Stermac & Quinsey, 1986; Segal & Marshall, 1985a). McFall (1990) has 
proposed an information-processing model of social skills which is a two-tiered 
model in which the constructs of social competence and social skills are 
hierarchically related. Such a model sheds light on how attitudinal variables 
play a role in sexual aggression.
Competence is the superordinate construct. It refers to the relativistic 
social-judgement process by which an individual’s performance of a particular 
task, in a particular setting, at a particular time, is evaluated either by that 
individual or by significant others to be adequate, relative to the judge’s implicit
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and explicit standards and values. Competence is not an attribute of the person, 
therefore, but is an attribute of the person’s task performance - as perceived by 
some judge. Competence is not global, but is task specific; a person is judged 
to be competent at a particular task. Competence is not absolute; different 
judges may evaluate the same task performance differently because they apply 
different criteria or because their judgements are shaped by different heuristics 
and biases (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Competence or 
incompetence refers to the appropriateness or inappropriateness of sex 
offenders’ social sexual behaviour.
The subordinate construct of social skills refers to the underlying 
component processes that enable an individual to perform a task in a manner 
that has been (or will be) judged to be competent. Thus, an analysis of social 
skills makes sense only within the fi-amework of a given definition of social 
competence. If the criteria for competent task performance change, then the 
analysis of the component skills underlying the competence also must change 
accordingly. These component processes are organised into a sequential, three- 
stage system which the individual transforms incoming stimulus information - 
or situational task demands - into the observable behaviours that get evaluated 
as competent or incompetent. They are (1) decoding skills, which centred 
around the perception of incoming sensory information; (2) decision skills.
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which involve generating response alternatives; and (3) execution skills, which 
concern the smooth performance of a behavioural response.
McFall’s information-processing model of social competence has been 
used to examine the hypothesis that rapists are selectively deficient in their 
ability to process interpersonal cues in heterosexual interactions. Lipton, 
McDonel, & McFall (1987) hypothesised in their study that rapists would 
misconstrue negative cues received fi'om women and interpret them as positive. 
This could then lead to responses which would be considered inappropriate 
sexual advances and which women would regard as sexually intrusive. The 
study concerned itself with the first stage of McFall’s model, namely, that 
rapists would be deficient in their decoding of women’s negative cues.
According to McFall (1990), decoding skills are the afferent processes 
involved in the accurate reception, perception, and interpretation of incoming 
sensory information. To illustrate, if a man never receives a woman’s social 
cues, his social behaviour toward the woman is more likely to be inappropriate 
and to be judged incompetent. Similarly, if the man receives the woman’s cues, 
but misperceives or misinterprets them, his behaviour will be tailored to the 
wrong situation and, as a result, is likely to be judged incompetent.
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The Lipton et al (1987) study avails itself of a theoretical model of 
social information processing and specifies precise hypotheses as to where 
deficiencies in rapists’ processing may occur. It suggests that a social cognition 
approach to the analysis of sexual assault may have some merit, and it serves as 
a possible model for fijture investigations with respect to the specificity of its 
hypotheses (Segal & Stermac, 1990). According to Segal and Stermac (1990), 
cognitive variables which influence the processing of information in a more 
automatic fashion are examined in McFaU’s model, meaning that individuals 
may not intentionally choose to attend to or think about certain information but 
find that they do so nevertheless. Such variables are referred to as cognitive 
operation variables.
2.6 Level of cognitive processing
It has been proposed that cognitive processes operating at a number of 
different levels of interest can be distinguished, and they are cognitive 
structures, cognitive propositions, cognitive operations, and cognitive products 
(Hollon & Kriss, 1984; Ingram & Kendall, 1986). Cognitive structures refer to 
the organisation of memory content and the various linkages and associations 
among stored features of memory. Cognitive propositions refer to the type of 
information which is actually stored or represented in the various cognitive
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structures. An example here would be a cognitive schema of women or a 
schema of children. Cognitive operations can be viewed as the various 
processes by which the components of the information-processing system 
operate. These operations emphasise the active manipulation of information 
throughout the system and emphasise the use of such processes as attention 
allocation, encoding, controlling processes, and spreading activation among 
related concepts. Finally, cognitive products are the actual thoughts or images 
which come to mind that result from the input of information and the 
interaction of cognitive structures, propositions, and operations. Examples of 
these may be things such as self-statements, attributions, or inferences. Segal 
and Stermac (1990) suggested that the use of a theoretical model of social 
cognition such as McFalTs which focuses on cognitive operations and which 
examines more automatic and less intentional forms of information processing 
is valuable in that it can guide future research toward more specific analyses 
and away from global cognitive constructs; and decoding skills and 
representations of the self are the types of constructs which are worth pursuing 
in the respect.
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2.7 Implicit social cognition
The growing interest in the study of cognitive operations or the more 
automatic form of information processing has been highlighted by Greenwald 
and Banaji (1995) who postulated that attitudes, self-esteem (or self-attitude), 
and stereotypes have important implicit modes of operation. The authors 
perceived that such postulation extends both the construct validity and 
predictive usefulness of these major theoretical constructs of social psychology. 
This kind of social cognitions resemble the cognitive operation variables 
(Hollon & Kriss, 1984; Ingram & Kendall, 1986) and the automatic thoughts 
(Beck, 1976) in cognitive therapy, and possess the identifying feature past 
experience influencing judgement in a fashion not readily known by the actor.
Recent work has established that attitudes are activated outside of 
conscious attention, by showing (1) that activation occurs more rapidly than 
can be mediated by conscious activity (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 
1992; Frazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986); (2) that activation is 
initiated by (subliminal) stimuli, the presence of which is unreportable 
(Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989); and (3) that the attitude activated by one 
object can be (mis)attributed to another (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). The 
essence of the awareness of the presence of implicit social cognitions among
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social psychologists lies in its implication on the measurement of attitudes. The 
usual justification for indirect measures in social psychological research is the 
empirical one of minimising reactivity of research situations to avoid demand 
characteristics (Ome, 1962) and sources of self-representational artifacts such 
as evaluation apprehension (Rosenberg, 1969). When used in this way to 
minimise reactivity, indirect measures are empirically desirable but not 
theoretically essential. By contrast, in studying implicit cognition, indirect 
measures are theoretically essential (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Examples of 
such indirect measures are the Role Construct Repertory Grid (Kelly, 1955), 
the Semantic Differential (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957), and projective 
tests.
2.8 The present model
The present study is based on (1) Murphy’s (1990) social learning 
model of cognitive factors in sex offenders which emphasise justification, 
cognitive biases, and blame attribution and (2) McFall’s (1982, 1990) social 
information-processing model of social skills and social competence which 
focuses on how an individual transforms incoming stimulus information into the 
observable behaviours that get evaluated as competent or incompetent. The 
two models are designed to measure the cognitive products and cognitive
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operations (Hollon & Kriss, 1984; Ingram & Kendall, 1986) of the cognitive 
processes respectively. Horley and Quinsey (1994) suggested two general 
routes in the assessment of sex offenders’ cognitions which are adopted in the 
present study. The first approach deals with cognitive distortions that may lead 
to deviant behaviour. For example, the Cognition Scale was developed by Abel, 
Becker, and Cunningham-Rathner (1984) to examine the role that certain 
beliefs play in continued sexual involvements by adults with children. Another 
example was the Attitude Towards Women Scale (Spence, Helmreich, & 
Stapp, 1973; Spence & Helmreich, 1978) which focuses on the rights and roles 
of women, and this scale is employed in the present study. The second 
approach to cognitive assessment involves a less focused examination of 
offenders’ specific thoughts about themselves and others. The Semantic 
Differential (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) is an example of such 
approach and an adapted version of the scale is used in this study to examine 
the subjects’ concept of self and others. While McFall’s (1990) decoding-skills 
measure focuses on the test of reading affective cues in heterosexual 
interactions, the present study aims to depict the attitudes towards self and 
others which are implicit in sex offenders’ cognition regarding their sexual 
aggression. The two approaches help to translate Murphy’s (1990) and 
McFall’s (1990) models into operationalised terms which facilitate empirical 
validation.
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It has been rare that research studies of the attitudinal variables 
explicate or even adopt a theoretical orientation on which the interpretation of 
their results are based. It is also the first time such variables are applied to the 
comparison among child molesters, rapists and frotteurs despite the high 
frequency of their admission into the penal system and the considerable impact 
of their behaviour on victimisation (refer to Table 1.2). Certainly, a close 
examination of their cognitive processes in a systematic way based on sound 
scientific paradigms has tremendous value in sex offenders’ relapse prevention 
and in the advancement of knowledge. Some related studies of the attitudes of 
sex offenders are examined before the methodology of the present study is 
outlined.
Table 1.2: Completed paraphilic acts and victims/partners by diagnosis
Paraphilia Number o f subjects 
seen
Total completed 
paraphilic acts
Total victims
Paedophilia 224 5197 4435
(nonincest) female
target
Rape 126 907 882
Frottage 62 52669 55887
Note: Extracted from G.G. Abel et al. 91987). Self-reported sex crimes o f  
nonincarcerated paraphilias. Journal o f interpersonal Violence, 26 (6), 3 - 2 5 .
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2.9 Empirical findings
The following section outlines some of the important empirical studies 
that are related to the assessment of the attitudes of sex offenders. 
Unfortunately, most of the studies concerned the cognitive processes of rapists 
and child molester and very few of them have involved frotteurs as their 
subjects. No specific scale has been developed to explore the thoughts of this 
group of assaulters. One of the most widely used and comprehensive self- 
report measures, the Multiphasic Sex Inventory, has only included rape, child 
molestation and exhibitionism as their major interests in assessing sex 
offenders’ cognitions. More research is needed to understand the nature of 
frotteurism and the characteristics of those who commit the assault.
2.9.1 Rape
At the level of generic attitudes, beliefs, and stereotypes, the construct 
most often assessed in this population has been the attitudes of rapists towards 
women. There is a considerable body of literature linking sexual aggression 
against women to a number of social factors such as perceptions of women’s 
social roles, general attitudes towards women, acceptance of rape myths, and
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attitudes towards rape. Hall, Howard, and Boezio (1986) have developed the 
Rape Attitude Scale to examine tolerance for rape among university 
undergraduates, sexual offenders, non-sexual offenders, and community control 
subjects. Scale items were developed to include rape myths, rationalisations for 
aggressive behaviours, and situations stereotypically perceived as justifying 
forced sex. The results of the survey of rape attitudes revealed that incarcerated 
rapists and non-sexual offenders showed a higher level of rape tolerance than 
did the community control group. The highest level of rape tolerance, however, 
was held by the male university undergraduates. Rape tolerance was further 
found to be associated with a sexist attitude towards heterosexual relationships. 
Those who tolerated rape tended to perceive women as sex objects and to 
condone male dominance of women.
A related study was conducted by Burt (1980) who randomly surveyed 
598 Minnesota adult men and women. The rape Myth Acceptance Scale was 
constructed, and it consisted of six subscales: (1) ovm sex-role satisfaction, (2) 
sex-role stereotyping, (3) adversarial sexual beliefs, (4) sexual conservatism, 
(5) acceptance of interpersonal violence, and (6) rape myth acceptance. It was 
found that the acceptance of rape myths was correlated with sex-role 
stereotyping, acceptance of interpersonal violence, sexual conservatism, 
adversarial sexual beliefs, and age. It was also found that over half the sample 
believed that most rapes resulted from revenge seeking against a man or hiding
175
a pregnancy, and it was believed that in the majority of rape cases the victim 
was promiscuous or had a bad reputation.
Stille, Malamuth, and Schallow (1987) examined the relationship 
between rape myth attitudes and hostility toward women among college 
undergraduates. They found that the likelihood of using force in a sexual 
encounter is motivated by a feeling of hostility towards women and by a belief 
that women deserve or desire rape. Costin (1985) examined the hypothesis that 
sexual assault against women is supported by beliefs that encourage male 
domination and exploitation. Four groups of subjects participated: male and 
female undergraduates and employed men and women recruited through 
service and social clubs. A rape scale and an adapted Attitude Towards women 
Scale (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973) were administered. Again, the 
results support the hypothesis that negative stereotypes or myths about rape are 
positively related to beliefs that women’s social roles and rights should be more 
restricted than those of men.
Although the above-noted studies suggested a positive link between 
sexual aggression and a number of attitudinal variables, they focused largely on 
college students. The majority of research which has assessed the attitudes 
towards women and the acceptance of rape myths of incarcerated rapists has 
found that rapists do not differ from other sex offenders or from similar
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socioeconomic status groups in these attitudes (Segal & Stermac, 1984). 
Incongruously, some researchers have reported that rapists evidence more 
positive attitudes towards women and less endorsement of rape myths than do 
control groups (Marshall, Bates & Ruhl, 1984; Sattem, Savelis, & Murray, 
1984).
Feild (1978) collected data from a large sample of male and female 
citizens, police officers, rape counsellors and rapists and compared their scores 
on a measure of attitudes towards women’s role in society. His results 
indicated that negative attitudes towards women were related to perceptions of 
rape and that subjects who viewed women in more traditional roles were more 
likely to see rape as being the woman’s fault. Liberal or profeminist scores on 
this measure were correlated with antirape attitudes. Interestingly though, 
when only the rapists’ scores were considered, there were no significant 
correlations between rape attitudes and scores on the attitudes towards women 
measure.
Segal and Stermac (1984) reported a similar lack of specificity among 
rapists’ attitudes towards women and their attitudes towards rape in an 
investigation which employed the same measure used in the Feild study. Their 
data suggest that rapists as a group are not exclusively conservative or negative 
in their attitudes towards women but hold a value orientation similar to that of
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non-sex-offender inmates as well as community-based males of similar 
socioeconomic status.
Overholser and Beck (1986) administered a questionnaire examining 
attitudes towards sexuality as well as rape myth acceptance to samples of 
rapists, non-sex-offender inmates, low-socioeconomic volunteers, and minimal- 
dater college students. No significant effect was found on the rape myth 
acceptance scale between the groups. Once again, this tends to suggest that 
rapists’ attitudes towards sexuality or sexual aggression may not differ 
significantly from other institutional or social class controls.
The lack of support regarding the contention that negative attitudes 
towards women are linked to sexual aggression has been explained by the 
influence of socially desirable responding on the self-reports of rapists 
(Stermac, Segal, & Gillis, 1990). Another criticism on the above-noted studies 
is specificity in the attitude being measured. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) have 
noted that one of the reasons why there is such as poor correlation between 
attitude and behaviour relationships is that the attitude being measured is often 
global (e.g., attitudes towards women), whereas the behaviour to be predicted 
is usually quite specific (i.e., a proclivity for sexual assault). These authors 
argued that the more closely the attitude measured relates to the behaviour to 
be predicted, the higher the correlation will be.
178
Another approach to assessing the thinking style of sex offenders 
involved the measurement of the cognitive component of heterosexual 
interaction. However, although a number of controlled studies have examined 
the social skills and interaction abilities of sex offenders, a clear pattern of 
deficits has not emerged for either rapists or child molesters. For example, 
Overholser and Beck (1986) administered the Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale (FNE) and the Social Anxiety and Distress Scale (SADS) to a number of 
groups. They reported no differences between rapists and institutional or 
community controls in the level of fear of being evaluated negatively or feeling 
distressed in social situations. Stermac and Quinsey (1986) also utilised the 
FNE and SADS and reported no significant difference between rapists and 
other subjects.
Stermac and Quinsey (1986) found that based on their responses to the 
Callner-Ross Assertion Scale, rapists were less assertive than community 
controls and were generally poor in situations involving heterosexual assertion. 
Yet, Segal and Marshall (1985b) administered the same measure to a group of 
rapists and controls and found no significant differences between these groups 
on either the heterosexual assertion subscale or the total score on this measure. 
Assessment of heterosexual assertion in a role play also failed to discern 
differences between rapists and low-socioeconomic controls, both in their
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responses during the role play itself as well as on a related questionnaire 
measuring knowledge of what the appropriate response to the situation would 
be. Overholser and Beck (1986), using the Rathus Assertiveness Inventory, 
also failed to find differences between rapists and their control groups on this 
measure. Segal and Marshall (1985a) utihsed the social Interaction Self 
Statement Test to examine self-statements of automatic thinking following an 
interaction with a female confederate. No differential finding was reported 
between rapists and non-sex-offender inmates or child molesters.
Although clear patterns of behaviour deficits have not emerged for 
either rapists or child molesters, some deficits in decoding and cognitive 
processing of social information have been noted. Morrison and Bellack (1981) 
pointed out that social performance requires not only appropriate response 
skills but also an “ability to accurately read the social environment.” Lipton, 
McDonel, and McFall (1987) applied McFalTs (1982, 1990) information- 
processing model of social competence to examining the hypothesis that rapists 
are selectively deficient in their abiUty to process interpersonal cues in 
heterosexual interactions. Specifically, they hypothesised that rapists would 
misconstrue negative cues received from women and interpret them as possible. 
This could lead to responses which would be considered inappropriate sexual 
advances and which women would regard as sexually intrusive. The study 
concerned itself with the first stage of McFalFs model, namely, that rapists
180
would be deficient in their decoding of women’s negative cues, and the 
measure of decoding utilised was specifically designed to assess the 
heterosexual cue-reading accuracy of young adults. The measure consisted of 
seventy-two 30-second videotape vignettes of heterosexual couples interacting, 
and subjects were instructed to guess which one of five affective cues were 
being portrayed in each interaction. The specific cues ranged fi’om romantic, 
positive, neutral, negative, or bad mood. Accuracy scores were computed and 
served as the dependent measure. Results indicated that rapists were 
significantly less accurate than either the two inmate control groups (violent 
nonrapists or nonviolent nonrapists) in interpreting cues in simulated first-date 
interactions. Rapists were found to be especially deficient in reading women’s, 
as opposed to men’s, cues, and errors associated with negative cues accounted 
for the largest proportion of variance in these findings.
A less successful attempt conducted in a similar fashion was made by 
Segal and Marshall (1986). They utilised Bandura’s (1977) notion of self- 
efficacy to analyse the cognitive aspects of heterosexual interaction between 
rapists and a female confederate. Subjects were asked to indicate their ability 
and confidence in performing a number of task-relevant behaviours such as 
introducing themselves, starting the conversation, asking questions, and 
answering questions. Ratings were made before the role-played interaction as 
well as after subjects had finished the role play. Discrepancy scores were then
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calculated by subtracting subjects’ pre-role-play predictions from their post­
role-play evaluations. Higher discrepancies were significantly related to lower 
ratings of skill in the interaction as well as higher ratings of anxiety. The results 
of the study showed that males of high-socioeconomic class had the least 
discrepancy in their predictions, while rapists as a group did not differ from 
other males of low-socioeconomic class whether in or out of prison.
In sum, attempts to examine the attitudes of rapists have yielded mixed 
results and their findings are still far from conclusive. Further research which 
focused on the specificity in the attitude being measured and the social 
cognition approach such as the study of decoding skills or self-representaion 
have been suggested.
2.9.2 Child molestation
The attitudes of offenders against children have not been the focus of 
systematic investigation (Stermac, Segal, & Gillis, 1990). It is unknown 
whether child molesters endorse rape myths or hold negative attitudes towards 
women and children. Sattem, Savelis, and Murray (1984) examined sex-role 
stereotyping and attitudes towards women among sexual offenders against both 
women and children. They used the Attitudes towards Women Scale, the Bem
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Sex-Role Inventory (Bem, 1974) , and the Macho Scale (Villemez & Touhey, 
1977). No significant differences were found between child- and adult-oriented 
offenders or between offenders and nonoffenders on any measures.
Using the Cognition scale (Abel et al., 1984), Stermac and Segal (1989) 
assessed child molesters’ attitudes towards adult sexual contact with children 
and found that child molesters endorsed more permissive attitudes towards 
sexual contact with children and more strongly supported beliefs that children 
were the property of adults than did other groups of both offenders and 
nonoffenders. Abel, Rouleau, and Cunningham-Rathner (1985) reported 
anecdotal data supportive of child molesters’ distorted cognitions and attitudes, 
such as that children consent to sexual activity with adults, that they want sex 
with an adult, and that these activities are not harmful to them. Gore (1988) 
found that child molesters scored more deviantly on the Cognition scale than 
did control subjects, but there was only minor differences between child 
molesters and the nonpaedophilic sexual offender comparison group. In short, 
results of sex-role research with groups of child molesters often have been 
inconclusive (Hanson, Cox, & Woszczyna, 1991).
Recognising the usefulness of specificity in attitude measurement, 
Hanson, Gizzarelh, and Scott (1994) attempted to identify the specific attitudes 
of incest offenders by administering the Hanson Sex Attitudes Questionnaire
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designed by themselves to a group of 50 male incest offenders and to two 
comparison groups without identified problems with sexual offending. One of 
the groups consisted of 25 men referred for treatment for assaulting their 
partners, and the other was a community control group of 25 men not seeking 
treatment. The Questionnaire was comprised of six scales the items of which 
were developed fi'om the authors’ interviews with child molesters and through 
repeated administration of various versions of the scales to child molesters and 
community comparison groups. These scales were (1) the Sexual Frustration 
Scale; (2) the Affairs Scale; (3) the Sexy children Scale; (4) the Sexual Harm 
Scale; (5) the Sexual Entitlement Scale; and (6) the Sex / Affection Scale.
The results of the study showed that the incest group scored 
significantly higher on the Sex Entitlement, Sexy Children, and the Sexual 
Harm Scales compared to the other two factors. In other words, they were the 
most likely to perceive children as sexually attractive and as sexually motivated, 
they minimised the harm caused by the sexual abuse of children, and they often 
endorsed attitudes supportive of male sexual entitlement. This group of incest 
offenders appeared to share the sexualised view of children that have been 
identified previously in samples of child molesters using other questionnaires 
(Abel, Gore, Holland, Camp, Becker, & Rathner, 1989; Cortoni, Gordon, 
Malcolm, & Ellerby, 1991; Stermac & Segal, 1989). However, contrary to the 
authors’ expectation, there was no difference between the incest offenders and
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the other groups on the measures of attitudes towards affairs, sexual 
frustration, and confusion between sex and affection.
Social perception among child molesters has also been an area of 
investigation. Segal and Marshall (1986), with the help of female confederates, 
assessed sex offenders’ social perception in heterosexual situations. They found 
that child molesters, in comparison to other sexual offenders and community 
controls, were significantly poorer at predicting and evaluating their own 
performance. Barbaree, Marshall, and Connor (1988) examined the social 
problem-solving skills of child molesters in social situations involving both 
adults and children. They found that child molesters were equally as good as 
nonoffenders in recognising the existence of a problem and at generating 
alternative solutions, but they chose socially unacceptable solutions and failed 
to recognise likely negative outcomes. They concluded that child molesters 
may demonstrate deficits in the cognitive processing that precedes social 
behaviour. Stermac and Segal (1989) also found differences in cognitive 
processing between child molesters and others in child molesters’ judgements 
of children’s behaviours. Child molesters saw children’s behaviour as more 
seductive and judged children as more responsible for sexual contacts than did 
other groups. However, in a recent study of child molesters’ cognitive factors, 
Hayashino, Wurtele, and Klebe (1995) found that child molesters’ reported 
levels of empathy on the Interpersonal reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) were
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similar to those obtained from comparison groups (including rapists, non-sex 
offenders and community control subjects). It seems that the exact nature of 
child molesters’ social perception is yet to be fiirther ascertained.
Studies of social competence of child molesters have also suggested 
that there may be a differential perception of social cues by this group of sex 
offenders. In the study by Hayashino, Wurtele, and Klebe (1995), child 
molesters displayed significantly more fear of being negatively evaluated, as 
measured by their scores on the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale, in contrast 
to rapists and other controls. Similarly, Segal and Marshall (1985a) reported 
that the scores of child molesters on the Social Anxiety and Distress Scale were 
significantly higher than rapists’ scores. Segal and Marshall (1985b) also 
reported that child molesters scored significantly lower than rapists and other 
controls on the positive feedback, negative feedback, and general assertion 
subscales of the Callner-Ross assertion scale. However, no systematic research 
exists which has examined cognitive operations of the sort reported by the 
McFall group in their work with rapists. This may be due to the lack of a 
specific theory which would predict where child molesters may be deficient in 
their social information processing. According to Segal and Stermac (1990), 
personal constructs relating to issues such as dominance/submissiveness and 
self-representation would be logical starting points in this respect.
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Howells (1978) utilised the repertory grid technique to investigate the 
personal construing of adult females, adult males, and children in a sample of 
heterosexual paedophiles and matched controls. The results of this study point 
to differences between the two groups’ perception of children. What emerged 
was that paedophiles used constructs related to dimension of dominance in 
their descriptions of both children and adults, with children appearing at the 
nondominant pole of this dimension, whereas adults were seen as overbearing 
and more threatening. In contrast, children were viewed as nonthreatening and 
easier to relate to. It was also found that the cognitions of paedophiles about 
children are not exclusively sexual in nature but may have to do with other 
positive or even idealised attributes which they see children as possessing. It 
was suggested that the attraction of paedophiles to children as sexual partners 
may be related to the paedophiles’s search for a context in which he can enjoy 
nonsexual mastery or dominance over another individual, the idealisation of 
specific aspects of childhood (such as the child’s innocence, capacity for 
unconditional loving, the simphcity of life seen through a cWld’s eyes, etc.), or 
the enjoyment of a relationship which is free from the problems associated with 
anxiety-laden adult heterosexualilty (Lanyon, 1986; Quinsey, 1986).
Another study in this vein was conducted by Horley and Quinsey 
(1994), who utilised a semantic differential developed by themselves after a 
search of the research and clinical hterature on child molestation measuring
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child molesters’ thoughts about themselves and others. There were twenty-one 
scales (bipolar adjectives such as kind-cruel, beautifiil-ugly, erotic-frigid, etc.), 
randomly sorted and counterbalanced with respect to positive and negative 
dimensions. The study was expected to reveal differences between child 
molesters and non-child molesters in terms of their self-image (both actual and 
ideal selves) and perceptions of others (including boy, girl, man, woman, and 
spouse). Three groups of respondents were recruited for a study of their 
attitudes and beliefs. They included 57 incarcerated child molesters, who had 
convictions involving extra-famihal victims, 50 non-sex offenders and 30 
community control subjects. Differences emerged between molesters and non­
molesters in their actual and ideal self-descriptions (e.g., non-molesters 
described themselves as cleaner, harder, more erotic, and more seductive); and 
women were seen as less erotic by molesters than non-molesters. However, 
relatively few differences were found among the three groups on the semantic 
differential and the ratings of all groups were positive than negative in general.
It seems that the application of the semantic differential to the study of 
sex offenders’ attitudes has the advantages of being specific, more automatic, 
and less threatening (compared to items asked in most cognition scales) in 
eliciting the information processing style (the cognitve operation variables) of 
the offenders. However, it is still in its initial stage of development and fiirther 
refinement of the measure is necessary.
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2.9.3 Frotteurism
Frotteurism was defined as obtaining sexual gratification by rubbing 
against or fondling an unsuspecting, nonconsenting person, and sexual 
intercourse is not involved (Davidson & Neale, 1994). Often, this occurs when 
the victim, typically a stranger, is in a crowded place, such as a shopping 
centre, elevator, or subway (Campbell, 1989). Frotteurs experience fantasies 
that are accompanied by strong, irresistible urges to touch others. The fantasies 
often centre on the victims’ vrishes to have a caring, affectionate relationship 
with the ffotteur (American Psychiatric Association, 1987).
The process of fi*otteurism includes the fantasy, the urge to touch, the 
selection of a victim, the touching itself, and then fleeting to a place where 
masturbation usually occurs. Included in the process of offending is an escape 
plan. The \dctim selected fits the fi*otteur’s ideal victim type. The victim is 
viewed as sexually attractive, usually wearing tight-fitting clothes (Holmes,
1991).
Little research has been done on the attitudes of this group of sex 
offenders despite the fact that fi’otteurs are likely to cause a considerable
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amount of victimisation (refer to Table 1.2). According to Weaver and Fox 
(1984), men committing indecent assault on women usually lack self- 
confidence in their relationships with women, have difficulty treating them as 
individuals rather than sex objects, but yearn for a normal heterosexual 
relationship. It is predicted in the present study that fi'otteurs have a more 
negative concept of self than rapists, that they have a more positive view on 
women than other sex offenders, and that they hold less permissive attitude 
towards children than paedophiles. It seems that more systematic research into 
the attitudes of fi*otteurs may help in better assessment and treatment of this 
group of offenders.
2.10 Hypotheses of this study
Based on the social learning model of cognitive factors in sex offenders 
(Murphy, 1990) and the information-processing model of social competence 
(McFall, 1990), the research hypotheses of the present study are as follows:
(1) There are differences among rapists, paedophiles, and frotteurs in their 
attitudes towards sex-role, heterosexual relationships, and sexual 
aggression against women and children. It is predicted, for example, that 
paedophiles hold more permissive attitudes towards sex with children, that
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rapists have stronger belief in male sexual entitlement, and that frotteurs 
are more sexually obsessed.
(2) There are differences among rapists, paedophiles, and frotteurs in their 
ways of construing about themselves and others. It is predicted, for 
example, that frotteurs hold more positive attitudes towards women, and 
that paedophiles view children as more submissive and attractive.
(3) There are differences among sex offenders as a group, non-sex offenders, 
and college students in their attitudes towards sex-role, heterosexual 
relationships, and sexual aggression against women and children. It is 
predicted that sex offenders have more “distorted” sex attitudes in terms of 
attitude towards women, rationalisations and specific attitudes like sexual 
entitlement.
(4) There are differences among sex offenders as a group, non-sex offenders, 
and college students in their ways of construing about themselves and 
others. It is predicted, for example, that sex offenders perceive themselves 
more negatively than do the other two groups.
A two-tailed, non-directional test is employed in this study.
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Subjects
Five groups of male subjects participated in the present study. Three of 
them were sex offenders, one non-sex offenders, and one college students. The 
three sex offender groups included paedophiles, rapists and frotteurs who 
altogether represented the majority among the local sex offender population 
(78% on 30 January, 1996)\ All subjects were currently serving their sentences 
in three of the local prisons, namely, Stanley Prison, Shek Pik Prison, and Pik 
Uk Prison. They are briefly described as follows:
3.1.1 Eight incarcerated, extra-familial child molesters
Only nine child molester fitted the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(4th Edition) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria in the local 
prison population. One of them was illiterate and had to be excluded from the 
study. The other eight inmates all agreed to take part in the study. The reason 
for excluding the intra-familial type was two-fold: (1) the involvement of 
acquaintance and affection in most incest cases made it difficult to compare
 ^The figure was provided by the Psychological Unit, Correctional Services Department
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with the three sex offender groups in this study which all involved stranger 
.victims; and (2) incest offenders show the lowest untreated recidivism, with 
rates ranging from 4-10% (Gibbens, Soothill, & Way, 1981), while rapists (7- 
35%) and non-familial child molesters who abused girls (10-29%) or boys (13- 
40%) had higher reoffence rates (Furby, Weinrott, & Blackshaw, 1989), and 
thus, incest offenders were a distinct group and were excluded in the present 
study.
3.1.2 Eight incarcerated rapists
Rape is treated as paraphilia by some researchers (e.g., Abel & 
Rouleau, 1990) and as comparable to paedophilia and frotteurism. It was 
beyond the scope of the present study to give support to or repudiate the 
proposition. Rapists were treated in an atheoretical manner and they were not 
classified in any way. The sample was randomly sampled from a group of 
inmates convicted of rape. Four of them refused to participate in the study and 
one candidate was excluded due to his illiteracy. Altogether, eight rapists were 
selected and agreed to take part in the study. All victims were adult female 
strangers to their perpetrators.
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3.1.3 Eight incarcerated frotteurs
Frotteurs were randomly selected from a group of inmates convicted of 
indecent assault against a female. Their offences all fitted the definition offered 
by Davidson and Neale (1994) on frotteurism - that obtaining sexual 
gratification by rubbing against or fondling an unsuspecting, nonconsenting 
person, and intercourse is not involved. Two inmates refiised to take part in the 
study, and one was excluded due to his unstable mental state at the time of the 
assessment. Altogether, eight frotteurs were selected and agreed to participate 
in the study. All victims were adults and were strangers to their perpetrators.
3.1.4 Eight incarcerated non-sex offenders
The sample was randomly selected from a group of inmates not 
convicted of any sexual offence. One inmate refiised to take part in the study 
and another one was excluded due to his illiteracy. Altogether, eight non-sex 
offenders were selected and agreed to participate in the present study. Three of 
them were convicted of robbery, two theft, one trafficking of dangerous drugs, 
one manslaughter, and one throwing corrosive fluid with intent.
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3.1.5 Eight college students
The sample was randomly selected from a group of male undergraduate 
students who were on a language course. All of the eight students selected 
agreed to participate in the study.
3.2 Measures
Four measures, namely, the Attitude Towards Women Scale (ATW), 
the Hanson Sex Attitudes Questionnaire (HSAQ), the Multiphasic Sex 
Inventoiy (MSI), and the Semantic Differential (SED) were used in the present 
study. The tests were chosen in a way that they measured both the cognitive 
products (such as attitudes towards women and justification) and the cognitive 
operation variables (such as response to social cues and personal constructs) 
mentioned in the previous chapter. While many studies of this kind used 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) (e.g., 
Hayashino, Wurtele, & Klebe, 1995) to control for socially desirability 
response sets, it was replaced by the Social Sexual Desirability Scale (SSD) on 
the MSI in the present study. The scale was designed to measure “normal” 
sexual interest and drive, and to help identify persons who are responding to 
the MSI in a socially desirable way. It is the intention of the present study to
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use the (SSD) as a validity scale to provide useful information about the 
response set of a subject and his potential to dissimulate the test results in the 
study. It was demonstrated in a recent extensive attempt to examine the 
psychometric properties of the scale (Kalichman, Henderson, Shealy, & Dwyer,
1992)) which indicated that a high level of internal consistency of the scale 
(standard alpha coefficient = .87). There was also a Personal Information 
Questionnaire specially designed to collect data on the subjects’ age, education 
level, marital status, and occupation. A brief description of each measure is 
given as follows:
3.2.1 Personal Information Questionnaire (FIQ) (Appendix 1)
The PIQ was designed to collect data on each subject’s age (there were 
four age groups: below 31, 31-40, 41-50, and above 50), education level (nil, 
P.1-P3, P.4-P.6, F.1-F.3, F.4-F.5, F.6-F.7, and tertiary), marital status (single, 
married, separated, divorced, cohabitant), and occupation (nil, unstable, non­
skilled, skilled, and professional). It was used to examine the differences among 
the subject groups in relation to their age and socioeconomic status.
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3.2.2 Attitude Towards Women Scale (ATW, Spence, 
Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973) (Appendix 2)
The ATW is a 15-item version of the original 55-item scale (Spence & 
Helmreich, 1972). The scale focuses on the rights and roles of women, and 
asks subjects to respond to each statement on a four point scale from “agree 
strongly” to “disagree strongly.” Items are scored from 0 to 3. Three indicates 
a more egalitarian attitude towards women. Since little research has been done 
on the psychometric properties of the scale, it was not intended to be used 
quantitatively in the present study. Instead, subjects’ response on each item was 
examined. The face validity of the items is such that a clinician can derive 
information regarding the degree of sex role stereotyping in which an offender 
engages by analysis of the individual items (Salter, 1988).
3.2.3 Multiphasic Sex Inventory (MSI, Nichols & Molinder, 
1984) (Appendix 3)
The MSI is a psychometric test specifically developed to assess 
psychosexual characteristics and to be easily administered to sex offenders. It is 
a 300-item true/false self-report inventory originally designed to assist in the 
comprehensive assessment of sex offenders (Nichols & Molinder, 1984). The
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items make up three sexual deviance scales (Child Molest, Rape, and 
Exhibitionism); five atypical sexual outlet scales (Fetishes, Obscene Calls, 
Voyeurism, Bondage, and Sado-Masochism); a sexual dysfunction scale 
comprised of four sub-scales (Sexual Inadequacies, Premature Ejaculation, 
Physical Disabilities, and Impotence); six validity scales (Parallel Items, Sexual 
Obsessions, Cognitive Distortions and Immaturity, Social Sexual Desirability, 
Lie Scale, and Justifications); and a scale of sex knowledge and beliefs. The 
scales have adequate item content, no item overlap, and a substantial degree of 
face validity (Kalichman, Henderson, Shealy, & Dwyer, 1992).
Only four of the six validity scales were chosen to meet the purpose of 
the present study. They were Sexual Obsession (SO), Cognitive distortions and 
Immaturity (CDI), Justifications (JU), and Social Sexual Desirability (SSD). 
The SO has 20 items and was intended as a measure of preoccupation with sex. 
High scores are interpreted as indicating exaggerating of nondeviant sexual 
interest or ‘Taking bad,” and low scores are interpreted as indicating 
minimization of nondeviant sexual interest or ‘Taking good.” The CDI is a 20- 
item scale designed to measure one’s self-portrayal as a victim of circumstances 
and how much an offender distorts his thinking and actions. It was described by 
the original authors as a characterlogical scale as well as an assessment of self­
accountability (Nichols & Molinder, 1984). The JU was originally treated as an 
experimental scale and has 24 items. It is a general measure of the use of
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rationalizations in describing one’s offence. The SSD is a 35-item scale 
designed to measure “normal” sexual interest and drive, and to help identify 
persons who are responding to the MSI in a socially desirable response set. 
Low scores are interpreted as indicating minimization of nondeviant sexual 
interest. Normative studies for the MSI involved criterion groups including 
normals, untreated sex offenders, and treated sex offenders, depending on 
which scales were being normed (Nichols & Molinder, 1984).
One hundred and forty-four rape offenders were used in Kalichman, 
Henderson, Shealy and Dwyer’s (1992) study to evaluate the MSI scales’ 
internal consistencies. The standard alpha coefficients for the SO, CDI, JU, and 
SSD were .86, .53, .82, and .87 respectively, suggesting high reliability for the 
scales except JU. However, the JU was found to be significantly associated 
with cognitive distortions on the Cognitive Scale (Abel, Becker, Cunningham- 
Rathner, Rouleau, Kaplan, & Reich, 1984), and thus provided evidence for its 
convergent validity (Haywood, Grossman, Kravitz, & Wasyliw, 1994). 
Haywood et al. (1994) fiirther alleged that the correlations of the MSI validity 
scales with similar independent objective measures support the use of the MSI 
validity scales in the assessment of sex offenders.
The four validity scales’ items were intermixed to create a 98-items 
questionnaire used in the present study. One item on the SSD overlapped with
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an item on the CDI. The response of each subject was sorted to yield four total 
scores for the four validity scales.
3.2.4 Hanson Sex Attitude Questionnaire (HSAQ, Hanson, 
Gizzarelli, & Scott, 1994) (Appendix 4)
The HSAQ was developed to identify specific attitudes of incest 
offenders that may be related to their offences. It is also one of the few 
attempts to measure the specific types of offenders’ cognitive distortion such as 
sexual entitlement. Its specificity of the attitude measures and its relevance to 
both child molesters and offenders against adult females made the questionnaire 
usefiil in the present study.
The HSAQ contains six scales: (1) the Sexual Frustration Scale (SF), 
which contains 6 items related to the experience of not having sufficient sexual 
outlets; (2) the Affairs Scale (AFF), containing 3 items concerning the 
immorality of extramarital affairs; (3) the Sexy Children Scale (SC), containing 
12 items concerning the perception of children as sexually attractive and 
sexually motivated; (4) the Sexual Harm Scale (SH), containing 10 items 
concerning the amount of harm caused by adult/child sexual contact; (5) the 
Sexual Entitlement Scale (SE), containing 9 items concerning male sexual
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entitlement and the necessity of fulfilling sexual urges; and (6) the 
Sex/Affection Confiision Scale (SAC), an 8-item scale dealing with the 
perception that all positive relationships are sexual. It was found that the six 
scales were internally consistent (standard coefficient alphas greater than .80), 
with the exception of the SAC (.62) and the AFF (.67), which were only 
marginally internally consistent (Hanson, Gizzarelli, & Scott, 1994).
Respondents were asked to rate their agreement to a series of items 
using a 7-point scale fi’om completely disagree (1) to completely agree (7). 
Items fi'om each scale were intermixed to create a 47-item scale. A total score 
was obtained for each scale.
3.2.5 Semantic Differential (SED, Horley & Quinsey, 1994)
(Appendix 5)
The use of Semantic Differential with people with sexual deviance has a 
long tradition (e.g. Marks & Sartorius, 1967; Friesbie, Vanasek, & Dingman, 
1967; Quinsey, Bergersen, & Steinman, 1976), but it has received little 
attention fi-om researchers studying the attitude of sex offenders. The measure 
used in the present study was adapted firom the Semantic Differential developed 
by Horley and Quinsey (1994) who were interested in child molesters’ broader
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views of themselves and others. Their construction of the scale was informed 
by the cognitive personality theory of Kelly (1955) and based on the Marks and 
Sartorius (1967) scales.
The Horley and Quinsey (1994) Semantic Differential contained 
twenty-one scales. Test-retest coefficients were calculated for the Semantic 
Differential and the results revealed moderate temporal reliabilities for many 
scales. The scale consistency coefficients ranged from .26 (selfless-selfish) to 
.67 (happy-sad). All of the “sex” scales (e.g., sexy-sexless) were among the 
most stable. The overall grand mean was significant, r(15)=,47, p <.05. Using 
Cattell’s (1966) Scree test, three relatively distinct factors that explained 56.8% 
of the total variance emerged from a principle component analysis. The first 
factor was comprised of general evaluative dimensions (e.g., bad-good, 
deceitful-truthful, kind-cruel, immature-mature), the second factor was 
comprised of sexual evaluative dimensions (e.g., sexy-sexless, seductive- 
repulsive, beautiful-ugly), and the third factor was described as an activity 
component (e.g., submissive-dominant, constrained-spontaneous). Horley and 
Quinsey (1994) remarked that the overall performance of the 21-scale Semantic 
Differential was acceptable, but a number of scales could be dispensable. They 
recommended that two constructs could be altered and five excluded and that 
the resulting 16-scale technique would be an efficient means of comparing child
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molesters’ and nonmolesters’ views of people. It was based on their 
recommendation that the present Semantic Differential was constructed.
The SED used in the present study contained sixteen scales. They were 
randomly sorted and counterbalanced with respect to positive and negative 
dimensions. Seven different role titles or stimuli were rated. They were self, 
ideal-self, boy, girl, man, woman, and spouse. Bipolar scales were placed at 
opposite sides of a page with seven spaces between them. Subjects placed a 
tick over the appropriate space, and responses were numbered one to seven 
from left to right. Each subject had a score from one to seven on each scale.
3.3 Procedure
The present research was approved by Correctional Services 
Department, Hong Kong. Once the subjects were selected from the data 
provided by the Department, they were approached by the author individually 
in their respective prisons. The content and rationale of the study were 
explained to them. Those agreed to participate in the study were asked to sign 
a consent form (Appendix 6) which outlined (1) what the study was about; (2) 
the target population of the research; (3) the sampling procedure; (4) the tasks
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they would be asked to do; (5) the treatment of the data; and (6) the legal 
responsibility of the author for ensuring the confidentiality of their information.
The subjects were then asked to complete the five questionnaires in 
groups. Clear instructions were given to them on how to complete the 
questionnaires. Questions relating the instructions were attended to 
immediately by the author. All subjects cooperated during the test 
administration. Their response on each questionnaire was carefully checked to 
make sure that no item was left unanswered when they finished. Each 
questionnaire was given a code to represent the identity of the respondent in 
order to assure the subjects that only the author knew who had responded on a 
particular questionnaire.
3.4 Data analysis
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for Windows was 
applied to analyze the data collected from the study. The following is a brief 
description of the tests used in the analyses.
1. The Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA test was used to determined whether 
different subject groups differed in age, education level, and occupation
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which were treated as ordinal data, whereas Chi-square test was used in 
marital status which was treated as categorical data.
2. One-way analysis of variance was used to determine group differences by 
comparing their means on the ATW, HSAQ, MSI and SED. It was followed 
by the Tukey-HSD test which showed the unplanned multiple pairwise 
comparison.
3. Paired Samples T-test was used to determine whether each subject group 
differed in their perception of different pairs of roles in the SED.
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IV. Results
4.1 Personal Information Questionnaire
The PIQ yielded information on the demographic characteristics of the 
different subject groups. Table 4.1 shows the descriptive characters of the three 
sex offender groups. The information on Age, Education and Occupation were 
treated as ordinal data and the group differences were analysed using the 
Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA test. The three sex offender groups differed 
significantly on Age and Occupation. Paedophiles were found to be 
significantly older than the other two groups (%^ (2) = 7.52, p < .05) whereas 
rapists were significantly less skilled in their occupation than the other subjects 
(jc^ (2) = 6.33, p < .05). Regarding the subjects’ Marital Status, Single, 
Separated and Divorce were treated as one category (Not Living with 
Someone) and Married and Cohabitant were treated as another (living with 
Someone) in the analysis of group differences using the Chi-square test. The 
distribution of the two categories among the three groups were shown in Table 
4.1.1. It was found that the three groups did not differ significantly on their 
status of being with someone or not.
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Table 4.1; Descriptive Characteristics of the three sex offender groups, namely.
paedophiles, rapists, and frotteurs
Group
Paedophiles (n=8) Rapists (n=8) Frotteurs (n=8)
Age % % %
<31 0 (0) 4 (25) 3 (37.5)
31-40 3 (37.5) 3 (37.5) 4 (50)
41-50 3 (37.5) 1 (12.5) 1 (12.5)
>50 2 (25) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Education
nil 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
P.1-P.3 0 (0) 1 (12.5) 1 (12.5)
P.4-P6 5 (62.5) 2 (25) 2 (25)
F.1-F.3 2 (25) 3 (37.5) 4 (50)
F.4-F.5 0 (0) 1 (12.5) 1 (12.5)
F.6-F.7 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
tertiary 1 (12.5) 1 (12.5) 0 (0)
Marital status
single 6 (75) 4 (50) 4 (50)
married 1 (12.5) 2 (25) 3 (37.5)
separated 1 (12.5) 0 (0) 0 (0)
divorced 0 (0) 1 (12.5) 0 (0)
cohabitant 0 (0) 1 (12.5) 1 (12.5)
Occupation
nil 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
unstable 1 (12.5) 4 (50) 0 (0)
non-skilled 1 (12.5) 2 (25) 2 (25)
skilled 4 (50) 2 (25) 4 (50)
professional 2 (25) 0 (0) 2 (25)
Table 4.1.1: Descriptive Characteristics of the marital status of the three sex offender 
groups being grouped into two categories
Group
Paedophiles (n=8) Rapists (n=8) Frotteurs (n=8)
Marital status % % %
Not Living with 7 (87.5) 5 (62.5) 4(50)
Someone
Living with 1 (12.5) 3 (37.5) 4(50)
Someone
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive characters of the following three 
groups: (1) the sex offenders as a group; (2) the non-sex offender group; and 
(3) the college student group. The groups differed on (1) Age, (2) = 8.40, p
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< .05; (2) Education level, (2) = 16.71, p < .01; and (3) Occupation, (2) = 
15.28, p < .01. The figures in Table 4.2 suggested that college students were 
significantly younger, higher in education level and less skilled (most of them 
had no occupation) than the other two groups. Table 4.2.1 showed that the 
three groups did not differ significantly in whether they were living with 
someone or not.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Characteristics of the sex offenders, non-sex offenders, and 
college students
Variable
Group
Sex offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex offenders 
(n=8)
College students 
(n=8)
Age % % %
<31 7 (29.17) 4 (50) 8 (100)
31-40 10 (41.67) 1 (12.5) 0 (0)
41-50 5 (20.83) 3 (37.5) 0 (0)
>50 2 (8.33) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Education
nil 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
P.1-P.3 2 (8.33) 0 (0) 0 (0)
P.4-P.6 9 (37.5) 1 (12.5) 0 (0)
F.1-F.3 9 (37.5) 5 (50) 0 (0)
F.4-F.5 2 (8.33) 1 (12.5) 0 (0)
F.6-F.7 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
tertiary 2 (8.33) 1 (12.5) 8 (100)
Marital status
single 14 (58.33) 3 (37.5) 8 (100)
married 6 (25) 2 (25) 0 (0)
separated 1 (4.17) 0 (0) 0 (0)
divorced 1 (4.17) 1 (12.5) 0 (0)
cohabitant 2 (8.33) 2 (25) 0 (0)
Occupation
nil 0 (0) 0 (0) 5 (62.5)
unstable 5 (20.83) 6 (75) 2 (25)
non-skilled 5 (20.83) 0 (0) 1 (12.5)
skilled 10 (41.67) 1 (12.5) 0 (0)
professional 4 (16.67) 1 (12.5) 0 (0)
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Table 4.1.1: Descriptive Characteristics of the marital status of the three comparison 
groups being grouped into two categories
Group
Sex offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex offenders 
(n=8)
College students 
(n=8)
Marital status % % %
Not Living with 
Someone
16 (66.7) 4(50) 8(100)
Living with 
Someone
8 (33.3) 4(50) 0(0)
4.2 Attitude Towards Women Scale (ATW)
The internal consistency of the ATW was low in the present study 
(Coefficient alpha = .49, n = 40). Therefore, only group differences on 
individual items of the Scale were examined. There was no significant 
difference in scores among the three sex offender groups on any of the ATW 
items. Their mean scores are illustrated in Table 4.3 with standard deviations in 
parentheses.
Table 4.3: Means (Standard Deviations) for Attitude Towards Women Scale paedophiles, 
rapist, and frotteurs
_______________ Group___________________
Item Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
____________________________________ (n=8)_________^n 8^)__________(n=8)
1. Swearing and obscenity are more 1.13 (1.13) 0.50 (0.76) 0.75 (0.71)
repulsive in the speech of a woman tlian
aman.
2. Under modem economic conditions 2.38 (0.74) 2.25 (1.04) 2.50 (0.53)
with women being active outside the
home, men should share in household 
tasks such as washing dishes and doing 
the laundiy.
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3. It is insulting to women to have the 
“obey” clause remain in the marriage.
1.13 (1.13) 2.00 (0.76) 0.88 (0.83)
4. A woman should be as free as a man to 
propose marriage.
2.63 (0.74) 2.38 (0.52) 2.88 (0.35)
5. Women should worry less about 
becoming good wives and mothers.
0.88 (0.64) 1.25 (1.17) 0.50 (0.93)
6. Women should assume their rightful 
place in business and all the professions 
along with men.
2.50 (0.53) 2.25 (0.71) 2.13 (1.13)
7. A woman should not expect to go to 
exactly the same places or to have quite 
the same freedom of action as man.
2.00 (1.07) 1.75 (1.49) 1.75 (0.71)
8. It is ridiculous for a woman to run a 
locomotive and for a man to dam socks.
1.75 (1.28) 2.13 (0.99) 2.13 (0.83)
9. The intellectual leadership of a 
community should be largely in the 
hands of men.
1.75 (0.71) 2.38 (1.06) 1.88 (1.13)
10. Women should be given equal 
opportunity with men for apprenticeship 
in the various trades.
2.50 (0.53) 2.25 (1.39) 2.00 (1.07)
11. Women earnings as much as their 
dates should bear equally the ejq>ense 
when they go out together.
1.88 (0.83) 1.75 (1.04) 2.00 (0.76)
12. Sons in a family should be given 
more encouragement to go to college 
than daughters.
1.63 (1.06) 2.38 (0.74) 2.25 (1.04)
13. In general, the father should have 
greater authority than the mother in the 
bringing up of children.
1.50 (0.53) 1.88 (0.83) 1.75 (1.17)
14. Economic and social freedom is 
worth far more to women than 
acceptance of the ideal of femininity 
which lias been set up by men.
1.38 (0.52) 1.75 (0.89) 1.50 (0.53)
15. There are many jobs in which men 
should be given preference over women 
in being hired or promoted.
2.00 (0.76) 1.88 (0.83) 1.00 (0.93)
Note: Items 1, 5, 7, 8, 9 ,1 2 ,13, and 15 were scored with “agree strongly” scoring 0 and 
“disagree strongly” scoring 3. The remaining items were scored in reverse.
Sex offenders, non-sex offenders, and college students only differed 
significantly on one of the ATW items, namely, “the intellectual leadership of a 
community should be largely in the hands of men,” F(2, 37) = 5.04, p < .05. 
Non-sex offenders agreed more strongly to the statement than did the other
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two groups. There was no significant difference among the three groups on the 
rest of the items and in the total score. Their mean scores are illustrated in 
Table 4 with standard deviations in parentheses.
Salters, Kairys, and Teague, in previously unpublished research, found a 
sample of 59 male factory workers to score an average of 29.3 (total score) on 
the ATW with a standard deviation of 7.5 (c.f. Salter, 1988). All the present 
subject groups obtained scores which were somewhat lower than the factory 
workers.
Table 4.4: Means (Standard Deviations) for Attitude Towards Women Scale by sex offenders, 
non-sex offenders, and college students
Group
Item Sex offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex
offenders
(n=8)
College 
students (n=8)
0.79(0.88) 0.38 (0.52) 0.50 (0.76)
2.38 (0.77) 2.00 (0.93) 2.00 (0.76)
1.33 (1.01) 1.38 (0.74) 1.38 (0.74)
2.63 (0.58) 2.88 (0.35) 2.38 (0.52)
0.88 (0.95) 1.13 (0.64) 1.63 (0.74)
2.29 (0.81) 2.63 (0.52) 1.88 (0.99)
1.83 (1.09) 2.25 (1.17) 2.00 (1.20)
1. Swearing and obscenity are more 
repulsive in the speech of a woman than 
aman.
2. Under modem economic conditions 
with women being active outside the 
home, men should share in household 
tasks such as washing dishes and doing 
the laundry.
3. It is insulting to women to have the 
“obey” clause remain in the marriage.
4. A woman should be as free as a man t( 
propose marriage.
5. Women should wony less about 
becoming good wives and mothers.
6. Women should assume their rightfid 
place in business and all the professions 
along with men.
7. A woman should not expect to go to 
exactly the same places or to have quite 
the same freedom of action as man.
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8. It is ridiculous for a woman to run a 2.00 (1.02) 2.00 (0.76) 2.25 (0.71)
locomotive and for a man to dam socks.
9. The intellectual leadership of a 2.00 (0.98)* 0.88 (0.64)*+ 2.13(0.99)^
community should be largely in the
hands of men.
10. Women should be given equal 2.25 (1.03) 2.75 (0.46) 2.50 (0.76)
opportunity with men for apprenticeship
in the various trades.
11. Women earnings as much as their 1.88 (0.85) 1.38 (1.06) 1.50 (0.53)
dates should bear equally the expense
when they go out together.
12. Sons in a family should be given 2.08 (0.97) 2.25 (0.46) 2.63 (0.52)
more encouragement to go to college
than daughters.
13. In general, the father should have 1.71 (0.86) 1.75 (1.04) 2.38 (0.74)
greater authority than the mother in the
bringing up of children.
14. Economic and social freedom is 1.54 (0.66) 1.38 (0.74) 1.75 (0.71)
worth far more to women than
acceptance of the ideal of femininity 
which has been set up by men.
15. There are many jobs in which men 1.63 (0.92) 1.38 (0.92) 1.75 (0.89)
should be given preference over women
in being hired or promoted.___________________________________________________
Note: Items 1, 5, 7, 8, 9,12,13, and 15 were scored with “agree strongly” scoring 0 and 
“disagree strongly” scoring 3. Tlie remaining items were scored in reverse.
*,  ^pairs of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD
4.3 Multiphasic Sex Inventory (MSI)
The three sex offender groups did not differ significantly on the 
Cognitive Distortion and immaturity Scale (CDI), the Justification Scale (JU), 
the Sexual Obsessions Scale (SO), and the Social Sexual Desirability scale 
(SSD). Their mean scores and standard deviations were described in Table 4.5. 
No significant difference on the scales was also found between the sex offender 
group, non-sex offender group, and college students. Their mean scores and
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standard deviations were described in Table 4.6. Nevertheless, several 
interesting findings were noted.
Table 4.5: Means (Standard Deviations) for Multiphasic Sex Inventoiy
Group
Scale Paedophiles (n=8) Rapists (n=8) Frotteurs (n=8)
Cognitive Distortion 
and Immaturity 
Justification 
Sexual Obsessions 
Social Sexual 
Desirability
5.86 (3.04)
6.25 (3.11)
5.25 (2.38)
19.00 (8.12)
7.88 (4.26) 
5.38(4.75)
3.75 (3.20)
17.75 (5.04)
8.50 (4.38) 
5.88 (5.67)
8.38 (6.86)
18.38 (6.80)
Table 4.6: Means (Standard Deviations) for Multiphasic Sex Inventoiy
Group
Scale Sex offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex offenders 
(n=8)
College students 
(n=8)
Cognitive Distortion 
and Immaturity 
Justification 
Sexual Obsessions 
Social Sexual 
Desirability
7.42 (3.93) 
5.83 (4.44) 
5.79 (4.80)
18.38 (6.49)
7.88 (5.73) 
4.00 (3.38) 
6.38 (4.57)
24.88 (6.33)
7.88 (4.12) 
2.63 (2.92)
4.38 (3.02)
18.75 (12.33)
All the subjects’ scores on the CDI which is intended to assess early 
childhood cognitive distortions which stay with the offender and help him to set 
the stage for his personality disorder and potential to act out sexually deviant 
impulses were in the range of scores described by the original authors as 
“Cognitive Distortions / Immaturity” (Nichols & Molinder, 1984). The score 
ranges include (1) Acceptable Range of Accountability, 0-3; (2) Cognitive 
Distortions / Immaturity, 4-9; (3) Character Disturbance / Victim Stance, 10-
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14; and (4) Severe Lack of Accountability for Actions, 15-21. The authors 
expected that an untreated sex offender would score between 3.924 and 8.756 
on the CDI. It is interesting to note that non-sex offenders and college students 
scored as high as sex offenders.
Nichols and Molinder (1984) obtained a mean score of 1.775 
(SD=1.818) for a normal group of adult males and an average raw score of 5 
for a group of treated rapists and child molesters on the SO. Hence, they 
divided the scores on the scale into four ranges as follows: (1) Expected 
Deviant Range, 3-9; (2) Questionable Range (Fake Good), 0-2; (3) Sexually 
Obsessed, 10-16; and (4) Acquiescent Response Set / Malingering, 17-20. 
However, both the non-sex offenders and college students scored in the same 
range as did the sex offender group in the present study.
The SSD is designed to identify “normal” heterosexual desires and 
interests and to detect the presence of a socially desirable response set. A mean 
score of 30.875 (SD=3.215) was obtained for a normal group of adult males 
(Nichols & Molinder, 1984). The scores on the scale are divided into four 
ranges: (1) “Normal” Sex Drives and Interests, 28-35; (2) Questionable Range, 
24-27; (3) Denies Sex Drives and Interests, 20-23; (4) Presents Asexual Image 
- Consider Dissimulation, 0-19. It was found that all of the sex offender groups 
and the college students scored within the last range. In other words, they were
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found to have attempted to project an asexual image - that they were not 
interested in sex. The non-sex offenders obtained a lower score on the scale 
which was nearer to the above-noted normal population mean.
There are four ranges of scores on the JU which include (1) Accepts 
Accountability, 0-1; (2) Justifies Sexual Deviance, 2-6; (3) Justifies Sexual 
Deviance / Marked, 7-10; and (4) Severe Lack of Accountability for Actions, 
11-24. Nichols and Molinder (1984) obtained a mean score of 5.625 
(SD=3.765) for a group of untreated offenders. According to them, the second 
range identifies the typical untreated sex offender who uses justifications for his 
sexual offences. All subjects groups in the present study scored within the same 
range.
4.4 Hanson Sex Attitude Questionnaire (HSAQ)
Table 4.7 showed that the Sexy Children Scale (SC) was highly 
correlated with the Sexual Harm Scale (SH). The Sexual Entitlement Scale 
(SE) also correlated with three of the five other scales. Though not 
significantly, the Affairs Scale (AFF) tended to correlate negatively with other 
scales. Among the six scales, the Sex/Affection Confusion Scale (SAC), the 
AFF and the SE correlated significantly with the Social Sexual Desirability
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Scale, implying that the response on the three scales were influenced by the 
subjects’ social desirability tendency.
Table 4.7: Intercorrelation Matrix for the Hanson Sex Attitude Scales and the Social Sexual 
Desirability Scale (n=40)
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Sex/Affection Confusion
2. Frustration .23
3. Affairs -.24 -.20
4. Sexual Entitlement .39* .32* -.22
5. Sexy Children .31 .14 -.27 .39*
6. Sexual Harm .22 .03 -.06 .29 .58**
7. Social Sexual Desirabihty .49** -.09 .39* -.44** -.30 -.07
Note: * p< .05; **p< .01.
No significant difference between the three sex offender groups was 
obtained on the HSAQ scales using the one-way analysis of variance method. It 
is interesting to note that paedophiles scored the highest on all the scales, 
suggesting that they could be more distorted in sex attitudes as measured by 
the scales although the difference might have been due to chance. The three 
groups’ mean scores and standard deviations were shown in Table 4.8. 
However, the non-sex offender group scored significantly higher than the sex 
offender group on the SC, F(2, 37) = 3.88, p < .05, implying that the former 
perceived children as more sexually attractive and sexually motivated. 
Differences between the sex offender group, non-sex offender group and the 
college students on other scales were not significant. Their mean scores and 
standard deviations were described in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.8: Means (Standard Deviations) for Hanson Sex Attitude Questionnaire
Group
Scale Paedophiles
(n=8)
Rapists
(n=8)
Frotteurs
(n=8)
Sex/Affection Confusion
Frustration
Affairs
Sexual Entitlement 
SQxy Children 
Sexual Harm
30.00 (7.67)
22.13 (2.47) 
11.88(3.98) 
34.88 (6.27)
34.13 (8.53) 
21.38 (5.88)
28.63 (6.76)
18.50 (3.66) 
9.13 (4.55)
32.88 (6.20)
29.50 (6.89) 
16.38 (4.24)
27.13 (6.77)
18.13 (4.19) 
9.38 (3.86)
34.25 (8.96) 
33.38 (7.82)
20.13 (13.67)
Table 4.9: Means (Standard Deviations) for Hanson Sex Attitude Questionnaire
Group
Scale sex offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex
offenders
(n=8)
College
students
(n=8)
Sex/Affection Confusion
Frustration
Affairs
Sexual Entitlement 
Sexy Children 
Sexual Harm
28.58 (6.87)
19.58 (3.83) 
10.13 (3.86) 
34.00 (6.98) 
32.33 (7.71)* 
19.29 (8.80)
34.13 (5.87) 
20.38 (4.81)
8.25 (4.71) 
36.00 (7.71) 
40.88 (8.95)*
22.13 (7.04)
28.25 (5.87)
18.50 (5.76) 
13.13 (3.83)
34.50 (4.69)
32.50 (6.28) 
20.75 (7.44)
Note: *pair of significantly different means (p <.05) on Tukey HSD
4.5 Semantic Differentials
The Semantic Differential used in the present study was comprised of 
sixteen scales randomly sorted and counterbalanced with respect to positive 
and negative dimensions. Seven different roles were rated. They were self, ideal 
self, boy, girl, man, woman, and spouse. Table 4.10 shows the mean scores and 
standard deviations for the sex offenders’ “self’ ratings. The three groups 
differed significantly on “loving - not loving”, F(2, 21) = 4.89, p < .05,
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suggesting that frotteurs perceived themselves as significantly more loving than 
did the other two groups. The three groups did not differ on the rest of the 
scales. Though not significant, there was a trend that paedophiles viewed 
themselves as bigger, less kind, more unpleasant, more dominant, and more 
sexless than the other sex offenders. The mean scores and standard deviations 
for the self ratings of the sex offender group, non-sex offender group, and the 
college students were shown in Table 4.11. No significant difference between 
the groups was obtained on any of the scales.
Table 4.10: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Self ’ Rating by Sex Offender Groups
_______________ Group______________________
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
(n=8)_________ (1^ 8)_________ (n=8)
deceitful - truthful 5.75 (1.04) 5.25 (1.49) 4.75 (2.25)
kind - cruel 3.50 (1.78) 2.88 (1.55) 1.88 (1.64)
immature - mature 4.50 (2.45) 4.13 (1.64) 5.75 (1.49)
trusting - suspicious 3.63 (1.07) 2.63 (1.77) 2.38 (1.41)
pleasant - unpleasant 4.13 (1.36) 3^3 (1.77) 2.88 (1.64)
loving - not loving 3.63 (1.60)* 3.50 (1.20)+ 1.88 (0.83)*+
sexy - sexless 4.50 (2.27) 338 (1.51) 338 (1.89)
seductive - repulsive 3J8 (2.07) 4.38 (1.41) 3.63 (0.74)
beautifiil - u^y 3.38 (1.51) 4.50 (1.31) 3.75 (1.28)
clean - dirty 3.25 (1.91) 3.38 (2.78) 2.38 (1.69)
submissive - dominant 3.88 (1.96) 2.63 (1.77) 2.88 (1.64)
erotic - frigid 4.00 (1.31) 3.63 (1.06) 3.00 (1.41)
constrained - spontaneous 5.25 (1.28) 4.38 (1.06) 4.88 (1.55)
soft - hard 4.75 (1.04) 3.75 (1.75 4.50 (1.41)
hot-tempered - calm 4.63 (1.77) 5.00 (1.60) 4.88 (1.73)
big - small 3.38 (1.69) 4.38 (1.19) 4.13 (1.46)
Note: *, pairs of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD
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Table 4.11: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Self’ Rating by Sex Offenders, Non-sex 
Offenders, and College Stutots
Scale (rated 1 to 7)
Group
Sex offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex
Offenders
(n=8)
College
Students
(n=8)
deceitful - truthful 5.25 1.65) 4.25 (1.69) 4.25 (1.04)
kind - cruel 2.75 1.73) 2.88 (0.99) 2.63 (1.06)
immature - mature 4.79 1.96) 338 (2.30) 4.38 (1.51)
trusting - suspicious 238 1.78) 2.88 (1.25) 2.75 (1.04)
pleasant - unpleasant 3.54 1.61) 338 (2.17) 3.13 (1.36)
loving - not loving 3.00 1.44) 3.13 (1.36) 3.75 (1.83)
SGxy - sexless 3.92 1.89) 3.25 (1.67) 4.00 (1.31)
seductive - repulsive 3.79 1.50) 3.13 (1.13) 4.50 (1.20)
beautiful - ugly 338 1.39) 3.50 (1.07) 3.75 (1.28)
clean - dirty 3.00 2.13) 2.63 (1.19) 3.50 (1.41)
submissive - dominant 3.13 1.80) 3.63 (1.41) 4.00 (1.31)
erotic - frigid 3.54 1.28) 3.38 (1.77) 3.75 (1.49)
constrained - spontaneous 4.83 1.31) 4.38 (1.69) 4.63 (1.92)
soft - hard 433 1.43) 3.75 (1.83) 4.38 (1.60)
hot-tempered - calm 4.83 1.63) 4.63 (1.77) 4.63 (1.06)
big - small 3.96 1.46) 3.25 (1.17) 3.00 (0.93)
Table 4.12 shows the means scores and standard deviations for the 
“ideal self’ ratings of the sex offender groups. Paedophiles were found to have 
rated their ideal selves significantly less calm than did rapists, F(2, 21) = 3.92, p 
< .05. It is interesting to note that paedophiles tended to rate their ideal selves 
more negatively than did the other two groups such as more cruel, suspicious, 
unpleasant, sexless, and ugly. No such apparent difference was identified 
between rapists and fi’otteurs. The means scores and standards deviations for 
the ideal self ratings of the sex offender group, non-sex offender group and 
college students are described in Table 4.13. Sex offenders perceived their ideal 
selves as significantly more truthful than did non-sex offenders, F(2, 37) = 7.53,
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p < .05. It was also found that college students perceived their ideal selves as 
significantly more dominant than did sex offenders, F(2, 37) = 4.86, p < .05.
Table 4.12: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Ideal Self’ Rating by Sex Offender Groups
_______________ Group ___________________
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Paedopliiles Rapists Frotteurs
(n=8) (n=8)
deceitful - truthftil 6.00 (1.07) 6.00 (1.41) 6.50 (0.93)
kind - cruel 3.63 (1.92) 2.38 (1.77) 1.88 (1.13)
immature - mature 6.25 (1.04) 6.50 (0.93) 6.38 (1.06)
trusting - suspicious 3.13 (2.03) 1.75 (1.75) 1.50 (1.07)
pleasant - unpleasant 3.13 (1.81) 1.88 (1.73) 1.50 (1.07)
loving - not loving 2.63 (0.92) 2.38 (1.69) 1.88 (1.25)
sejg^  - sexless 4.63 (1.92) 3.00 (1.41) 2j& (1.25)
seductive - repulsive 2.88 (1.36) 3.38 (1.69) 2.88 (1.13)
beautifiil - ugly 4.00 (2.00) 2.88 (1.46) 2.50 (1.20)
clean - dirty 3.38 (2.00) 2.13 (2.10) 2.63 (2.07)
submissive - dominant 3.88 (2.10) 3.13 (2.59) 2J8 (1.69)
erotic - frigid 3jK (1.46) 3.88 (0.64) 3.63 (0.74)
constrained - spontaneous 4.75 (1.83) 5.38 (1.60) 5.38 (1.30)
soft - hard 4.38 (1.77) 4.38 (2.07) 4.88 (1.89)
hot-tempered - calm 4.38 (2.07)* 6.50 (0.76)* 4.63 (1.85)
big - small 2.63 (1.60) 2.88 (1.25) 4.25 (1.39)
Note: * pair of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD
Table 4.13: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Ideal Self’ Rating by Sex Offencters, Non-sex 
Offenders, and College Students
_______________ Group_____
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Sex offenders Non-sex College
(n=24) Offenders Students
___________________________________________ (n=8)_________ (n=8)
deceitful - trutliful 6.17 (1.13)* 4.75 (1.49)* 5.13 (1.80)
kind - cruel 2.63 (1.74) 2.50 (2.75) 2.75 (1.17)
immature - mature 6.38 (0.97) 5.88 (0.83) . 5.88 (1.25)
trusting - suspicious 2.13 (1.75) 2.25 (1.17) 1.50 (0.76)
pleasant - unpleasant 2.17 (1.66) 2.13 (1.13) 2.25 (1.49)
loving - not loving 2.29 (1.30) 3.38 (1.19) 2.25 (1.83)
sexy - sexless 3.50 (1.69) 2.88 (1.36) 2.88 (1.46)
seductive - repulsive 3.04 (1.37) 3.25 (0.89) 3.38 (0.74)
beautififi - ugly 3.13 (1.65) 2.88 (0.99) 3.13 (1.89)
clean - dirty 2.71 (2.03) 2.13 (0.99) 2.00 (1.07)
submissive - dominant 3.13 (2.15)* 5.00 (1.20) 5.13 (1.73)*
erotic - frigid 3.79 (0.98) 3.50 (0.76) 3.63 (0.74)
constrained - spontaneous 5.17 (1.55) 5.38 (1.51) 6.00 (0.93)
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soft-hard 4.54(1.84) 5.25(1.58) 5.38(1.06)
hot-tempered - calm 5.17(1.86) 5.50(1.07) 5.75(1.17)
big - small____________________ 3.25(1.54) 3.38(1.19) 3.63 (1.85)
Note: * pairs of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD
Table 4.14 shows the ratings of the sex offender groups on “man”. It 
was found that frotteurs viewed man as significantly more pleasant than did 
paedophiles, F(2, 21) = 7.39, p < .0.01. It is worth noting that the ratings of 
paedophiles on men were generally more negative than those of the other two 
groups. The mean ratings of the sex offender group, non-sex offender group 
and college students are shown in Table 4.15. College students perceived man 
as significantly more seductive than did non-sex offenders, F(2, 37) = 4.05, p < 
.05. Non-sex offenders viewed man as significantly higher on “soft-hard” than 
did sex offenders, F(2, 37) = 5.14, p < .05. It was also noted that non-sex 
offenders tended to perceive man as more cruel, repulsive, ugly, and dirty than 
did the other groups.
Table 4.14: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Man” Rating by Sex Offender Groups
_______________ Group______________________
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
_____________________________(n=8)_________(n=8)__________(n=8)
deceitful - truthful 4.63 (1.92) 4.88 (1.13) 4.63 (2.45)
kind - cruel 4.25 (1.49) 3.50 (1.41) 2.63 (2.26)
immature - mature 5.00 (1.07) 5.75 (1.28) 5.25 (1.98)
trusting - suspicious 4.63 (1.41) 3.16 (1.64) 2.63 (2.45)
pleasant - unpleasant 4.13 (1.46)** 3.16 (1.64) 1.88 (1.13)**
loving - not loving 4.13 (1.46) 3.38 (1.51) 2.50 (1.60)
sexy - sexless 4.63 (1.60) 3.63 (0.74) 3.25 (1.17)
seductive - repulsive 3.13 (1.81) 3.75 (0.89) 3.75 (0.89)
beautiful - ugly 4.13 (1.64) 3.75 (0.71) 2.75 (1.49)
clean - dirty 4.13 (1.46) 3.00 (1.69) 2.63 (1.60)
submissive - dominant 4.50 (1.41) 3.38 (2.20) 4.13 (2.17)
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erotic - frigid 3.00 (1.31) 3.50 (0.93) 3.38 (1.30)
constrained - spontaneous 4.88 (1.55) 5.00 (1.31) 5.25 (1.75)
soft - hard 5.00 (1.60) 4.00 (1.31) 4.13 (1.64)
hot-tempered - calm 2.75 (1.04) 3.50 (1.85) 4.75 (2.12)
big - small 3.00 (1.85) 2.75 (1.04) 4.38 (1.06)
Note: ** pair of significantly different means (p < .01) on Tukey HSD
Table 4.15: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Man” Rating by Sex Offenders, Non-sex
Offenders, and College Students
Group
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Sex offenders Non-sex College
(n=24) Offenders Students
(n=8) (n=8)
deceitful - truthful 4.71 (1.83) 3.00 (1.51) 4.13 (1.81)
kind - cruel 3.46 (1.82) 4.88 (1.46) 3.38 (1.30)
immature - mature 5.33 (1.46) 6.00 (0.76) 5.63 (1.06)
trusting - suspicious 3.46 (2.00) 4.50 (1.93) 2.25 (1.58)
pleasant - unpleasant 3.08 (1.47) 3.50 (1.60) 2.38 (0.92)
loving - not loving 3.33 (1.61) 4.25 (1.39) 3.00 (1.31)
sexy - sexless 3.83 (1.31) 4.00 (1.69) 3.50(1.31)
seductive - repulsive 3.54 (1.25) 4.88 (1.13)* 3.50 (1.07)*
beautiful - ugly 3.54 (1.41) 4.50 (1.07) 3.13 (1.13)
clean - dirty 3.25 (1.65) 4.38 (1.51) 3.38 (1.60)
submissive - dominant 4.00 (1.93) 5.50 (1.07) 4.75 (1.91)
erotic - frigid 3.29 (1.16) 3.13 (1.89) 3.25 (1.17)
constrained - spontaneous 5.04 (1.49) 5.00(1.31) 4.38 (1.60)
soft - hard 4.38 (1.53)* 6.25 (0.71)* 4.88 (1.64)
hot-tempered - calm 3.67(1.86) 2.75 (1.67) 4.75 (2.25)
big - small 3.38 (1.50) 2.75 (1.39) 2.88 (1.13)
Note: * pairs of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD
Table 4.16 shows the means and standard deviations for sex offender 
groups’ ratings on ‘Svoman”. It was found that frotteurs scored significantly 
lower than paedophiles on (1) kind-cruel, F(2, 21) = 4.46, p < .05; (2) pleasant- 
unpleasant, F(2, 21) = 5.29, p < .05; (3) loving-not loving, F(2, 21) = 3.69, p < 
.05; (4) sexy-sexless, F(2, 21) = 4.46, p < .05; and (5) soft-hard, F(2, 21) = 
6.78, p < .01. Paedophiles seemed to have found women less attractive and 
desirable on those scales than did frotteurs. Such trend was also apparent on
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the other scales on woman. The means and standard deviations for the ratings 
of sex offender group, non-sex offender group, and college students on woman 
are shown in Table 4.17. Non-sex offenders scored significantly lower than sex 
offenders on soft-hard, F(2, 37) = 4.63, p < .05. No significant difference was 
found on other scales between the groups.
Table 4.16: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Woman” Rating by Sex Offender Groups
Group
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
(n=8)_________ (n=8)_________ (n=8)
deceitful - truthful 3.88 (2.17) 5.13 (1.25) 5.50 (1.86)
kind - cruel 3.50 (1.77)* 2.38 (1.30) 1.50 (0.76)*
immature - mature 4.88 (1.46) 4.50 (2.20) 6.00 (1.20)
trusting - suspicious 4.00 (1.51) 2.75 (1.49) 2.38 (1.69)
pleasant - unpleasant 3.75 (1.67)* 2.86 (1.25) 1.63 (0.92)*
loving - not loving 3.88 (1.36)* 2.50 (1.51) 2.00 (1.41)*
sexy - sexless 4.63 (1.41)* 2.75 (1.67) 2.63 (1.41)*
seductive - repulsive 3.00 (1.41) 3.00 (1.69) 2.88 (1.17)
beautiful - ugly 3.38 (1.69) 2.88 (1.77) 2.00 (1.20)
clean - dirty 3.13 (1.89) 2.63 (1.69) 1.88 (1.36)
submissive - dominant 3.38 (1.85) 2.75 (1.67) 2.38 (1.19)
erotic - frigid 3.75 (1.83) 4.13 (0.64) 3.38 (1.06)
constrained - spontaneous 4.00 (1.77) 3.88 (1.55) 3.13 (1.13)
soft - hard 4.25 (1.67)** 1.88 (0.64)** 2.88 (1.36)
hot-tempered - calm 4.25 (1.98) 5.00 (1.51) 5.88 (1.55)
big - sniall 3.75 (1.83) 5.00 (0.93) 4.50 (1.07)
Note: * pairs of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD; ** (p < .01)
Table 4.17: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Woman” Rating by Sex Offenders, Non-sex 
Offenders, and College Students
Group
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Sex offenders Non-sex College
(n=24) Offenders Students
___________________________________________ (n=8)_________ (n=8)
deceitful - truthful 4.83(1.86) 4.38(2.00) 5.25(1.58)
kind-cruel 2.46(1.53) 2.63(1.92) 1.88(0.83)
immature - mature 5.13 (1.73) 4.00(2.00) 4.13 (1.89)
trusting - suspicious 3.04(1.65) 3.88(2.23) 2.13 (1.25)
pleasant - unpleasant 2.75(1.54) 3.38(1.69) 2.25(1.28)
loving - not loving 2.79(1.59) 2.13 (0.83) 1.63 (0.52)
sexy - sexless 3.33(1.71) 2.25(1.28) 2.75(1.04)
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seductive - repulsive 2.96 (1.37) 2.38 (1.30) 3.00 (1.31)
beautiful - ugly 2.75 (1.59) 1.63 (0.74) 2.00 (1.31)
clean - dirty 2.54 (1.67) 1.63 (0.74) 1.63 (1.06)
submissive - dominant 2.83 (1.58) 1.88 (0.83) 2.13 (0.83)
erotic - frigid 3.75 (1.26) 3.38 (1.30) 3.88 (0.99)
constrained - spontaneous 3.67 (1.49) 2.38 (1.41) 3.63 (1.60)
soft - hard 3.00 (1.59)* 1.50 (0.53)* 2.00 (0.76)
hot-tempered - calm 5.04 (1.76) 5.50 (1.69) 5.63 (1.19)
big - small 4.42 (1.38) 5.38 (1.30) 5.25 (0.89)
Note: * pair of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD
Table 4.18 describes the means ratings of the sex offender groups on 
“boy”. The groups differed significantly on pleasant-unpleasant, F(2, 21) = 
12.31, p < .001. It was found that paedophiles viewed boys as more unpleasant 
than did the other groups. In fact, paedophiles’ ratings on the rest of the scales 
suggested that they viewed boys more negatively than did the other two groups 
in general. Table 4.19 shows the mean ratings of the sex offender group, non­
sex offender group and college students. Non-sex offenders scored significantly 
lower on (1) immature-mature, F{2, 37) = 4.17, p < .05; and (2) pleasant- 
unpleasant, F(2, 37) = 5.50, p < .01, than did sex offenders, suggesting that the 
former perceived boys as less mature and more pleasant than did the latter.
Table 4.18: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Boy” Rating by Sex Offender Groups
_______________ Group______________________
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
_____________________________(n—8)_________ (n=8)_________ (n=8)
deceitful - truthful 4.63 (2.07) 5.75 (1.39) 4.75 (2.38)
kind - cruel 3.63 (2.13) 2.63 (1.85) 1.63 (1.06)
immature - mature 4.50 (1.85) 2.63 (0.92) 3.00 (1.93)
trusting - suspicious 4.13 (1.46) 2.75 (1.83) 3.25 (2.12)
pleasant - unpleasant 4.75 (1.28)*+ 3.00 (1.60)* 1.75 (0.46)+
loving - not loving 3.88 (1.46) 3.00 (2.00) 2.50 (0.93)
SGxy - sexless 4.50 (1.85) 2.88 (1.36) 3.75 (1.28)
seductive - repulsive 3.88 (2.10) 3.50 (1.60) 3.25 (0.89)
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beautiful - ugly 3.88 (1.81) 3.00 (1.77) 2.88 (1.13)
clean - dirty 4.13 (1.96) 2.75 (1.98) 2.38 (1.19)
submissive - dominant 3.63 (1.51) 3.25 (1.83) 2.88 (1.64)
erotic - frigid 4.13 (1.55) 3.50 (0.76) 4.13 (1.56)
constrained - spontaneous 5.00 (1.31) 4.63 (1.77) 4.88 (1.46)
soft - hard 3.88 (1.64) 5.25 (1.67) 3.75 (0.89)
hot-tempered - calm 3.63 (1.60) 3.88 (1.55) 3.75 (1.83)
big - small 4.88 (2.03) 4.13 (1.36) 4.50 (1.07)
Note: *, pairs of significantly different means (p < .001) on Tukey HSD
Table 4.19: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Boy” Rating by Sex Offenders, Non-sex 
Offenders, and College Students
Scale (rated 1 to 7)
Group
Sex offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex
Offenders
College
Students
deceitful - truthful 5.04 (1.97) 5.63 (1.51) 5.50 (1.20)
kind - cruel 2.63 (1.86) 2.38 (1.60) 2.38 (0.74)
immature - mature 3.38 (1.76)* 1.63 (1.06)* 2.13 (1.73)
trusting - suspicious 3.38 (1.84) 2.25 (1.39) 2.88 (1.64)
pleasant - unpleasant 3.17 (1.71)** 1.38 (0.74)** 1.88 (1.13)
loving - not loving 3.13 (1.57) 1.88 (1.36) 2.38 (1.69)
sexy - sexless 3.71 (1.60) 5.00 (2.14) 4.75 (1.98)
seductive - repulsive 3.54 (1.56) 3.50 (1.07) 4.12 (1.13)
beautiful - ugly 3.25 (1.59) 2.63 (1.19) 2.75 (1.58)
clean - dirty 3.08 (1.84) 3.00 (1.69) 3.00 (1.85)
submissive - dominant 3.25 (1.62) 2.50 (1.31) 2.63 (1.19)
erotic - frigid 3.92 (1.32) 3.63 (1.19) 4.75 (1.49)
constrained - spontaneous 4.83 (1.46) 5.38 (2.13) 4.75 (1.75)
soft - hard 4.29 (1.55) 3.50 (1.85) 3.88 (1.96)
hot-tempered - calm 3.75 (1.59) 4.88 (1.55) 4.13 (1.46)
big - small 4.50 (1.50) 4.50 (1.85) 5.00 (1.51)
Note: * pair of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD; ** (p < .01)
The mean ratings of the sex offender groups on girl is shown in table 
4.20. Paedophiles scored significantly differently fi’om frotteurs on trusting- 
suspicious, F(2, 21) = 4.31, p < .05. The former viewed girls as more 
suspicious than did the latter. The three groups also differed significantly in 
their ratings on pleasant-unpleasant, F(2, 21) = 8.25, p < .01. Girls were
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perceived as more pleasant by rapists and frotteurs than by paedophiles. It is 
worth noting that paedophiles tended to evaluate girls more negatively on other 
scales than did the other two groups. There was no significant difference 
between sex offenders, non-sex offenders, and college students in their “girl” 
ratings. Their mean ratings are shown in Table 4.21.
Table 4.20: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Girl” Rating by Sex Offender Groups
_______________ Group______________________
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
(n=8)_________ (n=8)______  (n=8)
deceitful - truthful 4.88 (2.03) 6.00 (1.07) 5.50 (2.51)
kind - cruel 3.25 (1.75) 1.88 (1.36) 2.00 (2.07)
immature - mature 4.50 (1.77) 3.75 (2.12) 2.63 (1.77)
trusting - suspicious 3.88 (1.64)* 2.25 (1.58) 2.00 (0.76)*
pleasant - unpleasant 4.25 (1.49)**+ 2.00 (1.41)** 1.88 (0.99)+
loving - not loving 3.63 (1.60) 2.25 (1.75) 2.13 (1.25)
sexy - sexless 4.50 (1.85) 3.50 (1.41) 3.75 (1.98)
seductive - repulsive 3.13 (1.46) 3.50 (1.41) 3.50 (0.93)
beautiful - ugly 3.50 (2.00) 2.63 (1.77) 2.00 (1.07)
clean - dirty 3.50 (1.93) 2.25 (1.75) 1.75 (1.17)
submissive - dominant 3.63 (1.92) 2.25 (1.67) 2.38 (0.92)
erotic - fiigid 4.13 (1.64) 4.13 (0.99) 4.13 (1.73)
constrained - spontaneous 4.13 (2.03) 4.00 (2.27) 3.25 (1.49)
soft - hard 3.88 (2.03) 3.13 (1.55) 2.38 (1.41)
hot-tempered - calm 4.13 (1.81) 5.63 (1.06) 4.75 (1.75)
big - small 4.63 (1.85) 4.88 (0.99) 4.75 (1.33)
Note: * pair of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD; **,+ (p < .01)
Table 4.21: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Girl” Rating ty Sex Offenders, Non-sex 
Offenders, and College Students
_______________ Group______________________
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Sex offenders Non-sex College
(n=24) Offenders Students
___________________________________________ (n=8)_________ (n=8)
deceitful-truthful 5.46(1.93) 5.63(1.77) 6.13 (0.64)
kind-cruel 2.38(1.79) 1.75(1.04) • 1.50(0.53)
immature - mature 3.63 (1.97) 2.00(1.41) 2.63 (1.77)
trusting - suspicious 2.71(1.57) 2.25(1.17) 1.75(0.71)
pleasant - unpleasant 2.71 (1.68) 1.38(0.52) 2.38(2.00)
loving - not loving 2.67(1.63) 1.63 (0.92) 1.75(1.17)
sexy - sexless 3.92 (1.74) 3.25 (1.17) 4.50 (1.60)
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seductive - repulsive 3.38 (1.24) 3.25 (1.28) 3.88 (0.99)
beautiful - ugly 2.71 (T71) 1.88 (1.13) 1.88 (0.83)
clean - dirty 2.50 (1.74) 1.88 (1.13) 1.50 (0.53)
submissive - dominant 2.75 (1.62) 1.63 (0:74) 2.75 (1.04)
erotic - frigid 4.13 (1.42) 3.88 (1.25) 4.88 (1.46)
constrained - spontaneous 3.79 (1.91) 3.50 (1.77) 3.38 (2.00)
soft - hard 3.13 (1.73) 1.88 (1.13) 2.13 (0.99)
hot-tempered - calm 4.83 (1.63) 5.75 (1.04) 5.50 (1.69)
big - small 4.75 (1.33) 5.63 (1.41) 5.88 (0.99)
Table 4.22 shows the mean scores and standard deviations for the 
“spouse” rating by the sex offender groups. The difference between 
paedophiles’ and rapists’ scores on hot-tempered-calm was significant, F(2, 21) 
= 4.23, p < .05. Rapist perceived spouse as more calm than did paedophiles. 
Although there was no significant difference between the groups on the other 
scales, paedophiles again tended to be more negative than the other two groups 
in their evaluation of spouse. Differences in the perception of spouse between 
sex offenders, non-sex offenders, and college students were not significant. 
Their means scores and standard deviations are shown in Table 4.23.
Table 4.22; Means (Standard Deviations) for “Spouse” Rating by Sex Offender Groups
Group
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
_____________________ _______ (n=8)_________ (n=8)__________(n=8)
deceitful - truthful 5.00 (1.93) 6.25 (1.39) 6.13 (2.10)
kind - cruel 3.00 (2.00) 2.00 (1.69) 1.50 (0.76)
immature - mature 6.00 (1.07) 5.88 (1.25) 6.25 (1.17)
trusting - suspicious 3.88 (1.96) 1.75 (1.75) 1.88 (1.81)
pleasant - unpleasant 3.00 (1.85) 2.13 (1.89) 1.38 (0.52)
loving - not loving 3.13 (2.17) 1.75 (1.75) 1.38 (0.74)
sexy - sexless 3.63 (1.60) 2.75 (1.67) 3.00 (0.93)
seductive - repulsive 3.38 (1.77) 3.13 (1.46) 3.38 (1.51)
beautiful - ugly 3.38 (2.33) 2.63 (2.00) 1.88 (1.13)
clean - dirty 3.25 (2.25) 2.00 (2.07) 1.63 (1.06)
submissive - dominant 3.88 (1.55) 2.75 (1.91) 2.00 (1.70)
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erotic-frigid 3.50(1.41) 4.00(0.93) 3.88(1.64)
constrained - spontaneous 4.88(1.13) 4.75(1.98) 4.25(1.28)
soft-hard 3.63 (1.85) 2.75(2.05) 3.25(1.75)
hot-tempered - calm 4.75(1.75)* 6.63 (0.52)* 5.50(1.31)
big-small___________________ 3.75 (1.75) 4.38 (0.92) 4.50 (0.93)
Note: * pair of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD
Table 4.23 : Means (Standard Deviations) for “Spouse” Rating by Sex Offenders, Non-sex 
Offenders, and College Students
Group
Scale (rated 1 to 7) Sex offenders Non-sex College
(n=24) Offenders Students
___________________________________________ (n=8)_________ (n=8)
deceitful - truthful 5.79 (1.84) 5.75 (1.49) 5.88 (1.73)
kind - cruel 2.17 (1.63) 2.13 (0.83) 2.13 (1.13)
immature - mature 6.04 (1.12) 5.00 (1.93) 5.50 (1.41)
trusting - suspicious 2.50 (2.02) 2.50 (1.51) 1.25 (0.71)
pleasant - unpleasant 2.17 (1.63) 1.75 (0.71) 1.50 (1.07)
loving - not loving 2.08 (1.77) 1.75 (0.71) 1.13 (0.35)
sexy - sexless 3.13 (1.42) 2.50 (0.93) 3.00 (1.31)
seductive - repulsive 3.29 (1.52) 2.75 (1.17) 2.88 (1.36)
beautiful - ugly 2.63 (1.91) 2.50 (0.93) 2.00 (1.07)
clean - dirty 2.29 (1.92) 1.75 (0.46) 1.63 (0.74)
submissive - dominant 2.88 (1.68) 2.38 (0.92) 2.13 (1.36)
erotic - frigid 3.79 (1.32) 3.13 (1.13) 3.50 (1.20)
constrained - spontaneous 4.63 (1.47) 4.13 (1.73) 4.38 (1.77)
soft - hard 3.21 (1.84) 2.63 (1.06) 3.75 (1.58)
hot-tempered - calm 5.63 (1.47) 5.38 (1.30) 5.88 (0.99)
big - small 4.21 (1.25) 4.63 (1.77) 4.75 (0.89)
The sixteen items were grouped under the three categories factor- 
analysed by Horley and Quinsey (1994), namely, the evaluative component, the 
sexual evaluative component and the activity component. Grouped under the 
evaluative component were deceitful-truthfiil, kind-cruel, immature-mature, 
soft-hard and hot-tempered-calm. Grouped under the sexual evaluative 
component were pleasant-unpleasant, sexy-sexless, seductive-repulsive, 
beautiful-ugly, and clean-dirty. Grouped under the activity component were 
submissive-dominant, erotic-fiigid, and constrained-spontaneous. Trusting-
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suspicious, loving-not loving, and big-small w q t q  not grouped under any of the 
three categories because they Avere not included in Horley and Quinsey’s 
(1994) original factor analysis.
Table 4.24 shows that there was no significant difference among the the 
three sex offender groups on all of the three factors on the “Self’ Rating. Table 
4.25 shows similar results for the sex offenders, non-sex offenders, and college 
students.
Table 4.24: Means (Standard Deviations) for “SeU” Rating by the three Sex Offender Groups
Group
Factors Paedophiles
(n=8)
Rapists
(n=8)
Frotteurs
(n=8)
Evaluative component 
Sexual evaluative component 
Activity component
3.48 (0.60) 
3.65 (1.25) 
3.63 (0.65)
3.25 (0.91) 
3.85 (1.41) 
3.88 (0.80)
3.00 (0.88) 
3.30 (0.45) 
3.75 (1.18)
Table 4.25: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Self’ Rating by Sex Offenders, Non-sex 
Offenders, and College Students
Group
Factors Sex Offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex
Offenders
(n=8)
College
Students
(n=8)
Evaluative component 
Sexual evaluative component 
Activity component
3.24 (0.80) 
3.60 (1.09) 
3.75 (0.87)
5.58 (0.84) 
3.28 (0.94) 
3.79 (0.67)
3.55 (0.65) 
3.78 (1.03) 
3.71 (1.40)
Table 4.26 shows that the three sex offender groups did not differ 
significantly on the three factors. Sex Offenders scored significantly more 
negatively on the activity component in their perception of ideal self than did
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college students (F(2.37) = 4.02, p < .05) as illustrated in Table 4.27. In other 
words. College students were more likely to construe their ideal self as 
spontaneous, erotic and dominant.
Table 4.26: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Ideal Self’ Rating by the three Sex Offender 
Groups
Group
Factors Paedophiles
(n=8)
Rapists
(n=8)
Frotteurs
(n=8)
Evaluative component 
Sexual evaluative component 
Activity component
3.08 (0.53) 
3.60 (1.05) 
3.75 (1.06)
2.35 (0.85) 
2.65 (1.53) 
3.46(1.01)
2.65 (0.62) 
2.48 (0.71) 
3.96 (0.72)
Table 4,27: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Ideal Self’ Rating by Sex Offenders, Non- 
Offenders, and College Students
Group
Factors Sex Offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex
Offenders
(n=8)
College
Students
(n=8)
Evaluative component 
Sexual evaluative component 
Activity component
2.69 (0.72) 
2.91 (1.21) 
3.72 (0.93)*
3.13 (0.72) 
2.65 (0.90) 
3.04 (0.84)
3.05 (0.74) 
2.73 (0.99) 
2.83 (0.69)*
Note: * pair of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD
Table 4.28 and 4.29 shows no significant difference between the subject 
groups on any of the factors in their perception of man.
Table 4.28: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Man” Rating by the three Sex Offender 
Groups
Group
Factors Paedopliiles Rapists Frotteurs
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8)
Evaluative component 4.18 (0.70) 3.48 (0.87) 3.23 (1.54)
Sexual evaluative component 4.03 (0.98) 3.48 (0.86) 3.23 (1.54)
Activity component 3.21 (1.05) 3.71 (0.76) 3.33 (1.63)
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Table 4.29: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Man” Rating by Sex Offenders, Non-sex 
Offenders, and College Students
Factors
Group
Sex Offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex
Offenders
(n-8)
College
Students
(n=8)
Evaluative component 3.63 (1.13) 4.68 (0.99) 3.55 (1.07)
Sexual evaluative component 3.58 (1.16) 4.25 (0.87) 3.18 (0.99)
Activity component 3.42 (1.17) 2.88 (0.73) 3.38 (1.07)
Regarding the perception of woman, the three sex offender groups 
differed significantly on the first factor (refer to Table 4.30), namely, the 
evaluative component. Paedophiles scored significantly higher than the other 
two groups (F(2,21) = 7.65, p < .01), meaning that their general evaluation of 
woman were more negative than that of rapists and fi'otteurs. There was no 
significant difference among sex offenders, non-sex offenders and college 
students in this respect as described in Table 4.31.
Table 4.30: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Woman” Rating by the three Sex Offender 
Groups
Group
Factors Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8)
Evaluative component 3.75 (1.11)*+ 2.73 (0.69)* 2.20 (0.49)+
Sexual evaluative component 3.57 (1.08) 2.83 (1.57) 2.20 (0.88)
Activity component 4.13 (1.38) 4.54 (0.82) 4.63 (0.65)
Note: *, pairs of significantly different means (p < .01) on Tukey HSD
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Table 4.31 ; Means (Standard Deviations) for “Woman” Rating ty  Sex Offenders, Non-sex 
Offenders, and College Students
Factors
Group
Sex Offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex
Offenders
(n=8)
College
Students
(n=8)
Evaluative component 2.89 (1.01) 2.85 (1.07) 2.55 (0.81)
Sexual evaluative component 2.87 (1.29) 2.18 (0.76) 2.33 (0.91)
Activity component 4.43 (0.98) 5.04 (0.60) 4.71 (0.72)
Paedophiles also scored significantly more negatively on the sexual 
evaluative component than frotteurs in their perception of boy (F(2, 21) = 5.01. 
p < .05) as described in Table 4.32. No significant difference among sex 
offenders, non-sex offenders and college students was obtained on the three 
factors which was shown in Table 4.33.
Table 4.32: Means (StandardDeviations) for “Boy” Rating by the three Sex Offender Groups
Factors
Group
Paedophiles
(n=8)
Rapists
(n=8)
Frotteurs
(n=8)
Evaluative component 3.75 (0.63) 3.85 (0.48) 3.58 (0.96)
Sexual evaluative component 4.23 (0.88)* 3.03 (1.28) 2.80 (0.62)*
Activity component 3.83 (1.28) 3.88 (0.76) 4.12 (0.96)
Note: *pair of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD
Table 4.33: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Boy” Rating by Sex Offenders, Non-sex 
Offenders, and College Students
Factors
Group
Sex Offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex
Offenders
(n=8)
College
Students
(n=8)
Evaluative component 3.73 (0.69) 3.55 (0.77) 3.70 (0.37)
Sexual evaluative component 3.35 (1.12) 3.10(0.99) 3.30 (1.15)
Activity component 3.94 (0.99) 3.92 (0.66) 4.46 (0.91)
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Again, paedophiles obtained significantly more negative scores on the 
sexual evaluative component compared with the other two groups of sex 
offenders in their perception of girls (F(2,21) = 4.48. p < .05). The results are 
shown in Table 4.34. There was no significant difference among sex offenders, 
non-sex offenders and college students on the three factors in their perception 
of girl as illustrated in Table 4.35.
Table 4.34: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Girl” Rating by the three Sex Offender Groups
Group
Factors Paedopliiles
(n=8)
Rapists
(n=8)
Frotteurs
(n=8)
Evaluative component 
Sexual evaluative component 
Activity component
3.53 (1.10) 
4.03 (0.82)* 
4.13 (1.72)
2.73 (0.44) 
2.78 (1.45) 
4.63 (0.95)
3.10 (0.86) 
2.50 (0.88)* 
4.83 (0.54)
Note: *pair of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD
Table 4.35: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Girl” Rating ty  Sex Offenders, Non-sex 
Offenders, and College Students
Group
Factors Sex Offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex
Offenders
(n=8)
College
Students
(n=8)
Evaluative component 
Sexual evaluative component 
Activity component
3.12(0.87) 
3.10(1.24) 
4.53 (1.16)
2.85 (0.74) 
2.33 (0.84) 
4.92 (0.66)
2.86 (0.51) 
2.83 (0.85) 
4.92(1.14)
Finally, there was no significant difference in their scores on any of the 
factors in their perception of spouse among the three sex offenders groups and 
among sex offenders, non-sex offenders and college students. The results are 
shown in Table 4.36 and Table 4.37 respectively.
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Table 4.36: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Spouse” Rating by the three Sex Offender 
Groups
Group
Factors Paedophiles
(n=8)
Rapists
(n=8)
Frotteurs
(n=8)
Evaluative component 
Sexual evaluative component 
Activity component
2.98 (1.36) 
3.33 (1.53) 
3.43 (1.32)
2.00 (0.97) 
2.53 (1.65) 
4.17(0.84)
2.18 (0.46) 
2.25 (0.66) 
4.54 (0.59)
Table 4.37: Means (Standard Deviations) for “Spouse” Rating by Sex Offenders, Non-se 
Offenders, and College Students
Group
Factors Sex Offenders 
(n=24)
Non-sex
Offenders
(n=8)
College
Students
(n=8)
Evaluative component 
Sexual evaluative component 
Activity component
2.38 (1.05) 
2.70 (1.38) 
4.45 (1.03)
2.55 (0.67) 
3.33 (0.84) 
4.20 (0.64)
2.68 (0.85) 
2.83 (0.85) 
4.34 (0.96)
In sum, paedophiles tended to evaluate boys and girls more negatively 
sexually and women more negatively in general. Sex offenders, non-sex 
offenders and college students did not seem to differ in their constructs about 
self and others. The results obtained from the above analyses using evaluative 
component, sexual evaluative component and activity component as dependent 
variables were similar to that using Horley and Quinsey’s 16-item scale as 
dependent variables.
The data gathered on the Horley and Quinsey Semantic Differential 
were fiirther analysed to see if the subject groups perceived different pairs of 
roles differently within themselves. The above three components were again 
used as dependent variables. Paired Samples T-test was employed to ascertain
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the differences between each subject group’s construct about (1) ideal self Vs 
self; (2) man Vs woman; (3) boy Vs girl; (4) boy Vs man; and (5) girl Vs 
woman.
Table 4.38 shows the means and standard deviations of the three sex 
offender groups’ ratings on ideal self and self. It was found that frotteurs rated 
their ideal self as significantly better than their self on the sexual evaluative 
component (t = 2.45, p < .05). Both sex offenders and college students rated 
their ideal self as significantly more positive on the sexual evaluative 
component than their self (t = 2.51, p < .05 and t = 3.82, p < .01). The results 
are shown in Table 4.39. It was also found that sex offenders perceived their 
ideal self as significantly better than their self on the evaluative component (t = 
3.34, p < .01).
Table 4.38: A Comparison between the Means (Standard Deviations) of the Subjects’ Ratings 
on Ideal Self and Self.
Factors Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
Ideal Self Self Ideal Self Self Ideal Self Self
Evaluative 3.08 3.38 2.35 3.25 2.65 3.00
(0.53) (0.60) (0.91) (0.91) (0.62) (0.88)
Sexual 3.60 3.65 2.65 3.85 2.48* 3.30*
Evaluative (1.05) (1.25) (1.53) (1.41) (0.71) (0.45)
Activity 3.75 3.63 3.46 3.88 3.96 3.75
(1.06) (0.65) (1.01) (0.80) (0.72) (1.18)
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Table 4.39: A Comparison between the Means (Standard Deviations) of the Subjects’ Ratings
on Ideal Self and Self.
Factors Sex Offenders Non-sex Offenders College Students
Ideal Self Self Ideal Self Self Ideal Self Self
Evaluative 2.69* 3.24* 3.13 3.58 3.05 3.55
(0.72) (0.80) (0.72) (0.85) (0.74) (0.65)
Sexual 2.91* 3.60* 2.65 3.28 2.73* 3.78*
Evaluative (1.21) (1.09) (0.90) (0.94) (0.99) (1.03)
Activity 3.72 3.75 3.04 3.79 2.83 3.71
(0.93) (0.87) (0.84) (0.67) (0.69) (1.40)
Table 4.40 shows that rapists perceived woman as significantly better 
than man on the evaluative component (t = 5.79, p < .01). Paedophiles rated 
man as significantly higher on the activity component than women (t = 2.99, p 
< .05). Sex offenders, non-sex-offenders and college students all rated woman 
as significantly more positive on the evaluative component than man (t = 3.46, 
p < .01, t = 5.84, p < .01, and t = 3.12, p < .05 respectively) and woman as 
significantly lower on the activity component than man (t = 4.66, p < .01, t = 
5.36, p < .01, and t = 2.96, p < .05 respectively) as described in Table 4.41. 
Both sex offenders and non-sex offenders perceived woman as significantly 
more positive on the sexual evaluative component than man (t = 2.82, p < .05 
and t = 3.88, p < .01 respectively).
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Table 4.40: A Comparison between the Means (Standard Deviations) of the Subjects’ Ratings
on Man and Woman.
Factors Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman
Evaluative 4.18 3.75 3.48* 2.73* 3.23 2.20
(0.71) (1.11) (0.88) (0.69) (1.54) (0.49)
Sexual 4.03 3.58 3.48 2.83 3.23 2.20
Evaluative (0.98) (1.08) (0.86) (1.57) (1.54) (0.88)
Activity 3.21* 4.13* 3.71 4.54 3.33 4.63
(1.05) (1.38) (0.76) (0.82) (1.63) (0.65)
Table 4.41: A Comparison between the Means (Standard Deviations) of the Subjects’ Ratings 
on Man and Woman.
Factors Sex Offenders Non-sex Offenders College Students
Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman
Evaluative 3.63* 2.89* 4.68* 2.85* 3.55* 2.55*
(1.13) (1.01) (0.99) (1.07) (1.07) (0.81)
Sexual 3.58* 2.87* 4.25* 2.18* 3.18 2.33
Evaluative (1.16) (1.29) (0.87) (0.76) (0.99) (0.91)
Activity 3.42* 4.43* 2.88* 5.04* 3.38* 4.71*
(1.17) (0.98) (0.73) (0.60) (1.07) (0.72)
Both rapists and frotteurs rated girl as significantly lower on the activity 
component than they rated boy (t = 3.47, p < .05 and t = 2.56, p < .05 
respectively) as described in Table 4.42. Rapists are also shown to have rated 
girl as significantly better than boy on the evaluative component (t = 12.22, p < 
.01). It is shown in Table 4.43 that sex offenders, non-sex offenders and college 
students all rated girl as significantly more positive on the evaluative 
component than boy (t = 3.14, p < .01, t = 3.27, p < .05, and t = 4,62, p < .01 
respectively). Both sex offenders and non-sex offenders rated boy as 
significantly higher on the activity component than girl (t = 3.72, p < .01 and t 
= 2.47, p < .05 respectively). Only non-sex offenders perceived girl as
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significantly more positive on the sexual evaluative component than boy (t 
3.99, p < .01).
Table 4.42: A Comparison between the Means (Standard Deviations) of the Subjects’ Ratings 
on Boy and Girl.
Factors Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
Evaluative
Sexual
Evaluative
Activity
Bov Girl 
3.75 3.53 
(0.63) (1.10) 
4.23 4.03 
(0.88) (0.82) 
3.83 4.13 
(1.05) (1.72)
Bov Girl 
3.85* 2.73* 
(0.48) (0.44) 
3.03 2.78 
(1.29) (1.45) 
3.88* 4.63* 
(0.76) (0.95)
Bov Girl 
3.58 3.10 
(0.96) (0.86) 
2.80 2.50 
(0.62) (0.88) 
4.12* 4.83* 
(0.96) (0.54)
Table 4.43 : A Comparison between the Means (Standard Deviations) of the Subjects’ Ratings 
on Boy and Girl.
Factors Sex Offenders Non-sex Offenders College Students
Boy Girl Boy Girl Boy Girl
Evaluative 3.73* 3.12* 3.55* 2.65* 3.70* 2.68*
(0.70) (0.87) (0.77) (0.74) (0.37) (0.51)
Sexual 3.35 3.10 3.10* 2.33* 3.30 2.83
Evaluative (1.12) (1.24) (0.99) (0.84) (1.15) (0.85)
Activity 3.94* 4.53* 3.92* 4.92* 4.46 4.92
(0.99) (1.16) (0.66) (0.66) (0.91) (1.13)
Only rapists rated boy as significantly more positive on the sexual 
evaluative component than man (t = 2.6, p < .05). The results are shown in 
Table 4.44. Table 4.45 shows that both sex offenders and non-sex offenders 
perceived boy as significantly lower on the activity component than man (t = 
2.85, p < .01 and t = 3.15, p < .05 respectively). Only non-sex offenders rated 
boy as significantly more positive on the evaluative component than man (t = 
2.44, p < .05).
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Table 4.44: A Comparison between the Means (Standard Deviations) of the Subjects’ Ratings
on Boy and Man.
Factors Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
Boy Man Boy Man Boy Man
Evaluative 3.75 4.18 3.85 3.48 3.58 3.23
(0.63) (0.71) (0.48) (0.88) (0.96) (1.54)
Sexual 4.23 4.03 3.03* 3.48* 2.80 3.23
Evaluative (0.88) (0.98) (1.29) (0.86) (0.62) (1.54)
Activity 3.83 3.21 3.88 3.71 4.12 3.33
(1.29) (1.05) (0.76) (0.76) (0.96) (1.63)
Table 4.45: A Comparison between the Means (Standard Deviations) of the Subjects’ Ratings 
on Boy and Man.
Factors Sex Offenders Non-sex Offenders College Students
Boy Man Boy Man Boy Man
Evaluative 3.73 3.63 3.55* 4.68* 3.70 3.55
(0.70) (1.13) (0.77) (0.99) (0.37) (1.07)
Sexual 3.35 3.58 3.10 4.25 3.30 3.18
Evaluative (1.12) (1.16) (0.99) (0.87) (1.15) (0.99)
Activity 3.94* 3.42* 3.92* 2.88* 4.46 3.38
(0.99) (1.17) (0.66) (0.73) (0.91) (1.07)
In Table 4.46, frotteurs are shown to have rated woman as significantly 
more positive on the evaluative component than girl (t = 2.38, p < .05). No 
significant difference was found between the rest of the pairs. No significantly 
different pairs were identified for sex offenders, non-sex offenders and college 
students on any of the factors in their perception of girl and woman.
Table 4.46: A Comparison between the Means (Standard Deviations) of the Subjects’ Ratings 
on Girl and Woman.
Factors Paedophiles Rapists Frotteurs
Girl Woman Girl Woman Girl Woman
Evaluative 3.53 3.75 2.73 2.73 3.10* 2.20*
(1.10) (1.11) (0.44) (0.69) (0.86) (0.49)
Sexual 4.03 3.58 2.78 2.83 2.50 2.20
Evaluative (0.82) (1.08) (1.45) (1.57) (0.88) (0.88)
Activity 4.13 4.13 4.63 4.54 4.83 4.63
(1.72) (1.38) (0.95) (0.82) (0.54) (0.65)
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Table 4.47: A Comparison between the Means (Standard Deviations) of the Subjects’ Ratings
on Girl and Woman.
Factors Sex Offenders Non-sex Offenders College Students
Girl Woman Girl Woman Girl Woman
Evaluative 3.12 2.89 2.85 2.85 2.68 2.55
(0.87) (1.01) (0.74) (1.07) (0.51) (0.81)
Sexual 3.10 1.50 2.33 2.18 2.83 2.33
Evaluative (1.24) (1.29) (0.84) (0.76) (0.85) (0.91)
Activity 4.53 4.43 4.92 5.04 4.92 4.71
(1.16) (0.98) (0.66) (0.60) (1.14) (0.72)
In sum, sex offenders as a whole perceived their ideal selves as better 
than their actual selves and frotteurs in particular perceived their actual selves 
as less sexually desirable than their ideal selves. Women and girls were in 
general evaluated as more positive than men and boys respectively by sex 
offenders (especially rapists), non-sex offenders and college students. They 
were also perceived as less dominant, erotic and spontaneous (the activity 
component) by the subjects. It is interesting to note that only frotteurs 
evaluated women as significantly higher than girls.
The mean discrepancy scores of the subjects in perceiving the above 
pairs of roles were further analysed to see whether different groups of subjects 
differed on those scores. One-way ANOVA was used to ascertain the 
significance level of the differences. It was found that paedophiles, rapists and 
frotteurs did not differ significantly on any of the factors in the extent of their 
difference in perceiving the following pairs: (1) self Vs ideal self; (2) man Vs 
woman; (3) boy Vs girl; and man Vs boy. However, frotteurs had a
240
significantly larger difference in perceiving woman and girl on the evaluative 
component than paedophiles (F(2,21) = 4.29, p < .05). In other words, 
frotteurs tended to have a larger discrepant view on the difference between 
woman and girl and rated woman as more positive on the component than did 
paedophiles. The results are shown in Table 4.48.
Table 4.48: Means (Standard Deviations) for the difference of the tliree sex offender groups 
in perceiving “Woman” and “Girl”
Factors
Group
Paedophiles
(n=8)
Rapists
(n=8)
Frotteurs
(n=8)
Evaluative component 0.23 (0.69)* 0.00 (0.60) -0.90 (1.07)*
Sexual evaluative component -0.45 (1.10) 0.05 (0.56) -0.30 (0.48)
Activity component 0.00 (1.04) -0.08 (0.61) -0.21 (0.59)
Note: *pair of significantly different means (p < .05) on Tukey HSD
Sex offenders, non-sex offenders and college students did not differ 
significantly in their difference in perceiving the following pairs: (1) self Vs 
ideal self; (2) boy Vs girl; and (3) woman Vs girl. However, they obtained 
significantly different scores on their discrepancy in perceiving man and woman 
as shown in table 4.49. It was found that non-sex offenders’ discrepancy in 
perception of man and woman on the sexual evaluative component was 
significantly greater than that of sex offenders (F(2,37) = 5.85, p < .01) and 
that woman was perceived as more positive than man on such component for 
non-sex offenders. Non-sex offenders were also found to be significantly 
different from college students in their discrepancy in perceiving the two roles
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on the activity component (F(2, 37) = 5.75, p < .01). The former tended to 
regard man as higher on this component than Avoman.
Table 4.49: Means (Standard Deviations) for the difference of sex offender, non-sex 
offenders and college students in perceiving “Man” and “Woman”
Group
Factors Sex Offenders Non-sex College
(n=24) Offenders Students
(n=8) (n=8)
Evaluative component 0.73 (1.04) 1.68 (0.62) 1.00 (0.91)
Sexual evaluative component 0.58 (0.87)* 2.08 (1.51)* 0.85 (1.17)
Activity component -1.01 (1.06) -2.17(1.14)* 0.00 (1.91)*
Note: *pair of significantly different means (p < .01) on Tukey HSD
Table 4.50 shows that non-sex offenders differed significantly from 
college students in their extent of discrepancy in perceiving the roles of man 
and boy on both the evaluative and sexual evaluative components (F{2, 37) = 
3.48, p < .05 and F(2, 37) = 4.53, p < .05 respectively). College students 
tended to perceive man as slightly more positive than boy on the two 
components whereas non-sex offenders construed man as much more negative 
than boy in those situations.
Table 4.50: Means (Standard Deviations) for the difference of sex offender, non-sex 
offenders and college students in perceiving “Man” and “Boy”
Group
Factors Sex Offenders Non-sex College
(n=24) Offenders Students
(n=8) (n=8)
Evaluative component 0.12 (0.94) 1.13 (1.30)* -0.05 (0.94)*
Sexual evaluative component 0.20 (0.87) 1.13 (1.68)* -0.60 (1.28)*
Activity component -0.50 (1.06) -1.04 (0.93) -1.09(1.31)
Note: *pair of significantly different means (p < .01) on Tukey HSD
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In sum, there was in general little significant difierence in discrepancy 
scores among the three sex offender groups and among sex offenders, non-sex 
offenders and college students. It was nevertheless found that (1) fi'otteurs 
gave adult females greater preference over girls than did other sex offenders, 
and (2) non-sex offenders perceived men and women as more different than did 
sex offenders (with women being more sexually desirable).
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V. Discussion
The results of the present study provided some support to the research 
hypotheses that there are differences among paedophiles, rapists and frotteurs 
in their ways of construing about themselves and others; and that there are 
differences among sex offenders, non-sex offenders, and college students in 
their ways of construing about themselves and others. However, contrary to 
the prediction that the three groups of sex offenders differed in their attitude 
towards sex-role, heterosexual relationships, and sexual aggression against 
women and children, no significant difference was found between the three 
groups as suggested by the results. The lack of significant difference in general 
between sex offenders, non-sex offenders, and college students in this respect 
was also noted. There were a number of interesting findings which helped to 
shed light on the understanding of sex offenders’ cognitive variables and 
pointed to more finitful approaches in the exploration of such variables. In the 
following section, the implications of the results and the inadequacies of the 
present study are discussed and recommendation for future research is made.
The lack of any significant difference between paedophiles, rapists and 
fi'otteurs on the Attitude Towards Women Scale (ATW), the Multiphasic Sex 
Inventory Scales (MSI), and the Hanson Sex Attitude Questionnaire (HSAQ)
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suggested that the three groups of sex offenders did not possess attitudinal 
variables unique to their types of offence as measured by those scales. One 
could conclude that sex offenders were driven by some other factors other than 
the cognitive variables in their commission of sexual offences. Such a 
proposition received support from the results that sex offenders did not differ 
from non-sex offenders and college students in those cognitive variables. There 
were two possible explanations. First, the link between cognitions and sexual 
offending behaviour was weak. Second, the attitudes assessed by the above 
three measures failed to reflect some important aspects of sex offenders’ 
cognitive processes.
5.1 Attitudes towards women and cognitive distortions
Studies regarding the link between attitudinal variables (such as sex-role 
stereotypes, negative view on heterosexual relationships, justifications, 
minimization of consequences, attribution of blame, and sexual obsession) and 
sexual offending behaviour have yielded inconclusive results (e.g., Sattem. 
Savelis, & Murrat, 1984; Hanson, Cox, & Woszczyna, 1991), and the present 
study further cast doubts on the authorities (e.g., Stermac, Segal, & Gillis, 
1990) claiming that such a relationship exists. The present results also 
corroborated some of the arguments that rapists were not a distinct group on
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attitudes (e.g. Marshall, Bates, & Ruhl, 1984). In fact, the three sex offender 
groups did not show themselves as distinct groups in their scores on the ATW 
and the MSI Subscales (including the Cognitive Distortion / Immaturity Scale, 
the Justification Scale, the Sexual Obsession Scale, and the Social Sexual 
Desirability) which were designed to measure sex-role stereotyping and 
cognitive distortions. Interestingly, non-sex offenders agreed more strongly 
than sex offenders and college students that the intellectual leadership of a 
community should be largely in the hands of men on the ATW, a finding which 
offered counter evidence to the argument that sex offenders have a less 
egalitarian attitude towards women (Spence & Helmreich, 1978).
The lack of significant difference between the subject groups on the 
ATW and MSI suggested some limitations on the Social Learning Model of 
cognitive Factors in Sex Offenders (Murphy, 1990) which is outlined in 
Chapter two of the present study. The model incorporates several approaches 
to cognitive factors which emphasize cognitive distortions (Abel, Becker, 
Cunningham-Rathner, Rouleau, Kaplan, & Reich, 1984), rape myth acceptance 
(Burt, 1980), and thinking error (Yochelson & Samenow, 1977) respectively. 
The model provides a means of summarizing the cognitive processes 
hypothesized to be relevant to sex offenders but does not address the degree to 
which these processes are specific or general for the sex offender or the degree 
to which they are causative of, or reactions to engaging in, deviant behaviour.
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In short, the results of the present study implied that the validity of the model is 
in doubt.
5.2 Specificity of attitudes
Hanson, Gizzarelli, and Scott (1994) argued that the Justification Scale 
and the Cognitive Distortion / Immaturity Scale are rather heterogeneous, 
containing many different types of rationalizations and cognitive distortions, 
and even if a particular type of sex offenders scored more deviantly than 
comparison groups on these scales, the specific types of deviant attitudes 
commonly found among the offenders would remain unclear. Other researchers 
suggested that specific attitudes are better predictors of behaviour than are 
general attitudes (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). The present study attempted 
to address the issue by using the HSAQ to probe into the sex offender subjects’ 
and the comparison groups’ attitude in seven specific areas, namely, 
sex/affection confusion, fiiastration, affairs, sexual entitlement, sexy children, 
and sexual harm. However, no significant difference was found between the 
three types of sex offenders and between the sex offenders and the comparison 
groups. It can be argued that the specific attitudes might well not be specific 
enough on the HSAQ.
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Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) argued that attitude-behaviour correlations 
(ABCs) will be high if the attitude and behaviour measures correspond in their 
‘‘target” and “action” elements (see also Ajzen, 1987). Attitude measures that 
specify a target and no specific action should predict behaviour measures that 
specify a target but no specific action; similarly, attitude measures that specify 
both a target and a specific action should predict behaviour measures that 
specify both a target and a specific action. For example, general attitudes 
towards the environment should predict a “multiple-act” criterion consisting of 
relevant actions such as recycling, donating to environmental groups, and so 
on; “attitudes towards an action” like attending church should predict a “single- 
act” criterion of church attendance. It seems that the HSAQ only specified a 
target but no specific action (i.e., sexual aggression), and hence could only 
predict behaviour that specified a target (e.g., sexual fantasy) but not a specific 
action (i.e., sexual offences).
Although it has been claimed that attitudes and behaviour will tend to 
be highly correlated if they are measured at corresponding levels of specificity 
(e.g., Kraus, 1995), some of the exceptions to the correspondence principle are 
difficult to explain. Schifter and Ajzen (1985), for example, found that attitudes 
towards losing weight in the next six weeks and towards trying to lose weight 
in the next six weeks did not significantly correlate with actual weight loss six 
weeks later. Similarly, attitudes and behaviour can be highly correlated even
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when the measures do not correspond; Genther and Taylor (1973), for 
example, found that attitudes towards desegregation significantly predicted 
aggression towards Whites as well as Blacks in a lab experiment. It is doubtful 
how specific the attitudes should be and how usefiil is the concept of specificity 
in the measurement of the relationship between sex attitude and sexual 
offending behaviour. Another potentially confounding variable to the 
appropriateness of applying specific attitudes to the assessment of sex offenders 
is the issue of denial and unreliable self-reports of behaviour which will be 
discussed later in this chapter. In fact, half of the scales of the HSAQ were 
found to be correlated with social sexual desirability. It seems that the 
transparent, if not brutally direct nature of the items of the questionnaire did 
present a problem to research of this kind.
5.3 Information-processing model
It has been postulated that cognitive processes operated at four levels 
of interests (Hollon & Kriss, 1984; Ingram & Kendall, 1986). They are 
cognitive structure, cognitive propositions, cognitive operations, and cognitive 
products. They resemble the basic beliefs, schemata, automatic thoughts, and 
self-statements of the cognitive theory (Beck, 1976). According to Segal and 
Stermac (1990), the majority of the studies measuring cognitive variables in
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sexual assault have focused on the last category of the above cognitive 
processes, which is the level of accessible thoughts or attributions. The use of 
the Semantic Differential in the present study was one of the few studies that 
have examined the level of cognitive operations which looks at active 
processing styles.
McFall’s (1982, 1990) information-processing model of social 
competence is an approach to identify the automatic cognitive processes in sex 
offenders. Lipton, McDonel, and McFall (1987) focused on rapists’ decoding 
skills (the first stage of the model) and found that rapists were significantly less 
accurate than non-rapists in interpreting cues in simulated first-date 
interactions. However, it was only speculated that deficits in reading social 
cues could lead to responses which would be considered inappropriate sexual 
advances and which women would regard as sexually intrusive. Moreover, it 
has not been proven that improvement on those skills led to a reduction of 
sexual aggression. The model might have limited use until the link between 
social competence and sexual assault is established. In fact, it is not clear that 
sex offenders are any less socially skilled than control subjects (Stermac & 
Quinsey, 1986).
Another approach in line with the information-processing model, such 
as the Semantic Differential, is the investigation of the personal construing
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(decoding skills) of self and others in sex offenders (especially woman and 
children). The Semantic Differential is an attempt to elucidate the personal 
meanings which sex offenders attach to the representations of self and others 
and which are mostly beyond their immediate awareness (cognitive operation 
variables). Attitude change was found to have paralleled clinical change on the 
Semantic Differential developed by Marks and Sartorius (1967) whose subjects 
revealed a variety of sexual deviations. Quinsey, Bergersen, and Steinman 
(1976) found that improvement of their child molester subjects was shown in 
both changes in penile circumference responses and the expected interaction of 
increased ratings for adults and decreased ratings for children.
Some differences between the three sex offender groups emerged on 
the Semantic Differential in the present study. The results showed that 
paedophiles only perceived themselves as less loving and their ideal self as less 
calm than did rapists and frotteurs. Otherwise, there was little support for the 
general assertion that child molesters lack self-esteem (Marshall & Barbaree, 
1990) in terms of (1) their negative evaluation of themselves (such as less 
seductive, sexy and erotic) compared with non-molesters (Horley & Quinsey, 
1994); and (2) their fear of negative evaluation compared with rapists and other 
control groups (e.g. Hayashino, Wurtele, & Klebe, 1995). Nevertheless, an 
interesting interpretation of the findings that paedophiles’ tended to view 
themselves negatively (though not significantly) was the possibility that
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molesters could be “accurate” (i.e., in line with consensus views) in their self­
perception. It has been found that photographs of child molesters have been 
rated by community volunteers as less attractive physically than incarcerated 
non-molesters (Segal, 1983).
It is interesting that paedophiles perceived men, women, boys, and girls 
as more unpleasant than did other sex offenders. They also viewed women as 
more cruel, not loving, sexless and hard on the Semantic Differential. Women 
in fact were rated as significantly more negative on the evaluative component 
of the Scale by paedophiles than by rapists and frotteurs. The findings 
corroborated Howell’s (1978) results utilizing the repertory grid technique that 
adult females were seen by heterosexual paedophiles as overbearing and more 
threatening than children. Horley and Quinsey (1994) offered an alternative 
explanation to paedophiles’ “misrepresentation” of women by suggesting that, 
as physically unattractive and socially inept individuals, child molesters may 
attract less desirable women and, thus, there may be cause for their views.
The results did not lend support to Howell’s (1978) findings that 
children were viewed as nonthreatening and easier to related to and as 
possessing positive or even idealized attributes. In fact, girls were perceived as 
more suspicious and unpleasant and rated as more negative on the sexual 
evaluative component by paedophiles than by other sex offenders in the present
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study. Paedophiles also tended to rate girls towards the negative pole on many 
of the scales such as deceitful-truthftil, loving-not loving, sexy-sexless, and 
hard-soft. The results also failed to support Howell’s finding that men who 
molested girls described children as passive and adults as dominant. The 
suggestion that the attraction of paedophiles to children as sexual partners may 
be related to the idealization of specific aspects of childhood (Lanyon, 1986; 
Quinsey, 1986) did not seem to stand. Alternatively, paedophiles may be 
excusing their behaviour by saying, in effect, that less sexually desirable women 
force them to turn to children (Horley & Quinsey, 1994).
Rapists did not score significantly differently from frotteurs on the 
Semantic Differentials, suggesting that they are not distinct groups in terms of 
their self-representation and perception of males and females. It is counter­
intuitive that rapists did not translate their anger towards or control over 
women (e.g., Darke, 1990) or their excess of maleness (Medea & Thompson, 
1974) into negative descriptions of the female role or an inflated evaluation of 
the male role. In fact, it was shown in the results that they rated women and 
girls in a more positive light than men and boys respectively. There is still little 
known about the cognitive style of frotteurs on the Semantic Differential 
except that they viewed themselves and others more positively than did 
paedophiles. It was evident that they viewed women as kind, pleasant, loving, 
sexy, beautifiil, and clean, and as more positive on the evaluative component of
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the Scale than girls. It was perhaps that such an idolized picture of women 
coupled with their deficits in heterosexual relationships could lead to a 
fi*otteur’s urge to touch adult women in a secretive manner.
Sex offenders as a group also did not differ fi*om non-sex offenders and 
college students in their perception of self, girls, and spouses. Sex offenders 
viewed ideal self as more truthful, men as more soft, women as more hard, and 
boys as more mature and unpleasant than non-sex offenders. Perhaps sex 
offenders identify themselves as more a victim (self was truthful and men were 
soft) and perceive women as harder to relate to than do non-sex offenders. 
They also evaluated their ideal selves as significantly more positive than their 
actual selves, implying that low self-esteem could be prevalent among them. 
College students differed fi*om the other two groups in that (1) they viewed 
ideal self as more dominant than did sex offenders; and (2) they perceived men 
as more seductive than did non-sex offenders. It is interesting to note that 
college students did not differed from sex offenders in terms of their self­
representations and perception of female figures.
It seems that the study of cognitive operation variables focusing on the 
personal construing of self and others based on McFalTs information- 
processing model of social competence was partially effective in identifying 
deficits in decoding social role stimuli in sex offenders’ social incompetence
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(i.e., their offending behaviour). The Semantic Differential yielded results 
which were revealing of paedophiles’ cognitive processes. Only few differences 
between rapists and frotteurs and between sex offenders, non-sex offenders, 
and college students were found in general. By and large, the attitudinal 
variables relating to sexual aggression remained unclear although the use of 
Semantic Differential and the study of cognitive processes at the cognitive 
operation (or automatic thoughts) level with reference to implicit social 
cognition (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) seem to be promising. Yet, such 
attempts are still at an embryonic stage. Questions remain to be answered 
include (1) Would improvement in the evaluation of women relate to a 
decrease in child molestation in a paedophile? (2) Are cognitions regarding 
personal construing evident before offending behaviour or just a result of the 
latter? and (3) How are decoding skills related to decision skills and execution 
skills (McFall, 1990) which result in the ultimate expression of sexual 
assaulting behaviour (e.g., looking for excuses or restoring self-esteem in the 
decision-making process)? A related issue would be the lack of indirect 
measures for use in this kind of research. Further research is needed to prove 
that indirect measurement of individual differences in implicit social cognition is 
possible.
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5.4 The relationship between attitude and behaviour
The difficulty in ascertaining the relationship between sex offenders’ 
attitudes and their offending behaviour as evidenced by many conflicting results 
yielded by research on this area has prompted one to rethink the strength of the 
attitude-behaviour relationship. The results of the present study seemed to have 
supported Wicker’s (1969) and McQuire’s (1985) claim that attitudes are 
generally unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviours. Kraus (1995) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 88 attitude-behaviour studies with stringent 
inclusion criteria yielded a correlation coefficient of .38, accounting for only 
14% of the variance in behaviour. What accounts for the rest of the variance 
remains an intriguing question. Perhaps one of the initial steps a researcher has 
to take in addressing the issue is to examine the theoretical basis on which 
attitude is seen as predicting future behaviour.
Cognitive models such as cognitive theory (Scott, Williams, & Beck,
1989), social learning model (Murphy, 1990), information-processing model of 
social skills (McFall, 1982), and even the relapse prevention model (Pithers,
1990) have tried to explain the relationships between cognitive factors and 
sexual offending behaviour. They focus on concepts such as automatic 
thoughts, cognitive distortions, decoding skills, personal construing.
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justifications, and attributions. However, the conceptuahzation of these 
concepts has been criticized as ambiguous. Lee (1993) argues that the essential 
vagueness of cognitive models (vague and metaphorical descriptions of 
subjective experience) means that one cannot make any firm prediction about 
the behavioural effects of any specific combination of the hypothesized 
cognitive variables. She further suggests that the invocation of invisible and 
ineffable forces inherent in the primacy-of-cognition paradigm (she is referring 
to the unobservable and unverifiable self-representations of subjective internal 
states) for the specific purpose of explaining away any deviations between 
prediction and actuality is a characteristic of closed belief system which is 
theoretically insupportable and empirically unsuccessful. Segal and Shaw 
(1986) further argued that cognitive assessment appears to have become a 
more purely phenomenological assessment enterprise. It seems that to ascertain 
the link between cognitive variables and behaviour is no simple business. The 
present study seemed to have cast more doubt on their relationship. At best, 
the study pointed towards a need to provide specific and unambiguous 
definitions of cognitive variables (attitude of sex offenders) and to develop 
satisfactory methods for the measurement of the hypothesized variables.
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5.5 Limitations of the present study
A major limitation of the present study is the small sample sizes of each 
subject group. Small sample size is particularly problematic when there is 
extreme variance in subjects’ responses. Real differences between subject 
groups may not be revealed in a small sample. Another limitation is the use of 
incarcerated sex offenders. Abel and Rouleau (1990) pointed out that 
incarcerated assaulters are frequently not representative of the general 
population of sexual assaulters. They claimed that because an average of fewer 
than 15% of sex crimes lead to incarceration, the majority of sex offenders are 
not within the prison system but “on the street.” It was also suggested that 
discovery and conviction rates most likely are related to a host of confounding 
factors, including social class, intelligence, psychopathology, and severity of the 
offence (Tierney & Corwin, 1983).
Steps were taken to protect the subjects’ confidentiality in order to 
obtain more valid self-reporting in the present study. Attention was paid to the 
skills of the interviewer, the quality of the relationship established during the 
interview (Abel & Rouleau, 1990), and anonymity (Kaplan, 1985). However, 
Stermac, Segal, and Gillis (1990) argued that despite any assurances of 
confidentiality, it is unlikely that incarcerated rapists are going to report hostile
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or negative feelings they may have about women or sexuality. In fact, Abel and 
Rouleau (1990) found that offenders reported only 5% of the sex crimes they 
admitted to in the mental health setting. It has been demonstrated that sex 
offenders may deny deviant fantasy, deviant sexual arousal, negative effects of 
their offence on victims, their own responsibility for deviant sexual behaviours, 
and guilt feelings (Haywood & Grossman, 1994; Wasyliw, Grossman, & 
Haywood, 1994). In fact, three of the scales on the HSAQ correlated 
significantly with social sexual desirability, suggesting that the problem of 
social desirability should not be underestimated in studies relying on self- 
reports. Although defenses were expected to be low when they responded on 
the less direct measure of the Semantic Differential, one should be guarded 
about how true the sex offenders were in their responding in penal institutions 
perceived by most of them as hostile and threatening.
Its interesting to note that college students’ and non-sex offenders’ 
scores on the Sexy Children Scale and on the Sexual Entitlement Scale of the 
HSAQ were as high as the paedophiles’. In fact, one can never be sure that a 
control group for sex offenders is comprised of purely non-sex offenders. 
Classification by conviction has been a long-standing problem inherent in 
studies of this kind. In view of the above limitations, the results of the present 
study have to be interpreted with caution.
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VI. Conclusion
The attitudes of paedophiles, rapists, and frotteurs have been assessed 
and compared. The three groups were similar in their age, education, marital 
status, and occupation. There was no significant difference between them in 
scores on the Attitude Towards women Scale (ATW), the Multiphasic Sex 
Inventory Subscales (MSI), and the Hanson Sex Attitude Questionnaire 
(HASQ). Paedophiles were found to have a more negative evaluation of self 
and others (especially women) on the Semantic Differential. Overall, relatively 
few differences were found among the sex offender group, non-sex offender 
group, and college students, and the expectations concerning the cognitive 
distortions of sex offenders were not supported. The relationship between 
cognitive factors such as sex-role stereotyping and attributions and sexual 
offending behaviour remained unclear. The results of the present study did not 
support the social learning model of cognitive factors in sex offenders 
(Murphy, 1990).
The present study has responded to the need of specificity in attitude 
measures (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and the HSAQ which was originally 
designed to meet the need (Hanson et al., 1994) was adopted in this study.
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However, the correspondence notion (Ajzen, 1987) did not receive support 
from the results.
The research hypothesis that different types of sex offenders possessed 
different attitudes unique to their deviant sexual expression was partially 
supported on the Semantic differential which measured less focused and more 
automatic form of cognitive processes of the subjects. Since the nature of the 
scales on the Semantic Differential were not directly related to their sexual 
offending behaviour (such as deviant arousal, deviant fantasy, negative effects 
of their offence on victims, and their responsibility for deviant sexual 
behaviours), subjects might have fewer defenses in their responding. 
Nevertheless, the link between personal construing of self and others and 
sexual offending behaviour is yet to be established. McFalTs (1990) 
information-processing model of social competence placed such decoding 
process in the framework of a social skills model - that the reading of social 
cues or the interpretation of the representations of self and others determines 
an individual’s decision skills and execution skills. Research is yet to be 
conducted to prove the efficacy of the model. It may still be speculated that 
paedophiles would more easily excuse themselves for assaulting girls by 
evaluating women as repulsive.
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Little has been learned about frotteurs except that they were different 
from paedophiles in their perception of self and others. Nevertheless, it has 
been shown that they perceived women as more kind, pleasant, loving, and 
sexy, and it was speculated that because they had difficulty in actualizing their 
fantasy of having an intimate relationship with women, they developed the urge 
to touch them in secret. More efforts are needed to understand the 
characteristics of this group of offenders before more sensitive attitude scales 
could be developed for them.
Caution is necessary when results of this study are interpreted. It is well 
known that sex offenders frequently show denial and distortion during 
psychological evaluation (Haywood, Grossman, Kravitz, & Wasyliw, 1994). 
The subjects might have hidden their deviant thoughts and feelings from the 
researcher even though confidentiality of the subjects’ responses had been 
strictly protected. It seems that measures which assess the offenders’ attitude in 
an implicit way may be more suitable than the traditional attitude scales the 
items of which are often direct and transparent.
The implication of pursuing fiirther studies on the more active but less 
conscious form of information processing or research in the domain of implicit 
cognition (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) relating to sexual offending behaviour is 
the need for development of indirect measures. Very few attempts to employ
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such measures have been made and the present study was one of them. 
Nonetheless, the results of such attempts have been encouraging. For instance, 
the results of the Semantic Differential in this study suggested that negative 
construing of self and women would more likely lead to child molestation 
among sex offenders. Porter, Geis, and Jennings-Walstedt (1983) showed that 
greater use of head-off table seatings as an indicator of leadership for male than 
female stimulus persons provided an indirect measure of gender stereotyping. It 
seems that indirect measurement of individual differences in implicit cognition 
and attitude is both possible and fruitfiil in fiiture attempts to understand the 
cognitive variables in sexual assault. Such attempts would not be easy given the 
complex and multifaceted nature of attitude.
‘Hard questions must have hard answers
- Plutarch
263
Appendix 1
Code:
Personal Information Questionnaire
Please put a tick in the appropriate boxes.
1. Age
<30
31-40
41-50
>50
□
□
□
□
2. Education
3. Marital Status
4. Occupation
Nil
P.1-P.3
P.4-P.6
F.1-F.3
F.4-F.5
F.6-F.7
Tertiary
Single
Married
Separated
Divorced
Cohabitant
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
Nil □
Unstable □
Non-skilled □
Skilled □
Professional □
Code:
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Appendix 2
Attitudes Toward Women Scale
The statements listed below describe attitudes towards women in society which 
different people have. There are no right or wrong answers, only opinions. You 
are asked to put a circle around one of the four numbers (0,1,2,3) next to each 
statement which can best express your feeling.
strongly
disagree
strongly
1. Swearing and obscenity are more repulsive in the 0 
speech of a woman than a man.
2. Under modem economic conditions with women 0 
being active outside the home, men should share in 
household tasks such as washing dishes and doing the 
laundry.
3. It is insulting to women to have the “obey” clause 0 
remain in the marriage service.
4. A woman should be as free as a man to propose 0 
marriage.
5. A woman should worry less about their rights and 0 
more about becoming good wives and mothers.
6. Women should assume their rightful place in 0 
business and all the professionals along with men.
7. A woman should not e?q)ect to go to exactly the 0 
same places or to have quite the same freedom of
action as a man.
8. It is ridiculous for a woman to run a locomotive 0 
and for a man to dam socks.
9. The intellectual leadership of a community should 0 
be largely in the hands of men.
10. Women should be given equal opportunity with 0 
men for apprenticeship in the various trades.
11. Women eaming as much as their dates should 0 
bear equally the expense when they go out together.
12. Sons in a family should be given more 0 
encouragement to go to college than daughters.
13. In general, the father should have greater 0 
authority than the mother in the bringing up of 
children.
14. Economic and social freedom is worth far more to 0 
women than acceptance of the ideal of femininity
which has been set up ty  men.
15. There are many jobs in wliich men should be 0 
given preference over women in being hired or 
promoted.
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Appendix 3
Code:
Multiphasic Sex Inventory
Cognitive Distortion and Immaturity Scale
1. My problem is not sexual, it is that I really love children (answer only 
if you have had sexual contact with a child).
2. In some way I was used by the person who reported me.
3 .1 am often hurt by the behaviour of others.
4. As a child, most adults did not understand me.
5 .1 feel like I am a victim as a result of the accusations that have been 
made against me.
6 .1 know I have gotten a raw deal out of life.
7. If I were artistic, I would like to draw children.
8 .1 have suffered more hurt in my life than most people.
9. In my growing up, my parents did not show me love and affection.
10. Children today engage in more sexual behaviour than when I was 
growing up.
11.1 feel younger when I am with youngsters.
12.1 am often misunderstood by others.
13.1 became interested in sex after high school age.
14.1 seem to prefer the company of children.
15. During my adolescence I was secretly excited about sexual matters but 
I was embarrassed to talk about it to my fiiends.
16.1 think I have never grown up emotionally.
17.1 have never believed my sexual contact with a child was a crime 
because I did not have intercourse or penetration with her/him 
(answer only if you have had sexual contact with a child).
18. Quite often I feel like a child living in a grown up body.
*19.1 was curious about sex as a child.
*20.1 do not believe I have had to overcome more in life than most people. 
Justification Scale
1. My sexual offence occurred as a result of my wife’s lack of 
understanding of me.
2. My sexual offence occurred as a result of my wife’s and my inability to 
communicate.
3. My sexual offence occurred because of stresses in my life.
4. My sexual offence occurred because the person asked for it.
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5. My sex offence would not have occurred if I had not had to take care 
of the child’s personal hygiene (answer only if you have had sexual 
contact with a child).
6. My sex offence occurred because I was mistreated by a female(s).
7. My sex offence would not have occurred if the child had not been 
curious and interested in sex (answer only if you have had sexual 
contact with a child).
8. My sex offence Would not have occurred if the victim had not been 
sexually “loose” (promiscuous).
9. My sex offence occurred as a result of not getting sex education as a 
young person.
10. My sex offence occurred because the person I was accused of
assaulting led me on all the way.
11. During my earlier years I did not satisfy my curiosity about sex and I 
believe that is why I committed my sexual offence.
12. My sexual involvement with a child would not have occurred if the
child had not been overly affectionate (answer only if you have had 
sexual contact with a child).
13. My sexual offence occurred as a result of physical problems which 
have effected my sexuality.
14. The victim in my case did not tell the truth about what really happened.
15.1 would not have had sex play with a child if she/he had not
encouraged it (answer only if you have had sexual contact with a 
child).
16. My sexual offence occurred as a result of my not having a satisfying
sexual relationship.
17. My sexual offence resulted from problems in my family.
18. My sexual offence would not have occurred iff had not tried to teach 
the child about sex (answer if you have had sexual contact with a 
child).
19. The person who reported me was willing and interested in sexual 
contact with me and was not hurt by the experience.
20. My sexual offence occurred as a result of my being sexually abused as
a child.
21. My sexual offence occurred because the child I had sexual contact with
appeared and acted much older than her/his actual age (answer only if 
you have had sexual contact with a child).
22. My sexual offence resulted from my having too much alcohol or drugs.
23. My sex offence occurred because I thought the victim in my case 
needed sex.
24. My sex offence would not have occurred if I had not become 
interested in the child’s sexual growth and development (answer only 
if you have had sexual contact with a child).
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Sex Obsessions Scale
1.1 think about sex about 80% of the time.
2 .1 need sex or masturbation daily to reduce tension.
3 .1 have not been able to stop myself from looking at others in a sexual 
way.
4 .1 have to fight the impulse to masturbate.
5. It seems that everything I do and everywhere I go I am constantly 
thinking about sex.
6 .1 am too easily sexually excited.
7. Fm worried about sexual things.
8 .1 wish thoughts about sex did not bother me.
9 .1 know I am different than other people because sex is on my mind so 
much.
10. If I did not fantasize about sex I could not maintain my erection.
11.1 often drift into daydreams about sex.
12.1 don’t like to think about sex as much as 1 do.
13.1 am obsessed with sex.
14.1 regularly have had several orgasms in one day.
15.1 have daydreamed about sex so much that 1 have masturbated or had 
sex once a day or more.
16.1 have been told that 1 am preoccupied with sex.
17. There have been times when thoughts about sex have almost driven me 
crazy.
18.1 have to fight sexual impulses continually.
19.1 cannot seem to keep my mind away from thoughts about sex.
20.1 need help because 1 am not able to control my sexual behaviour.
Social / Sexual Desirability Scale
1. It would interest me to learn that a female has felt pleasure from 
masturbating herself.
2. Many people could interest me sexually.
3.1 like to look at sexy pictures.
4.1 enjoy flirting.
5. There are times that 1 laugh at a dirty joke.
6. When a man is with an attractive woman, he has thoughts about sex.
7.1 like to look at sexually attractive women.
8. Sexual things interest me.
9. X-rated movies would interest me, especially if 1 could view them in 
the privacy of my home.
10. It feels good when 1 touch my sexual parts.
11. As an adult 1 have masturbated.
12.1 like sex play.
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13.1 like to see lots of bare skin.
14. Sexy stories are interesting to me.
15.1 was curious about sex as a child.
*16.1 seldom think about sex.
*17.1 am more interested in the excellent articles in “playboy” and 
magazines like that than I am in the centerfolds.
*18. It does not interest me to learn that a woman may not be wearing any 
panties.
*19. Oral sex disgusts me.
*20. It turns me off when a female advertises her sexuality.
*21. The thought of a woman performing oral sex on me does not interest 
me.
*22.1 do not really notice if people are sexy or not.
*23.1 get turned off with a woman who exposes part of her breasts or legs 
to men.
*24.1 am not interested in sex matters like most men seem to be.
*25.1 get turned off when I see a female wearing her clothes so tight you 
can see everything.
*26. The thought of a woman fondling my penis does not interest me.
*27.1 would not go to a topless bar or show for any reason.
*28. It does not interest me to learn that a woman may not be wearing a bra. 
*29.1 would not be interested in seeing a film about people engaging in 
intercourse.
*30.1 am turned off when a woman tries to flirt with me.
*31.1 would not be interested in seeing a person nude.
*32. Most men I have been around are dirty minded.
*33. The thought of having sex with more than one partner at a time does 
not interest me in the slightest.
*34.1 lose interest in a woman if her dress is too short.
*35.1 lose interest when I see an overly sexy female.
Note: Subjects were asked to indicate TRUE (score 1) or FALSE (score 0) on 
each item. *indicates that the item is reverse scored. The items are randomized 
when administered and are presented here as discrete scales for display 
purposes only.
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Appendix 4
Code:
Hanson Sex Attitude Questionnaire 
Sexual Entitlement
1. A person should have sex whenever it is needed.
2. Women should oblige men’s sexual needs.
3. Everyone is entitled to sex.
*4. Sex must be enjoyed by both parties.
5. Men need sex more than women do.
6 .1 have a higher sex drive than most people.
7 .1 am often bothered by thoughts of having sex.
*8.1 have no trouble going without sex if my partner is not interested.
9. A man who is denied sex suflfers more than a woman who has sex 
when she does not want it.
Sexy Children
1. Some children are mature enough to enjoy sex with adults.
2. An 8-year-old child can enjoy a good sex joke.
3. Some children like to sexually tease me.
4. Some children are so willing to have sex that it is difficult to stay away 
from them.
5. Young boys want sex as much as adult men do.
6. Young girls want sex as much as adult women do.
7. Children are often able to understand an adult’s needs better than other 
adults can.
8. The innocent look of young girls makes them attractive.
9. The lack of hair makes children’s bodies attractive.
10. Children don’t tell others about sexual activity because they do not 
want it to stop.
11. A child who does not resist sexual touching really feels OK about 
being touched.
12. If a child does not say “no,” it means the child wants sex.
Frustration
1 .1 am often sexually fhistrated.
*2.1 have sex about as often as I want to.
3. Quite often I would like to have sex but I cannot.
4 .1 am often sexually aroused when there is no one to have sex with.
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5 .1 don’t have sex as often as I would like to.
Affairs
*1. Sexual faithfulness is not essential for a happy marriage.
*2. It is OK for a man to have a few affairs in any relationship.
*3. A man can have sex outside marriage and still love his wife.
Sex/Affection Confusion
1. Sex is a necessary part of intimacy.
*2. My closest relationships are not sexual.
3. It is impossible to really love someone until you have had sex with 
them.
*4. Sexual attraction is not an important part of affection.
5. If someone likes me it is OK to have sex with them.
6. Being a good sexual lover is a way of showing someone that you care.
7. All kissing is a type of sex.
8. Sex makes all relationships stronger.
Sex Harm
1. Sometimes it is possible for an adult to teach children about sex by 
having sex with them.
2. An acceptable way to answer children’s questions about sex is to show 
them.
3. Having sex with a lonely child can make the child feel loved and cared 
for.
4. Sometimes having sex with a child can be a way of showing love for 
the child.
5. Caressing a child’s body or genitals usually is not a sexual act.
*6. Fondling a child without penetration can still cause harm.
7. As long as the child does not protest, it is OK to touch his or her 
genitals.
8. Sometimes in the future our society will realize that sex between child 
and an adult is all right.
*9. Children who have sex with adults will have sexual problems when 
they grow up.
10. Children can easily forgive parents if they have sex with them.
Note; ^indicates that the item is reverse scored. The items are randomized 
when administered and are presented here as discrete scales for display 
purposes only.
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Appendix 5
Code:
Semantic Differential
Please put a tick in the appropriate box on each item.
I think (self / ideal self / man / woman / boy / girl / spouse) is:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. deceitful □ □ □ □ □ □ □ truthftil
2. kind □ □ □ □ □ □ □ cruel
3. immature □ □ □ □ □ □ □ mature
4. trusting □ □ □ □ □ □ □ suspicious
5. pleasant □ □ □ □ □ □ □ unpleasant
6. loving □ □ □ □ □ □ □ not loving
7. se>y □ □ □ □ □ □ □ sexless
8. seductive □ □ □ □ □ □ □ repulsive
9. beautiful □ □ □ □ □ □ □ ugly
10. clean □ □ □ □ □ □ □ dirty
11. submissive □ □ 0 □ □ □ □ dominant
12. erotic □ □ □ □ □ □ □ . frigid
13. constrained □ □ □ □ □ □ □ spontaneous
14. soft □ □ □ □ □ □ □ hard
15. hot-tempered □ □ □ □ □ □ □ calm
16. big □ □ □ □ □ □ □ small
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Appendix 6 
Consent Form
I am a clinical Psychologist working in Correctional Services 
Department, Hong Kong. I am conducting a research project on the general 
population’s attitude towards sex. The target populations of this study include 
sex offenders, other types of offenders, and college students. Participants are 
randomly selected from the penal population and the general population. The 
identity of each participant is replaced by a code so that personal information 
cannot be identified.
The participants are asked to complete a set of questionnaires which 
takes about one hour. The data gathered from the questionnaires will be 
analyzed in the computer. All the questionnaires will be destroyed when the 
data-analysis is finished.
I guarantee that your information will be treated strictly according to 
the confidentiality principle, and that your information is only used for this 
study. If I do not follow this declaration, you have the right to take legal action 
against me.
Declaration bv participant 
I agree to participate in the above study.
Signature_____:___________________
Name : Date:
Declaration bv researcher
I have explained to the participant the objectives and content of the 
study, and he agrees to participate in it.
Signature :____________________
Name : Date:
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STUDY TWO
THE EFFECT OF 
THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITIES
ON
OFFENDERS’ SELF-ESTEEM
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Abstract
The effect of therapeutic communities on offenders’ self-esteem is 
studied. A group of subjects undergoing therapeutic community treatment at 
Grendon was compared to (1) a matched control group who had volunteered 
to join the treatment and were currently on the waiting list and (2) a second 
matched group of prisoners who had not applied to join a therapeutic 
community on self-esteem, depression and general health using the Rosenberg 
Self-esteem Scale, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), and the General 
Health Questionnaire {GHQ, 30-item version). It was found that the 
therapeutic community group at Grendon had positive self-esteem scores 
compared to the control group, supporting the view that therapeutic 
communities are an effective approach to prisoners’ rehabilitation. However, 
the subjects’ scores on the BDI and GHQ also suggested that poor 
psychological health of the prison population as a whole needs a lot of 
attention.
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I. Introduction
This study is to ascertain the effect of therapeutic communities on the self­
esteem of offenders. The rationale of the study is based on the following:
(1) The fonction of therapeutic communities can be seen as one which increases
self-esteem and selfefficacy as a result of learning through personal 
exploration and shared activity in a structured environment (Righton, 
1989; Sugarman, 1984).
(2) Low self-esteem has been said to be a predictor of various kinds of deviant
behaviour (Kaplan, 1975), and associated with delinquency (Himi, 1988) 
and various groups of criminals (Rani et al., 1989).
It is hypothesized that the therapeutic community at Grendon Prison has a 
positive effect on the selfesteem of offenders.
No similar studies have been done in a prison setting before although Gunn 
et al. (1978) have conducted an extensive study at Grendon Prison. They 
looked at the nature of the intake, the regime applied, the changes that 
occurred within the individuals and what happened to the men after they had
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left. They concluded that there was an increase in self-confidence in the 
prisoners' own worth and self-esteem. However, their comments were only 
based on interviews and subjective impression. This study attempts to measure 
prisoners' self-esteem in a more objective manner by using the Rosenberg Self­
esteem Scale.
Traditional ways of evaluating the effects of a penal institution have proven 
to be ineffective because of their reliance on reconviction rates which are 
known to be an inaccurate reflection of the actual amount of offending 
behaviour that occurs (Gunn et al., 1978; Walker, 1970; Hood and Sparks, 
1970). Since self-esteem has been seen as a potential predictor of prisoners' 
propensity to re-offend, this study is the first attempt to avoid equating 
conviction with reoffending in evaluative research and introduce self-esteem as 
a mediating variable in the understanding of reoffending behaviour.
While the term self-esteem seems to have been ubiquitous (Robson, 1988) 
and loosely used, Rosenberg's (1965) definition of it has received much 
popularity and exerted much influence upon the subsequent research on self- 
concept. He sees self-esteem as a positive or negative attitude towards a 
particular object, namely, the self. He shares the view of Shibutani (1961) that 
each person places some kind of estimates upon himself as an object of value. 
Wells and Marwell (1976) conclude from their review of the conceptualization
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of self-esteem that such an evaluative, judgemental, or affective aspect of a 
person's self-conception involves the process commonly referred to as self­
esteem.
Rosenberg (1986) further defines the meaning of high self-esteem and low 
self-esteem. According to him, individuals with high self-esteem respect 
themselves, consider themselves worthy; they do not necessarily consider 
themselves better than others, but they definitely do not consider themselves 
worse; they do not feel that they are the ultimate in perfection but on the 
contrary recognise their limitations and expect to grow and improve. Low self­
esteem, on the other hand, implies self-rejection, self-dissatisfaction and self­
contempt. Individuals lack respect for the self they observe. The self-picture is 
disagreeable and they wish it were otherwise.
Therapeutic communities are termed by Jones (1959) as open system 
communities where there is a strong democracy involving clients in the day to 
day running and decision-making of the communities. Righton (1989) 
postulates that the fiinction of therapeutic communities is to provide the social 
milieu in which people bereft of an inadequate sense of self can learn to develop 
it or recover it, and that social learning is the ultimate goal to be sought.
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Grendon Prison is a therapeutic community where change is the 
responsibility of each member of the community. Considerable emphasis is 
placed upon inmate self-governance and democracy. There are three wings 
which operate as independent communities. Each of the communities provides 
a social context where problems c^n be expressed, confronted and explored. 
The inmate's behaviour is constantly being evaluated and reviewed by his peers 
and by the staff. There is the opportunity for living-learning processes within 
the structured environment which is altogether different from a medical model.
To evaluate the effect of the therapeutic community at Grendon on its 
members' self-esteem, three groups of subjects matched in terms of age, types 
of offence and length of sentence were used. They were the treatment group - 
those prisoners who had been in the therapeutic community for at least one 
year; the control group - those who had volunteered to participate in the 
community and were currently put on the waiting list; and the local group - 
those who were kept in other prisons and did not belong to the above two 
groups (the word 'local' is used here because therapeutic communities are still 
foreign to the penal system as well as the society as a whole). There were 
fifteen subjects in each group.
The Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale, a unidimensional measure of global self- 
regard through the method of Guttman scaling, was used to measure the
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subjects* self-esteem. Their level of depression and general psychiatric health 
conditions which are expected to be highly associated with self-esteem were 
also measured by the use of the Beck Depression Inventory and the General 
Health Questionnaire (30-item version).
The concepts of self-esteem and therapeutic communities and how self­
esteem is associated with criminal behaviour will be explained in details in the 
following three chapters. Chapter V will be on the methodology used in the 
present study. It is followed by the chapter on the study's results. The results 
will then be discussed in Chapter VII which is followed by the conclusion.
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II. Self-esteem
1. Definition
To define self-esteem, it is important to understand what self means in the 
first place. The thought about self in psychology dates back to the end of the 
last century when William James (1890) addressed the nature of self He 
discriminated the self as known from the self as knower, and divided the former 
into three components: material (body/ family/ home); social ("a man has as 
many social selves as there are individuals who recognise him"); and spiritual 
(states of consciousness, psychic faculties, dispositions).
Cooley (1912) developed the idea of the 'lookingglass self which viewed 
self idea as having three principle elements:
(1) the imagination of our appearance to the other person;
(2) the imagination of her/his judgement of that appearance; and
(3) some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification.
Mead (1934) regarded self as reflexive. Like James, he divided self into T 
and 'me’, the former being the fiinctioning spontaneous part while the latter the
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part that reflected upon, judged and evaluated by the person. In other words, 
self was seen as both subject and object.
Despite the many differences among these various conceptions of self, they 
share something in common as is true in many current theories - that the self- 
concept is viewed as a cognitive schema that organizes abstract and concrete 
memories about the self and controls the processing of self-relevant 
information.
Viewing the self as a cognitive structure has yielded many new and 
provocative insights (Kihlstrom et al., 1988). One of which is Campbell's 
(1990) view that the self has both an evaluative component and a knowledge 
component. He conceptualizes the evaluative component as trait self-esteem, a 
global self-reflexive attitude addressing how one feels about the self when it is 
viewed as an object of evaluation, and the knowledge component as consisting 
of beliefs about one's attributes. He also distinguishes two types of self-esteem:
(1) outer self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1986) or self-evaluation (Tesser and 
Campbell, 1983) - temporary feelings of self-regard that vaiy over 
situations, roles, feedback, events, and the reflected appraisals of others 
(Rosenberg, 1986; Tesser and Campbell, 1983; Coopersmith, 1967; 
Cooley, 1912); and
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(2) inner or trait self-esteem - a global personal judgement of worthiness that 
appears to form relatively early in the course of development, remains 
fairly constant over time, and is resistant to change (Epstein, 1983). 
Measures of trait self-esteem have been shown to exhibit high temporal 
stability coefficients, even over long periods of time (OMalley and 
Bachman, 1983; Mortimer et al, 1982).
It is the latter that is of interest in this study, and was measured by the 
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale which is a measure of global self-regard (Wylie, 
1974).
Wells and Marwell (1976) have produced one of the most comprehensive 
literature review on self-esteem. They see self-esteem as having been defined in 
four different ways:
(1) Self-esteem as attitudes
Self-esteem is a phenomenal process in which individuals perceive 
characteristics of themselves and react to those characteristics emotionally or 
behaviourally. Rosenberg (1965) adopts this view by describing that "by self­
esteem we refer to the evaluation which the individual makes and customarily
306
maintains with regard to himself: it expresses an attitude of approval or 
disapproval(p. 5)
(2) Relations between attitudes or selves
Self-esteem is seen as a psychological relation between different sets of 
attitudes. This stance is best expounded by James’ (1890) conceptualization of 
self-esteem as a "ratio of our actualities to our supposed potentialities" (p.310) 
or in the form of an equation
pretensions
self-esteem =
successes
which involves two sets of attitudes - how individuals actually perceive 
themselves to be with respect to some quality or ability and how they might be 
or ought to be.
Cohen (1959) adopts a similar view that self-esteem is the degree of 
correspondence between an individual's ideal and actual concepts of oneself, 
that is, a discrepancy between ideals and actual attainment.
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(3) Self-esteem as psychological responses
Self-esteem is defined here as the degree to which individuals accept and 
value themselves (Rosenberg, 1965; Brownfain, 1952), and by specifying what 
it feels like.
Rosenberg (1965) postulates that high self-esteem expresses the feeling that 
one is good enough. Individuals simply feel that they are perons of worth and 
they respect themselves for what they are. On the other hand, low self-esteem 
implies individuals' lack of respect for themselves, the feeling that they are 
unworthy, inadequate, or otherwise seriously deficient as a person (Rosenberg, 
1986).
(4) Self-esteem as a personality function
This view is closely associated with field-theoretic descriptions (Ziller, 
1969; Ziller et al., 1969; Mossman and Ziller, 1968). Ziller et al. (1969) define 
self-esteem as "component of the self system which regualtes the extent to 
which the self system is maintained under conditions of strain, such as during 
the processing of new information concerning the self." (p.84) Self-esteem 
here is mainly seen in terms of the fimction of the construct relative to a larger 
psychological gestalt of behaviours.
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However, this last definition is more a description than a definition since it 
does not specify what self-esteem is or how it operates as a process, but 
describes it principally in terms of the consequences of different self-esteem 
levels (Wells and Marwell, 1976).
Moreover, seeing self-esteem as relations between discrepant selves or 
attitudes (Cohen, 1959; James, 1890) does not seem to be altogether 
satisfactory because self-esteem is not the discrepancy itself but the feeling 
which is attached by the person to that discrepancy (Wells and Marwell, 1976). 
In other words, the discrepancy proposition, as well as the other self­
acceptance descriptions (e.g. Silber and Tippett, 1965; Berger, 1955; Rogers, 
1950) which regard self-esteem as dependent upon the discrepancy between 
how individuals perceive themselves and how they think they should be, fail to 
deal with the self-esteem construct explicitly in a tenable and measurable 
manner.
Rosenberg (1986) acknowledges the evaluative and affective components 
explicitly in his definition of self-esteem which embraces the (1) and (3) of the 
above. He sees self-esteem as signifying a position or negative orientation 
towards oneself and defines high and low self-esteem as the following 
(Rosenberg, 1965):
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High self-esteem "expresses the feeling that one is good enough. Individuals 
simply feel that they are persons of worth; they respect themselves for what 
they are, but they do not stand in awe of themselves nor do they expect others 
to stand in awe of them. They do not necessarily consider themselves superior 
to others." (p.31)
Low self-esteem "implies self-rejection, self dissatisfaction and self­
contempt. Individuals lack respect for the selves they observe. The self-picture 
is disagreeable, and they wish it were otherwise ." (p.31)
Rosenberg's definition not only gives self-esteem an operationalized quality, 
it also renders the concept parsimonious and measurable. The scale developed 
from it to measure self-esteem is the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale which is a 
unidimensional measure of global self-regard through the method of Guttman 
scaling. This scale, together with its psychometric properties, will be fiirther 
described in Chapter V.
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2. Self-esteem level and adjustment
It has long, or sometimes unquestioningly, been recognised that high self­
esteem implies a desirable personality and healthy mental and even physical 
conditions while low self-esteem the otherwise. It has been suggested that low 
self-esteem was associated with dependency, the need for approval, 
helplessness, and masked hostility (Storr, 1979); depression, anxiety, and 
submissiveness (Luck and Heiss, 1972); poor general health (Goldberg and 
Fitzpatrick, 1980); apathy, feelings of powerlessness, isolation, unloveability, 
withdrawal, passivity, and compliance (Coopersmith, 1967); the tendency to 
downgrade or denigrate others (Keller and Bishop, 1985; Adler, 1926) or 
project one’s own failings onto others (Bramel, 1963); reduced ability to 
choose jobs well suited to needs and abilities (Korman, 1966) and a lessened 
association between task performance and satisfaction (Korman, 1968); a 
tendency to accept unfavourable assessments as accurate (Swanson and Weary, 
1982); less likelihood of scholastic success (Brookover et al., 1964); and 
vulnerability to multiple interpersonal problems in adolescence (Kahle etal., 
1980); and various forms of deviance or criminality (Rani et al., 1989; Kaplan, 
1980; Fitts, 1972; Reckless and Dinitz, 1967).
On the other hand, high self-esteem has been found to be associated with 
greater capacity for love and acceptance of others (Rogers, 1967; Brown,
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1961) and less tendency to social isolation, exploitative attitudes or hostile 
dependency (Sullivan, 1953). People with this attribute are said to be more 
accepting and more likely to be leading active lives with a sense of being self- 
determining; are better able to tolerate internal and external distress without 
isolating themselves from inner experiences; anxious; are less sensitive to 
criticism; are more willing to express a controversial opinion, paying greater 
attention to personal values than group mores (Coopersmith, 1967). They tend 
to have better physical health, enjoy better relationships, value independence, 
welcome competition, and anticipate more success (Rosenberg, 1965). There is 
also positive association between self-esteem and assertiveness (Lefevre and 
West, 1981).
However, in considering the above correlational relationships, it is essential 
to bear in mind that statistical associations may relate to either cause or effect, 
or be merely fortuitous (Robson, 1988), and hence they should not be taken 
without further qualifications in a particular context. As a matter of fact, those 
generalisations have not been without challenge. Cohen (1959) argues that 
people with high self-esteem have a preference for ego-defenses which help 
them to repress, deny or ignore challenging and conflicting impulses, and thus 
are less open to change, They are also found to be more rigid in their cognitive 
field and tend to avoid or ignore negative information (Byrne et al, 1963; 
Byrne, 1961). Some writers even argue that self-esteem is inversely related to
312
social competence (Archenbach and Zigler, 1963) and developmental level (in 
terms of maturity and cognitive differentiation) (Katz and Zigler, 1967).
However, the above findings have not been fiirther substantiated. One 
explanation to those findings may be that the high self-esteem the authors refer 
to is either defensive (Winters and Neale, 1985; Harder, 1984) or unstable 
(Kemis et al., 1989). Individuals whose true self-view is one of rejection or 
loathing sometimes score very highly on self-esteem questionnaires (Robson, 
1989), resulting in defensivly high self-esteem. Kemis et al. (1989) suggest that 
people with unstable high self-esteem tend to be more defensive in face of 
criticisms and react with anger and hostility to a self-esteem threat.
Some writers suggest a medium position that some medium amount of self­
esteem is optimum for healthy functioning (Cole et al, 1967). Relationship 
between self-esteem and adjustment is seen as curvilinear rather than positive 
or negative (Weissman and Ritter, 1970; Block and Thomas, 1955) and the 
middle ground represents a reasonable and realistic amount of selfappraisal and 
self-acceptance. Worchel and McCormick (1963) agree by pointing out that 
persons with medium self-esteem seem best able to handle problem-solving 
situations because their reactions to dissonance are more affected by reality 
factors.
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Despite all the various views regarding the desirability of high self-esteem, 
published research indicates fairly decisively that low self-esteem persons are 
more likely to exhibit anxiety and neurotic behaviours (Wylie, 1974; Fitts, 
1972), to perform less effectively under stress and failure (Shrauger and 
Rosenberg, 1970; Schalon, 1968), and to be less socially effective overall 
(Wells and Marwell, 1976).
3. Conclusion
In this chapter, attempts have been made to define self-esteem. Rosenberg's 
(1965) definition, so far being the most satisfactory one, was used to guide this 
study including the measurment of self-esteem. Various levels of self-esteem 
and how they may affect people's adjustment have also been examined. 
Although it is generally agreed that low self-esteem results in negative 
adjustment, how high the level of self-esteem should be desirable still remains 
controversial.
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III. Therapeutic communities
I. Definition
Therapeutic communities originate from what Jones (1959) terms as open 
system therapeutic communities where there is a strong democracy involving 
patients in the day to day running and decision-making of the community, as 
opposed to the traditionally held medical model where the ultimate power rests 
upon the 'experts'. This evolutionary nature of therapeutic communities is 
fiirther implicated in what Jones (1984) states "...a therapeutic community is 
associated with ...problems of social structure, decentrahzation, information 
sharing, and shared decision-making at all levels of the social organization from 
patients to governing bodies. "
Although therapeutic communities have been defined and used in various 
fashions, the essence of it has never been lost. For instance, Zeigenfiiss (1976) 
has reviewed the world-wide literature on therapeutic communities from 1970 
to 1975. He studied 270 papers published in this period from the widest variety 
of countries, and concluded that the term therapeutic communities was ill- 
defined and covered a wide range of methods and applications, but that interest 
in a social approach to psychiatric treatment was universal.
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Considerable efforts have been made to come to a satisfactory definition of 
this broad and embracing concept. Perhaps the definition given by Crocket
(1979), a psychiatrist who has contributed to structuralist theory as a basis for 
integrating sociology and psychotherapy, is the most fully and succinctly 
described one:
"A therapeutic community ... is a treatment organisation which 
seeks to maximize its use of total group consensus in relation to 
decision-taking by its individual members in the discharge of 
their social roles." (p. 138)
'maximize' = within the limits and role skills of the membership, 
including patients
'total group consensus' = acknowledging the requirement that all 
the members, not just a selection, share in consensual 
transactions, usually through routine large groups
'decision-taking by individual members' = individual participants 
have choices all the time they take decisions, shown in action, 
which are, or are not, in conformity with others' understanding, 
and with mutual agreements or requirements when these are 
recognised
'social roles’ = a phrase which embraces the variety of rewards 
and expectations associated with performance, whether as 
patient or staff-member
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2. Theories and models
Four principles originally suggested by Rapoport (1960) as characterising 
therapeutic communities are generally uphold (Morrice, 1979). They are 
démocratisation, permissiveness, reality confrontation and communalism.
Democratization denotes the movement away from rigid and authoritarian 
control towards more flexible and participative administration. Permissiveness 
means the toleration of deviant behaviour in a way that suppression by 
regulation or decree is avoided so that real-life problems can be revealed in an 
open fashion. Reality confrontation implies that individuals' conduct is reflected 
back to them in the hope that they will accept interpretation and modify the 
offending behaviour. Communalism serves to emphasize the sharing nature of 
the whole enterprise of therapeutic communities.
Righton (1989) describes therapeutic communities in terms of open systems 
which corroborate the above mentioned principles. Under the operation of 
open systems, people are as near as possible equal partners in the learning 
process with those who provide learning opportunities; there is genuine and 
highly-valued two-way communication between them; there is sufficient mutual 
trust and respect for defenses to be lowered, powerful feelings expressed, 
blocks to learning explored, and inappropriate behaviour faced and modified;
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and the people themselves contribute actively and purposefiilly to each other's 
learning. He sees the ultimate goal of such an operation as social learning. He 
says.
"it is the business of therapeutic environments, as I see it, to 
provide the social milieu in which people bereft of an adequate 
sense of self can learn to develop it or recover it." (p. 3 8)
Cross (1979) explains this ultimate goal even more thoroughly. He sees 
therapeutic communities as a total living group experience in a unit which is 
developing as a social system based on the interpersonal relationships growing 
and thriving between all the participants in the community, which provides 
unique potential for the treatment of individuals through the consistent, 
organised and managed use of all the social and emotional processes and 
situations that arise through a living experience involving both members and 
staff. The primary task of the unit is not the elimination of symptoms but is in 
terms of experience, development and growth potential, relating at the 
appropriate time emotional experience to social experience, and able to provide 
the opportunity for the acquisition and development of a wide range of social, 
creative and educational skills. Jones (1984) also sees such an open system 
approach as having a profound effect on individuals' self-awareness and 
motivation to change to higher levels of thinking and living.
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Sugarman (1984) has developed a comprehensive framework for how 
therapeutic communities from a variety of origins and traditions seek to 
facilitate the social learning of the members. It has been fiirther modified by 
Righton (1989) giving rise to a very usefiil model as shown in Figure 1.
The model in Figure 1 draws altogether the major principles, the learning 
processes and the ultimate goals of therapeutic communities and was adopted 
in the present study.
3. Therapeutic communities in the penal system
Therapeutic communities have been seen as a positive approach to the 
problem of crime and antisocial behaviour. Jones (1984) describes the approach 
as creating a living-learning' situation in a residential community where the 
social forces in the environment are mobilized to achieved behavioural changes, 
growth, and a group identity in the majority of the participants.
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Basic principles
ritual participation 
facilitating expression of feelings 
confrontation 
helping each other
Implication for structure of therapeutic environment
living in self-sufficient group 
insulation from outside forces 
open system communication 
supervised community contact
Learning through personal 
exploration and self-discovery
behavioural limits and 
sanctions 
peer-group pressure 
modelling 
counselling
Learning through shared ctivities
organised recreation 
constructive activi­
ties and achievement 
education and social 
skills learning
Desirable learning outcome
Improved self-esteem 
Increase coping capacities 
Greater understanding of self and others 
Progressive mastery and control of self 
Increasing concern and regard for others
Figure 1: Model for therapeutic communities (Righton, 1989)
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Toch (1980) sees a prison as a potentially sterile or destructive environment 
- a place for marking time, suffering, for noncoping under stress. He suggests 
that an ideal response to this challenge calls for building growth-promoting 
communities in prison in the form of therapeutic communities.
Briggs (1980), who ran the Chino Prison in the United States based on the 
concept of therapeutic communities (Jones, 1962; Whiteley et al., 1974), 
concludes that the therapeutic community method is more effective in changing 
the antisocial behaviour of offenders than is the rest of their prison experience.
The importance of therapeutic communities in prison, according to Briggs
(1980), lies in the creating of a setting in which people can see the effects of 
what they do and say on others. The goal is to give them a feeling of 
democracy, not by chance but by design, not by legislation but by an active part 
in execution. Individuals must see their reflections in a social mirror that does 
not condemn, interpret, or condone, but faithfully reflects. The assumption is 
that, when reflecting on the reflection, one might want to change the image - if 
it is seen as disagreeable. This may in turn generate what Righton (1989) points 
out as the 'desirable learning outcome' for prisoners.
321
Most of the studies done on the effects of therapeutic communities relate to 
substance abusers and have produced very favourable results (De Leon, 1984). 
Wexler and Chin (1981) have found that therapeutic community treatment 
environments were capable to facilitate positive personality changes in inmates 
with various drug problems. A recent study on the effectiveness of prison- 
based therapeutic treatment was done by Wexler et al. (1990). A total number 
of 1500 drug abusers participated in the study which employed a quasi- 
experimental design. The results provided convincing evidence that prison- 
based therapeutic community treatment could produce significant reductions in 
recidivism rates for males and females.
4. Therapeutic communities at Grendon
Grendon Prison was opened in 1962 as a unique experiment in the 
psychological treatment of offenders. The prison had three primary aims. First, 
it was to investigate and treat mental disorders not generally recognised as 
responsive to treatment. Second, it was to investigate offenders whose offences 
in themselves suggested mental morbidity. Third, it was to explore the problem 
of dealing with the psychopath (Conimissioners of Prisons, 1963).
Grendon Prison has undergone a lot of changes in the past three decades. In 
1985, Home Office published a report recommending that Grendon's role
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within the Prison Service could be developed in four areas (Home Office, 
1985). The first was in the treatment of 'sociopaths', a diverse group whose 
common feature is a lack of social awareness, and with whom Grendon had a 
proven track record of success. The second was the treatment of sex offenders, 
another group which Grendon was already receiving into therapy in substantial 
numbers and who were able to exist there without the usual protection of 
segregation under rule 43, Thirdly, two ways were suggested in which Grendon 
could play a greater role in dealing with the long-term prison population, 
especially with life sentenced prisoners: first, in the assessments for 'sentence 
planning', and secondly, in assisting the Parole Board by preparing pre-release 
reports on particularly difficult cases. The final recommendation was that a 
rescue unit should be set up, separate fi’om the psychotherapeutic wings, where 
short term treatment could be given to prisoners suffering fi’om an acute 
breakdown or a severe prison crisis.
Following those guidelines, Grendon has now developed as a multi­
functional establishment, accommodating three adult male therapy wings, an 
assessment and induction unit, a youth custody centre, an acute psychiatric 
unit, and the newly established treatment wing for sex offenders. It is under the 
direction of a prison governor and is classified as a category B training prison.
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The three adult treatment wings, which are the subject of interest in this 
study, operate as selfcontained therapeutic communities. Each of the 
communities provides a social context where problems can be expressed, 
confronted and explored. They permit the opportunity for 'living-learning' 
processes within a system in which all activities are deemed to have a treatment 
dimension. At the heart of the system is inmates' self-governance and 
democracy. Therapy is seen as the responsibility of each member of the 
community.
Openness of communication is very much emphasized at Grendon from 
throughout England and Wales; most come from other prisons rather than 
directly from the courts. All admissions are voluntary. There are several types 
of prisoners which the Prison Department considers suitable for the therapeutic 
regime at Grendon (Home Office, 1987). Inmates who are identified as 'best 
suited' to the programme which Grendon has to offer are men with personality 
disorders, especially those who have demonstrated persistent antisocial 
behaviour. Those suffering from acute psychiatric illness and those who are 
'highly disturbed' are defined as unsuitable since a tenet of the 
psychotherapeutic approach is that all individuals must be able to accept 
responsibility for their own actions. Above all, they must be motivated to 
participate in the group therapy process and have the ability 'to learn to 
communicate openly within a group without recourse to physical violence.'
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When inmates first arrive at Grendon, They are accommodated in the 
assessment unit where their suitability for treatment is evaluated, each prisoner 
usually remains in the assessment unit for approximately eight weeks. His 
suitability is assessed according to the criteria mentioned above. In addition, he 
must be deemed able to withstand the rigours of the therapeutic process, that 
is, an ability to participate and understand what is going on in therapy.
The three adult therapy wings have a regular staff of eight officers and aim 
to maintain a population of between 35 and 40 prisoners. Most interaction 
occurs amongst members of the same community: all meals are eaten 
communally; the therapeutic sessions are limited to members of the same unit; 
and most recreation and leisure takes place within the wing. Opportunities for 
inter-wing contact occur at work, in education and during outside exercise 
periods or gymn activities. Importance is attached to the fostering of links with 
the outside society, and one of the ways outside links are forged is through the 
wing social evenings, which are organised by the inmates every three months 
and to which prison staff, their families and other guests are invited.
Each wing has two formal therapeutic forums: the small groups, consisting 
of between six and eight inmates, which meet three times a week for one hour;
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and the wing or community meetings which are also scheduled for one hour 
and take place twice weekly.
The small group is intended to provide an intimate forum in which all 
members actively participate in the exploration of their individual and collective 
problems. Emphasis is ubiquitously place upon a policy of no confidentiality: 
each man is expected to be open and candid about his own life and not to 
withhold information about himself or other group members. Members are 
urged to face up to the fact that therapy can be a painful process, but that the 
acceptance of criticism and the acknowledgement of sensitive and painful 
episodes is a necessary part of the ’healing' process. Each small group is 
nominally assigned one or two uniformed officers whose role is typically that of 
facilitator rather than group leader and to encourage the development of a 
therapeutic atmosphere.
The wing meetings are attended by all inmates and as many staff as possible. 
They are chaired by an inmate who has been elected by the community and 
typically there is a vice-chairman or secretary who records the events in the 
Wing Book. The aims of the meetings are to facilitate the day to day 
fimctioning of the unit and to develop and extend the therapeutic process. They 
provide a forum for the airing of grievances or relational difficulties, and for 
praising or criticising individual members of staff or inmates. They also play an
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explicit therapeutic role in raising and debating matters of immediate concern 
to an individual's therapy.
Meetings of the staff team are held three times a week on each of the wings. 
These are attended by all of the officers on duty at the time and, whenever 
possible, by the wing doctor, wing psychologist and wing probation officer. 
Besides business matters such as parole reports and issues relating to wing 
organisation and management, the staff are also encouraged to talk about any 
difficulties or anxieties they are experiencing; to confront interpersonal 
tensions; and where necessary, to lend each other support.
The wing psychologist attend the small groups and the wing meetings 
regularly as a facilitator. Individual counselling is provided by the psychologist 
upon the inmates' request.
Work is said to be another therapeutic element at Grendon, although the 
range of employment is limited and primarily focused upon the essential 
maintenance of the institution. The therapeutic value of work is articulated in 
terms of the opportunities it provided to test out, modify and practice new 
attitudes and behaviours learned on the wing.
327
There are exercise and organised recreational activities for the inmates 
everyday. There is a ’sport rep' elected by the inmates which involves the 
setting up of various recreational events. Education class are also available to 
those inmates who are interested in them.
The length of stay at Grendon is suggested to be two years, although it 
varies with the inmates' individual needs. The inmates who have completed 
their treatment are returned to the mainstream prison system or are released 
directly into the community having been granted parole or reached their EDR 
(estimated date of release). Those who have not completed the treatment and 
leave the establishment 'prematurely' may either be drop-outs or have been 
'voted out' by other inmates due to unacceptable behaviours like violence and 
possession of illegal drugs.
5. Studies on Grendon’s effects on self-esteem
No study has been done directly on the effect of Grendon Prison's 
therapeutic regime on inmates' self-esteem. In fact, the effect of therapeutic 
communities on self-esteem has in general never been systematically explored 
even in other contexts, and so this is the particular contribution of the present 
study.
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Gunn et al. (1978) made an attempt to evaluate the psychotherapeutic effect 
of Grendon upon a sample of 107 men received into the prison between 1971 
and 1972. Using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the General 
Health Questionnaire (60-item version), the semantic differential and 
psychiatric interviews, they concluded that whilst in Grendon changes took 
place in social attitudes and psychiatric state. A highly significant reduction was 
found in neurotic symptoms, such as anxiety, tension and depression, and 
antagonism felt towards other people, and particularly to those in authority. In 
addition, the authors suggested that there was a marked increase in the self- 
confidence and self-esteem of inmates, who reported a significantly greater 
degree of social participation and a lessening of anxiety about social 
interaction. However, there was no measure directly related to self-esteem and 
the authors' suggestion was only an inference.
Another less related but interesting study was done by Gunn and Robertson 
(1987). A controlled reconviction study was carried out on the Grendon sample 
after the men in the above study had been at liberty for at least one year and 
then again ten years later. The authors concluded that whilst there were 
significant and positive changes in the psychological test scores of men during 
their time in Grendon, their experience in therapy appeared to have no impact 
upon their subsequent pattern of reoffending, when they were compared with
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prisoners with similar probabilities of reconviction who had been held at other 
prisons.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter, therapeutic communities are defined as an open system 
characterised by democratization, permissiveness, reality confrontation and 
communalism. The aim of them is to change the self-perception of the members 
of the residential communities through social learning and to enhance their 
coping capacities. Righton's (1989) model of therapeutic communities was 
adopted in the present study.
Therapeutic communities as a treatment approach has been found useful in 
prison. The three adult wings at Grendon operate as therapeutic communities 
and their policies and spirit have been reviewed in this chapter. Two related 
studies have been discussed - one by Gunn et al. (1978) and the other by Gunn 
and Robertson (1987).
330
IV. Self-esteem as a contributory factor to offending behaviour
It has been suggested that low self-esteem is related to a propensity to 
offend. McGuire and Prestley (1985) claim that some people with low self­
esteem tend to become offenders because they do not value themselves, do not 
care what happens to them and are unconcerned about the consequences of 
getting into trouble. Kaplan (1980) suggests that deliquency or delinquent acts 
have been looked upon as a protection of the self against derogation. This 
chapter will look at some of the related studies and examine the theories behind 
the suggestion.
Berman (1976) in a study of social self-esteem as an index of delinquent 
behaviour reported that subjects who reported frequent delinquent behaviour 
tended to have lower self-esteem than subjects who reported such behaviour 
infrequently.
Hilmi (1988) examined the self-concept similarities and dissimilarities of 
young Saudi delinquent and non-delinquent males. Seventy-seven deliquent 
subjects (average age = 16.27 years) were compared with ninety-nine non­
delinquent subjects (average age = 15.31 years). The result showed that 
delinquency was associated significantly with negative self-descriptions.
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Rani et al. (1989) investigated the self-concept of seven groups of criminals 
and a group of non-criminals, matched in terms of their age, sex, education and 
income. The sample consisted of 20 arsonists, 36 murderers, 42 dacoits, 22 
sex-criminals, 50 burglars, 27 assaultives, 20 cheats and 100 normal controls 
with no history of criminal offence. It was found that non-criminals possessed 
higher private and social self-concept.
There are some theories trying to explain the association between self­
esteem and delinquent behaviours. The most direct expression of the notion 
that low self-esteem contribute to delinquency occurs in what may be termed a 
'self-esteem model' (Kaplan, 1980; Wells, 1978). In this perspective, low self­
esteem predisposes people to participate in delinquency, because they have 
little to lose by deviating and something to gain in terms of self-esteem, 
Deliquent behaviours constitue adaptive or self-protective responses to 
situations in which conventional activities are derogating and devaluing. 
Delinquency constitutes a defensive attempt to enhance self-esteem through 
trying out alternative, unconventional, or even illegal activities. Such activities 
represent an attempt both to reject actively the conventional order as the 
source of negative evaluations and to seek out alternative experiences that may 
be a source of new positive evaluations.
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In line with the above reasoning, Kaplan (1982; 1980; 1977; 1975) has 
developed the self-derogation theory of deviance which is fiirther refined by 
Kaplan et al. (1986). In the model, self-esteem (self-derogation) does not 
directly predict delinquent behaviour. Rather, low self-esteem causes 
delinquent dispositions or motivations, these in turn cause delinquent behaviour 
in conjunction with other social situational variables. According to Kaplan et 
al.'s (1986) findings, self-esteem is strongly linked to delinquent dispositions; 
these motivations in turn are causally linked to delinquent behaviour. However, 
the overall association between self-esteem and delinquency does not look 
large because the causal relationship between them is complex, multipath, and 
varies according to the effects of other variables such as prior involvement in 
delinquency, relations with peers, and so on. Nevertheless, the authors argue 
that self-esteem does have a substantial and very strong motivational effects on 
delinquency.
Another theory trying to explain the link between self-esteem and criminal 
behaviour in a less direct way suggests that level of self-esteem is an important 
dimension associated with the tendencies to experience anger and hostility 
which have been implicated in violent crimes such as rape and spouse abuse 
(Kemis et al., 1989; Maiuro et al., 1988). Anger here refers to a relatively 
intense emotional experience, one that is primarily interpersonal in nature and 
that often involves the assignment of blame. Hostility, although it usually
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involves anger, has the added connotation of a complex set of attitudes that 
motivate aggressive behaviours directed towards destroying objects or injuring 
other people (Spielberger et al, 1983). Averill (1982) also claims that low self­
esteem may be associated with greater anger and hostility, because threats to an 
already low self-view are likely to be particularly aversive.
In this chapter we have reviewed some of the studies that have lent strong 
support to the suggestion that self-esteem is closely related to delinquency. 
Some of the theories have been examined and Kaplan's self-derogatory theory 
of devaince seems to be the most explicit one. It seems that if therapeutic 
communities are the agent for increased self-esteem, they may have an 
important role to play in resisting reoffending behaviour.
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V. Methodology
1. An overview
A quasi-experimental design was employed in the present study. Three 
groups of subjects were involved:
(1) experimental group - subjects who had been involved in the therapeutic 
community treatment at Grendon for more than one year;
(2) control group - subjects who had volunteered to join the therapeutic 
community treatment at Grendon but were still on the waiting list. They 
were serving their sentences in other prisons;
(3) local group - subjects who had not undergone the therapeutic community 
treatment at Grendon nor volunteered to join the treatment. They were 
serving their sentences in the same prisons as the control group.
There were 15 subjects in each group and the three groups were matched in 
terms of age, types of offence and length of sentence.
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The subjects' level of self esteem was measured by the Rosenberg Self-esteem 
Scale on which extensive reliability and validity evidence has accumulated 
(Duffy, t989; Crandal, 1974). Several variables that have been found to be 
correlated with self-esteem, namely, depression, anxiety and psychosomatic 
symptoms of the subjects, were also measured by the Beck Depression 
Inventory and the General Health Questionnaire (30-item version).
2. Subjects
Three groups of subjects were used in this study. They were the experimental 
group, the control group and the local group, which have already been 
described in the previous section.
Evaluation studies of treatment programmes are sometimes criticised on the 
basis that the effects of the treatment are biased because subjects are self­
selected in the experimental group. In the present study, it is assumed that the 
quasi-experimental design controled for self-selection bias because the subjects 
in the control group had volunteered to join the treatment programme.
Contacts with the prisons were initially made via their psychology 
departments. A research proposal for the present study was presented to the 
psychologist-in-charge in each prison who in turn sought the prison governors'
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approval. Approval was also sought from the Regime, Research and 
Development Section of the Prison Department.
Subjects in the control group were identified from Grendon Prison’s record 
of prisoners who had been put on the waiting list to enter the therapeutic 
community regime at Grendon. They had all gone through the referral and 
assessment procedures which were required before they got accepted by 
Grendon. The present author was able to sit in on some of the assessment 
interviews in this group, conducted by the senior medical officer of Grendon at 
Dartmoor Prison. The interviewees all seemed to be motivated to have their 
problems sorted out at Grendon. Those problems involved areas like 
relationship , self-control and self-understanding. Most of them had learned 
about the treatment programme at Grendon from their friends who had gone 
through it before. The senior medical officer decided on the spot who were put 
on the the waiting list.
There were 15 subjects in the control group. They were selected from three 
prisons, namely, Dartmoor Prison, Wormwood Scrubs Prison and Wandsworth 
Prison.
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Dartmoor Prison, like Grendon Prison, is a closed training prison for adult 
males. Both Wormwood Scrubs Prison and Wandsworth Prison are local 
prisons for males. Grendon accepts prisoners from both types of prisons.
The reason for obtaining subjects from the above three prisons was two-fold. 
First, there were not enough prisoners in each of the three prisons who were 
put on the waiting list to join the Grendon programme. Second, every prison 
had its own prison subculture and to select subjects from several different 
prisons could avoid biases in sampling.
All prisoners on the waiting list in the three prisons were invited to take part 
in the present study. There were altogether 15 of them agreed to participate - 
six from Dartmoor, five from Wormwood Scrubs and four from Wandsworth.
The subjects in the local group were matched to those in the control group 
in terms of their age, types of offence and length of sentence. They were 
selected from the same prison as their ’equivalents*. The subjects had to match 
as closely as possible to those in the control group. If several prisoners matched 
equally well to a particular subject, the one with a greater sum of his prison 
number would be chosen. Hence, again there were six subjects from Dartmoor, 
five from Wormwood Scrubs and four from Wandsworth constituting 
altogether 15 subjects in the local group.
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The subjects in the experimental group were selected and matched to those 
in the control group in the same fashion as were the subjects in the local group 
except that the sample population were those who had stayed in Grendon for 
more than one year. There has been empirical evidence suggesting that the 
longer residents stayed in therapeutic communities, the more likely they were 
to benefit (Norris, 1989). One year was an arbitrary but reasonable Cut-off 
point from the Grendon staffs point of view for changes to take place and 
consolidate in the inmates.
Matching was done via the prisons' most up-to-date computer record of the 
prisoners' information. Once the subjects were identified, they were approached 
by the author and invited to participate in the present study on a voluntary 
basis. The nature of the study was explained as a study on prisoners' self­
esteem and general health conditions so as to avoid demand characteristics - a 
tendency of subjects to construct their answers in a way that meets the research 
hypothesis of a study. Then the way the subjects were selected and the tasks 
they were expected to do in the study were also explained to them. The 
subjects were also assured of the confidentiality of any individual response. A 
letter addressed to every individual by name was given to each subject restating 
the above (Appendix 1).
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In view of the sensitive nature of prisoners regarding any personal 
information that may be used to their disadvantage, an aggreement specifying 
that (1) no publication whatsoever using the information obtained should refer 
to any individual person, or character, in a manner that allowed them to be 
identified; and (2) the information obtained was given strictly on the condition 
that it was for research only, and that any breach of the above conditions was 
liable to prosecution (Appendix 2) was signed between the author and every 
individual subject.
Only three prisoners whom the author approached refiised to participate. 
The reason one of them gave was that he was very poor at reading and writing. 
Another prisoner said he was not interested. The third one refiised to be seen 
by the author as he was being transferred to another establishment.
3. Measurement of self-esteem
The self-esteem level of the subjects was measured by the Rosenberg Self­
esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) which is a unidimensional measure of global 
self-regard (Wylie, 1974). The scale (Appendix 3) is comprised of ten 
questions, each answered on a four-point array, which is subsequently 
collapsed to a dichotomy when scoring. These questions constitute a Guttman 
scale, on the basis of which certain items should be grouped in a specific
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manner, so as to provide a final scale of six scalar items (Rosenberg, 1986). 
These procedures of scoring were followed in this study.
According to Wylie (1974), this technique avoids the problems entailed in 
trying to select appropriate items referring to heterogeneous content areas; and 
it allows subjects to select and weight as they see fit whatever specific 
behaviour referents seems appropriate to them as bases for responding to the 
very general items in Rosenberg's scale.
Rosenberg (1965) also suggests that the ease of administration and economy 
of time are two important merits of the scale which seem to be particularly 
relevant when it is used in a prison setting.
The scale was originally standardised on a large sample of 5,024 adolescents 
and a fiirther sample of 50 young adults. Rosenberg (1965) reports a 
coefficient of reproducibility of .93, scalability (items) of .73 and scalability 
(individuals) of .72. According to Wylie (1974), a coefficient of reproducibility 
of .90 or more has been taken as an arbitrary minimum for a possible inference 
that one is dealing with a satisfactorily reliable, unidimensional scale. 
Furthermore, Silber and Tippett (1965) obtained a 2week test-retest reliability 
coefficient of .85 for 28 college students.
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In considering the construct validity of the Rosenberg Self-esteem (RSE) 
Scale, Wylie (1974) examines the irrelevant response determiners, the 
convergent and discriminant validity, and some studies based on assumed 
validity.
(1) Irrelevant response determiners
Social desirability, acquiescence response set and item wording can all be 
irrelevant response determiners which affect the scale's construct validity. In 
Rosenberg's (1965) study, subjects were guaranteed anonymity. Care was 
taken to establish rapport with each subject and to reduce test-taking 
defensiveness through the manner of presenting the tests. Hence social 
desirability, that is, the degree to which deliberate distortions or more subtle 
desirability considerations affect responses, was minimized.
Aquiescene response set is somewhat controlled by the fact that there is an 
equal number of items for which 'agree' and 'disagree' response indicate high 
self-esteem, and these are presented alternately.
If some of the items have degrees of intensity or frequency built into the 
item, some do not, and when each item is evaluated by a subject on the same 4- 
point scale from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree', comparisons between
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items may be unnecessarily confusing. Since Rosenberg in fact used only an 
agree-disagree dichotomy in his scoring, this difficulty may be partly 
counteractered.
(2) Convergent and discriminant validity
Silber and Tippett (1965) correlated the RSE scores against three other 
measures of self-esteem:
a. Kelly Repertory Test, sum of (self-ideal) discrepancies, on 20 bipolar 
dimensions,
r=  .67
b. Health Self-image Questionnaire, sum of 20 selected items, 
r=.83
c. Interviewers' ratings self-esteem 
r = .56
Their subjects were 44 college students: 7 were hospitalized for emotional 
disturbances, 37 were normal volunteers. Wylie (1974) regards those 
convergent validités as among the highest in crossinstrument correlations.
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Silber and Tippett (1965) presented an evaluation of the discriminant validity 
of the RSE scores as part of a multitrait-multimethod matrix. Besides including 
the self-esteem scores from the measures mentioned above, the matrix also 
included four self-image stability measures: a 5-item Guttman scale by 
Rosenberg (1965) aimed at changeability of subjects' self-view; interviewers' 
ratings of subjects' self-image stability; and the amount of change in two weeks 
on the Health and Repertory tests. All of the convergent-validity values from 
the above exceeded the correlation of .53 between two different 'traits' (self­
esteem and self-image stability) measured by the same method (Guttman 
scales). Moreover, they also exceeded the three heterotrait-heteromethod 
correlation coefficients, that is, those between the RSE Scale and Repertory 
Test self-image stability. Health self-image stability, and interview self-image 
stability (.40, .34 and .21 respectively). The results show that the RSE Scale 
has achieved high discriminant validity.
(3) Studies based on assumed validity
According to Wylie (1974), a strong point of Rosenberg's (1965) study was 
the attempt to control for other possible influences on the dependent variable 
when examining relationships between hypothetical independent and dependent 
variables. The method Rosenberg used was 'standardization'.
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There is research evidence suggesting that there are theoretically predicted 
associations between the RSE scores and other variables to which self-esteem 
is theoretically expected to be related (Ingham et al., 1986; Wylie, 1974). 
These associations, if proven, can give much support to the construct validity 
of the RSE Scale. Some of those associations were obtained with the large 
New York group in Rosenberg's (1965) study and apparently 'cross-validated' 
by the same or apparently similar findings with other subjects. Some of the 
variables having such associations are depressive affect, anxiety and 
psychosomatic symptoms (Kaplan and Pokomy, 1969; Rosenberg, 1965), 
interpersonal insecurity, participation in activities, leadership, and parental 
disinterest (Rosenberg, 1965).
Wylie (1974) concludes that it is impressive that such high reliability is 
attainable with only ten items on the RSE Scale and that such a short scale has 
yielded relationships supporting its construct validity. Based on their review of 
the self-esteem literature. Wells and Marwell (1976) also suggest that the RSE 
Scale is among the best instruments in measuring self-esteem. Indeed, ever 
since Rosenberg's (1965) study, his scale has been widely used and validated 
and also been satisfactorily used with various age groups and sectors of the 
population (Duffy, 1988; Ingham et al, 1986; Breyspraak and George, 1979; 
Crandal, 1974; Kaplan and Pokomy, 1969).
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4. Measurement of depression and psychiatric disorders
As mentioned in the previous section, depression, anxiety, and 
psychosomatic symptoms are variables that are found to be theoretically related 
to self-esteem (Ingham et al, 1986). The aim of measuring these variables in 
the present study was two-fold: First, if the subjects' scores on those variables 
were found to be correlated with their RSE scores, construct validity of the 
RSE Scale on prison populations would be indicated; second, it was in any case 
desirable to examine the effect of therapeutic communities on the level of 
depression and psychological health of prisoners.
(1) Depression
Among 50 normal volunteer subjects at the National Institute of Mental 
Health who were rated by nurses, those with low RSE scores were significantly 
more often rated as gloomy and frequently disappointed (Rosenberg, 1965). In 
Rosenberg’s (1965) New York study. Self-reports on a Guttman scale of 
depressive affect were significantly associated with self-esteem. Kaplan and 
Pokomy (1969) studied 500 community adults in Texas and found that 
Rosenberg's Guttman scale of depressive affect was significantly associated
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with factor scores based on the authors’ self-derogation factor from the RSE 
Scale.
Ingham et al. (1986) studied a random sample of women aged 18-65 years 
drawn from the population of a geographically defined area of North Edinburgh 
using the RSE Scale. He was looking at the relationship between self-esteem 
and psychiatric diagnosis and found that major depressive disorder was 
associated with a marked impairment of self-regard.
Although the link between low self-esteem and depression is well 
documented and widely accepted, controversy persists as to whether changes 
occur independently of changes in mood (Robson, 1988). A behavioural view 
of depression would be that low selfesteem is a consequence of depressive 
behaviour (Lewinsohn, 1974), while others see it as one component of a 
depression-prone personality (Altman and Wittenbom, 1980). Beck (1967) 
argues that negative attitudes towards the self are not merely symptomatic of 
the depressive syndrome, but are, in association with negative value 
judgements, central to its pathogensis. They may increase vulnerability to 
depression by existing in a latent state ready to be activated by relatively minor 
experiences of deprivation or rejection. He points out that depression-prone 
people often relate their worth to external factors beyond their control (Beck et 
al., 1979). It is beyond the scope of the present study to discuss the issue
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fiirther. What is shown here is that the theoretical association between self­
esteem and depression is very much evidenced.
The Beck Depression Inventoiy (BDI) (Beck et al., 1961) (Appendix 4) 
was used to measure the subjects' depression in this study. It is a 21-item test 
presented in multiple choice format which purports to measure presence and 
degree of depression in adolescents and adults. Each of the 21 items attempts 
to assess a specific symptom or attitude 'which appears to be consistent with 
descriptions of the depression contained in thepsychiatric literature' (Beck, 
1970).
Test-retest reliability of the BDI has been studied in the case of 38 
psychiatric patients who were given the BDI on two occasions (Beck, 1970). It 
was discovered that the changes in the BDI scores tended to parallel changes in 
the clinical ratings of the depth of depression, indicating a consistent 
relationship between the BDI scores and the patient's clinical state. The 
reliability was .90. Item analysis also demonstrated a positive correlation 
between each item of the BDI and the total score. These correlations were all 
significant at the .001 level. A meta-analysis of the BDI's internal consistency 
estimates yielded a mean coefficient alpha of .86 for psychiatric patients and 
.81 for nonpsychiatric subjects (Beck et al, 1988).
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Both face and content validity of the BDI are said to be high (Stehouwer, 
1985). According to Beck et al. (1988), concurrent validities of the BDI with 
respect to clinical ratings and the Hamilton Psychiatric Rating Scale for 
Depression (HRSD) were also high. The mean correlations of the BDI samples 
with clinical ratings and the HRSD were .72 and .73 respectively, for 
psychiatric patients. With non-psychiatric subjects, the mean correlations of the 
BDI with clinical ratings and the HRSD were .60 and .74, respectively. The 
authors also suggest that the BDI discriminates subtypes of depression and 
differentiates depression from anxiety.
Stehouwer (1985) concludes that the results of reliability and validity studies 
strongly support the BDI as a veiy useful measure for assessing depression. 
This has been demonstrated with a variety of subjects in a variety of situations. 
Additionally, cross-validation research tends to support the reliability and 
validity findings with regard to the BDI.
The ease of administrating, taking, scoring and interpreting the BDI makes 
it a very attractive test. Since the test can be given orally and the subject does 
not have to write a response, the test is made particularly advantageous for 
individuals who have a short attention span, for individuals who have difficulty 
reading, and for individuals who may be less compliant with a longer test.
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The BDI is scored by summing the ratings given by the subject for each of 
the 21 items. Each item is rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 to 3. If a 
subject has chosen more than one statement for a particular item, the statement 
with the highest rating is used to calculate the score of that item.
(2) Anxiety and psychosomatic symptoms
Besides depression, anxiety and psychosomatic symptoms are also found to 
be closely and theoretically associated with self-esteem. In the New York study 
group (Rosenberg, 1965) and Kaplan and Pokomy’s (1969) study using self­
derogation factor scores, low RSE scores were significantly associated with a 
larger number of psychosomatic symptoms reported.
Bagley et al. (1979) reviewed the concepts of self-esteem and anxiety and 
suggested that they were highly correlated. Such a proposition is further 
supported by Ingham et al.'s (1986) study mentioned above which found that 
self-esteem correlated at about the same level with anxiety as with depression.
The General Health Questionaires (GHQ) (30-item version) (Goldberg, 
1978) (Appendix 5) was used in the present study to measure the above 
variables. According to Goldberg and Williams (1988), items were selected so
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as to cover four main areas in the construction of the questionnaire. These were 
depression, anxiety, social performance and somatic complaints.
The GHQ has a high level of internal consistency. Goodchild and Duncan- 
Jones (1985) found the Cronbach's alpha (split-half reliability) to be .90 for 
their community sample. However, the test-retest reliability tends to vary 
among different populations. DePaulo and Folstein (1978) found a test-retest 
reliability of +.85 for the GHQ-30 in a small sample of neurological patients 
over a five-to-seven day period, while FirthCozens (1987) administered the 
GHQ-30 to 195 housemen who had previously completely it two years earlier 
as fourth-year medical students: the test-retest correlation was +.36, significant 
beyond the .0001 level.
Goldberg and Williams (1988) claim that the GHQ has high content validity, 
in that each test item is known to be highly discriminating between calibration 
groups of respondents with or without mental illness. Its construct validity is 
also very much supported by many factor analytic studies done on the 
questionnaire (e.g., Shek, 1987; D’Arch, 1982).
Seven studies are quoted by Goldberg and Williams (1988) which were set 
up to look at the correlation between the GHQ and standardized psychiatric 
assessment (it was either Clinical State Interview Schedule or Present State
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Examination). The correlation coefficients between the GHQ scores and 
interview measures of morbidity ranged from .45 to .77, proving that the GHQ 
has a reasonably high concurrent validity.
In order to fiirther substantiate their claim that the GHQ was a valid clinical 
instrument, Goldberg and Williams (1988) introduced the concepts of 
specificity (proportion of true normals correctly identified) and sensitivity 
(proportion of true cases correctly identified). They quoted 29 studies of the 
GHQ-30 and arrived at a median value for the sensitivity of the questionnaire 
which was .81 and the specificity .80 which were both very high.
The GHQ has been used on a wide variety of populations and its ease of 
administration and other merits are comparable to the BDI.
The scoring of the GHQ-30 is done by weighting the first two columns O 
and the last two 1. Each item is rated either O or 1 and the ratings given by the 
subject for each of the 30 items are summed up to give a total score.
5. Procedure
Every subject who had agreed to participate in the present study was given 
the three questionnaires. The subjects were asked to read the instructions
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carefiilly before they started doing them. They were welcomed to ask any 
questions pertaining to the task and offered help if they had any problems 
reading or understanding the questions. It was also made sure that every one of 
the subjects had a pen to write with.
The subjects were asked to put their names on the top right comer of each 
questionnaire for easy identification and assured that the author was the only 
person who had access to individual responses and that the questionnaires 
would be destroyed immediately after the study had been completed.
The subjects were asked to take the questionnaires with them and fill them 
in wherever they liked. The author usually gave the questionnaires to the 
subjects in the morning and collected them in the afternoon. All subjects 
handed in their questionnaires as agreed. The author then thanked the subjects 
for their kind cooperation.
After the questionnaires had been collected, they were scored and then 
computed using the SPSS-PC. Mean scores for each group were obtained and 
any significant differences between the three groups were determined by using 
One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) which is a statistical procedure 
showing whether the groups are different at a statistically significant level. The 
results will be shown in the following chapter.
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VI. Results
In this chapter, the general characteristics of the subjects will be described. 
The mean scores of each group on the questionnaires will also be shown. The 
results of the One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) which showed whether 
the three groups were different at a statistically significant level will be given, 
and so will the correlations between different scores.
1. Subjects
There were altogether 45 subjects involved in this study. Their mean age 
was 30.78 years with a standand deviation (S.D.) of 8.03. The youngest of 
them was 21 years of age and the oldest 55.
Of the subjects, 12 had committed murder, 6 indecent assault, 13 rape, 3 
wounding, 3 burglary, 3 robbery, 3 manslaughter and 2 other sex offences. 17 
of the subjects were serving life sentence, 5 serving 10 years or above, 16 
serving between 5-9 years, and 7 serving below 5 years.
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The three groups were matched as closely as possible. The mean age (x) of 
the experimental group (E), the control group (C) and the local group (L) were 
shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Summary statistics for age
E (N=15) C (N=15) L(N=15)
X 30.47 31.8 30.07
S.D. 5.05 10.26 8 35
Kruskal-Wallis 1-way ANOVA was done on the above group means and the 
results showed that the three groups did not differ with respect to age (chi- 
square = .6854, p < .7098). In other words, the three groups were well 
matched in terms of age.
Over 93 percent of the subjects were successfully matched according to 
their types of offence. The similarity of the subjects' length of sentence in each 
match set was also very satisfactory. More than 90 percent of the sets had a 
difference of no greater than two years between the subjects.
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All in all, the three groups of subjects were probably as well matched as 
possible. It was the intention of this study to make the three groups of subjects 
look as similar and homogeneous as possible. This has been achieved at least in 
terms of the subjects' age, types of offence, and length of sentence.
2, Group differences
In the following, the subjects' scores on each of the three questionnaires and 
the mean differences between the groups in terms of their scores will be 
reported.
(1) The Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale
The mean score of all the subjects on the scale was 2.49 with a standard 
deviation of 1.9. The summary statistics for the mean scores in each group are 
provided in Table 2.
To examine whether the mean differences between the three groups are 
statistically significant, a between-subjects One-way ANOVA was done. The 
results are shown in Table 3.
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Table 2 Summary statistics for the RSE scores
E(N=15) C (N-15) L (N=15)
X 2 07 3.6 1.8
S.D. 1.49 1.88 1.9
Table 3 ANOVA summary table for the RSE scores
Source D.F , S.S. M S. F ratio p
Between Groups 2 28.3111 14.1556 4.5407 .016
Within Groups 42 130.9333 3.1175
Total 44 159.2444
The results of the One-way ANOVA clearly indicated that the three groups 
did differ with respect to their Rosenberg Self-esteem scores [F(2,42) = 
4.5407, p < .05].
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The One-way ANOVA was followed by Student-Newman-Keuls Procedure 
which showed that the control group was significantly different fi'om the 
experimental and local group (p < .05) while the difference between the 
experimental group and the local group was not statistically significant. In other 
words, the control group had a significantly lower level of self-esteem than the 
other two.
The shared variance, that is, the total amount of the dependent variable’s 
(self-esteem level) variance that is shared with the independent variable (group 
membership), was also calculated as follows:
28.3111
Shared variance = ________ =.18
159.2444
In other words, 18 percent of the variation in the subjects’ self-esteem level can 
be explained in terms of the treatment effect of the Grendon Therapeutic 
Community.
(2) The Beck Depression Inventory
The mean score of all the subjects on the BDI was 17.73 with a standard 
deviation of 10.72. The summary statistics for the mean scores in each group 
are shown in Table 4.
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Table 4 Summary statistics for BDI scores
E(N=15) C (N=15) L (N=15)
X 13.6 23.07 12.30
S.D. 7.29 10.31 12.30
Again a between-subjects One-way ANOVA was done to examine the mean 
differences between the three groups. The results are listed in Table 5.
Table 5 ANOVA summary table for the BDI scores
Source D.F. S.S MS. F ratio P
Between Groups 2 704.5333 352.2667 3.3994 .0428
Within Groups 42 4352.2667 103.6254
Total 44 5056.8000
The results of the One-way ANOVA clearly indicated that the three groups 
did differ with respect to their BDI scores [F(2,42) = 3.3994, p < .05].
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The one-way ANOVA was followed by Student-Newman-Keuls Procedure 
which showed that the experimental group was significantly different from the 
control group (p < .05). In other words, the latter was found to be significantly 
more depressed than the former. There was no significant difference between 
the local group and the other two.
The shared variance here is calculated as follows:
704.5333
Shared variance =_________ = .14
5056.8000
In other words, 14 percent of the variation in the subjects' depression level can 
be explained in terms of the treatment effect of the Grendon Therapeutic 
Community.
(3) The General Health Questionnaire
The mean score of all the subjects on the GHQ was 8.38 with a standard 
deviation of 8.88. The summary statistics for the mean scores in each group are 
presented in Table 6.
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Table 6 Summary statistics for the GHQ scores
E (N=15) C (N=15) L (N=15)
X 5.27 11.87 8.0
S.D. 5.75 10.30 9.22
One-way ANOVA was performed and no statistically significant difference 
in group means was found. In other words, the three groups were not different 
in terms of their scores on the GHQ.
3. Correlations
The correlations between scores across all subjects were computed by 
means of Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient (the Pearson r). 
The results are shown in Table 7.
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Table 7 Correlations between scores across all subjects
RSE BDI GHQ
RSE .6707* .5324*
BDI .8299*
* p < .002
The results of the Pearson r showed that the three dependent variables were 
significantly correlated with each other. The following shows the amount of 
variance shared between the variables:
(1) RSE and BDI = .6707 x .6707 = .45
(2) RSE and GHQ = .5324 x .5324 = .28
(3) BDI and GHQ = .8299 x .8299 = .69
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VIL Discussion
The results of the previous chapter show that the self-esteem level of the 
treatment group was significantly higher than the control goup. Hence, the 
research hypothesis of the present study - that the therapeutic community 
treatment at Grendon has a positive effect on offenders’ self-esteem - is 
supported. In this chapter, the significance of the above will be discussed. The 
difference between the Grendon group and the local group will also be 
examined. It will be followed by the discussion on the results of the subjects' 
scores on the BDI and the GHQ.
1. Increased Self-esteem in therapeutic communities
The results showed that the self-esteem level of the Grendon group was 
significantly higher than that of the control group who had not received any 
therapeutic community treatment but had volunteered to enter Grendon and 
been put on the waiting list. They have given convincing support to the 
hypothesis that therapeutic communities have a positive effect on the 
participants' self-esteem. The findings of this study also corroborate the model 
postulated by Righton (1989) which suggests that the outcome of therapeutic 
communities is increased self-esteem and self-efficacy.
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Given that the Grendon therapeutic community seems to be having a 
positive effect on prisoners’ self-esteem and that there is a strong association 
between self-esteem and criminal behaviour (Rani et al., 1989; Hilmi, 1988; 
Kaplan et al., 1986; Berman, 1976), it can be argue that therapeutic 
communities do indeed have a role in the rehabilitation of prisoners in line with 
the general aim of the Prison Service - "to look after them (the prisoners) with 
humanity and to help them lead law-abiding and useful lives in custody and 
after release." (Home Office, 1990)
The findings have also lent support in a more general sense to Brim and 
Wheeler (1966) who, while writing about socialization, suggest that the most 
significant thing that occurs to a participant in a therapeutic community is that 
the whole basic motivational system of the person undergoes significant change 
in the area of attitudes, values and behaviour.
The essential features of therapeutic communities, namely, open system and 
social learning, and how they have been developed at Grendon have already 
been discussed in Chapter III. The attractiveness of the approach does not only 
lie in its record of success, but that it represents a form of ’social ecology’ 
(Jones, 1984) - that every individual being’s rights and value are recognised and 
any exploitation or abuse of power in the system is checked. No one seems to
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have expounded on such a humanistic force of therapeutic communities in a 
more succinct way than Jones (1984) who says.
"In our therapeutic community, we have come to have a deep 
distrust of reductivism in the form of scientific research unless it 
is linked with a humanistic orientation and subject to constant 
discussion and recycling with a view of achieveing consensus 
with all the participants...we evolved a democratic system which 
inevitably clashed with the more authoritarian and technocratic 
systems in other psychiatric facilities and in our surrounding 
environment, dominated by professional tradition, rationalism, 
and secularism."
This democratic view of Jones on therapeutic communities is echoed by 
Demare et al. (1991), who have been widely influential in the field of group 
psychotherapy. According to them, the large group offers a structure or 
medium for linking inner world with cultural context, and is thus able to 
establish a unique dimension - that of the micro-culture. Neither psychoanalysis 
or small groups have been able to handle this aspects empirically, since in the 
former, the analyst represents the assumed culture, while in the small group 
situation the hierarchy of family culture inevitably prevails. The large group 
displays the other side of the coin to the inner world, namely, the socio-cultural 
dimension in which interpersonal relationships take place.
Therapeutic communities in prisons certainly have their significance as a 
model for change - its positive healthy effect on the people involved, its answer
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to the abuse of power by delegation of responsibility and authority to the level 
in the system where it belongs, its conceptual framework of multiple leadership, 
social learning, growth and creativity not only reflect one approach to the 
cultural dilemma of our time (Jones, 1984) but also present a hope for the 
rehabilitation of prisoners.
Many rehabilitative programmes for prison populations have focused on 
individual interventions (Gendreau and Ross, 1987). However, criminal 
behaviour occurs in social contexts where there are not only interactions 
between the offender and the victim but those between the offender and the 
society, the entire culture. Instead of reducing treatment of offenders to 
individual encounters within a power structure which encourages suppression 
and further hostility, a social milieu where respect for others and 
responsibilities are encouraged through openness and change of one's self­
perception and where participants are motivated to change and better equipped 
to adjust to the world they live in, is preferred. The result of those changes is 
an increase in self-esteem and a decrease in offending behaviour.
All in all, therapeutic communities, which emphasize change of the whole 
self, the gestalt, rather than the conditioning of certain aspects of behaviour, are 
a very attractive alternative to most of the existing rehabilitation programmes. 
They are also a social evolutionary process through which a more open and
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democratic society will emerge, and so will a happier and better adjusted life 
for everyone who lives in it.
2. A comparison between the Grendon group and the local group
The lack of significant difference between the Grendon group and the local 
group in terms of the three dependent variables may be due to a number of 
reasons which will be examined here. However, it has no direct relevance to the 
research hypothesis of this study because the two groups are not comparable in 
a quasi-experimental design as will be explained in the next section. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of the local group in the present study has definitely 
thrown light on the functioning of prisoners in general in terms of their self- 
perception and mental health. It also helps to explain the similarity between the 
Grendon population and the control group in terms of reconviction rate in 
Gunn and Robertson's (1987) study.
(1) The local group
The local group, which was comprised of prisoners having no relation to the 
therapeutic community treatment at Grendon, should not be seen as a control 
group which can be compared with the experimental group in a quasi- 
experimental design. Grendon Prison has a set of selection criteria that do not
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suit the whole prison population. While some prisoners can meet all or some of 
the criteria, others may be a totally different group of prisoners sharing very 
unique characteristics veiy different from that of the Grendon inmates. To draw 
conclusion on Grendon’s treatment effects from comparing the two groups may 
be methodologically unsound as they could be basically two different 
populations. Even though they did share similar characteristics, the comparison 
of them may still run the risk of self-selection bias - that the local group had not 
chosen to enter the treatment programme had already rendered itself different. 
One notable difference may be the individual's motivation to change. In other 
words, those prisoners who stayed away from the treatment could be less 
motivated to change themselves. De Leon (1984) argues that those who do not 
enter treatment differ entirely from those who do and that only those who seek 
treatment should be included in comparison of treatment effects.
All in all, the comparison between the local group and the other two groups 
in the present study should be interpreted with extreme caution. Any result 
coming out of it should not be taken as evidence in accepting or rejecting the 
null hypothesis.
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(2) Better adjusted burglars
Although one cannot comment on the effectiveness of the therapeutic 
community treatment by referring to the difference between the Grendon group 
and the local group, it is certainly very interesting to see how they differed. In 
the present study, there was no statistically significant difference between the 
two groups, with the mean score of the local group on the RSE Scale (x = 1.8) 
even slightly higher than that of the Grendon group (x = 2.07).
At first sight, inmates at Grendon did not seem to have benefited fi’om the 
therapeutic communities because they would have been having as high (or low) 
self-esteem if they had been at the other prisons. However, Grendon was 
actually recruiting inmates with an already very low self-esteem, as evidenced 
by the mean score of the control group on the RSE Scale (x = 3.6). In view of 
the magnitude of change in self-esteem of the prisoners at Grendon, the 
treatment programme was already very successfiil in achieving its aim - 
increased self-esteem. Just how much the increase has to be in order to make a 
more law-abiding person, assuming that higher self-esteem leads to less 
offending behaviour, is beyond the scope of this study. It is, however, at this 
stage tempting to think that if therapeutic communities could be extended to 
those prisoners whose level of self-esteem are similar to that of the local group, 
positive change in selfesteem and behaviour would also be witnessed.
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Meanwhile, the Grendon experience seems to be an increased self-esteem, 
however remarkable, up to the extent where inmates become better adjusted 
burglars (Gunn and Robertson, 1987) with the prospect that the otherwise 
would be more maladjusted psychopaths looming large in the society when they 
are released.
In line with the above argument, it may not be too difficult to understand 
why Gunn and Robertson (1987) have found no difference in reconviction rate 
between their Grendon sample and control group. What they have not 
measured was the difference in reconviction rate between the two groups or the 
extent of maladjustment and offending behaviour of the Grendon subjects had 
they not gone through the treatment at all.
The argument here is that since low self-esteem is likely to be linked to 
criminal behaviour, lower self-esteem may be associated with higher propensity 
to offend. In other words, the Grendon subjects’ propensity to offend may have 
already been lessened to the extent that was similar to that of an average 
offender, bearing in mind that most of the Grendon inmates do have relatively 
higher number of previous convictions. As a matter of fact, the average number 
of previous convictions among the control group was eight. Studies have 
indeed shown that therapeutic communities are effective with clients who have
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extensive criminal history (Bale, 1979; De Leon et al, 1979). Of course, 
further research is needed to ascertain the claim that lower self-esteem is 
associated with higher propensity to offend if this argument is to be 
substantiated.
(3) Defensively high self-esteem
There has always been concern about the genuineness of prisoners’ self- 
reports. This problem is hoped to have been minimized in this study by the 
sincerity shown by the researcher and the strict confidentiality guaranteed for 
individual responses. However, the degree of defensiveness and secretiveness 
seemed to vary among the three groups in the present study. The reason for 
such a possible difference may be due to the fact that the Grendon group and 
the control group were more genuine in seeking help and facing their problems, 
and hence more ready to admit to their inadequacies, while the local group may 
have lacked this kind of intrinsic motivation to be honest. They may also have 
denied any short-comings that they possessed but found too painfiil to accept.
Hobson (1988) suggests that subjects whose true self-view is one of 
rejection or loathing sometimes score very highly on self-esteem 
questionnaires. Such people may appear self-confident, ambitious, arrogant.
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aggressive, and present an image of 'haughty superiority' (Reich, 1933) or 
defensively high self-esteem (Winter and Neale, 1985).
In other words, the self-esteem level of the local group could be untruly 
high compared with that of the Grendon group who had experienced a genuine 
improvement in self-perception.
(4) Unstable high self-esteem
Another possibility that the two groups of subjects may have a difference in 
terms of self-esteem may be seen in the light of self-esteem stability and the 
resultant tendencies to experience anger and hostility. Stability of self-esteem 
can be conceptualized in terms of the magnitude of short-term fluctuations in 
one's global self-evaluation (Kemis et al., 1989). Theoretically, instability has 
been associated with enhanced sensitivity to evaluate feedback, increased 
concern over one's self-view, and greater efforts to assign credit and blame for 
events (Kugle et al, 1983; Turner, 1968). In other words, unstable individuals 
tend to be more defensive in face of criticisms and less willing to accept 
responsibility when things have gone wrong.
In their study of 21 male and 24 female undergraduates, Kemis et al. (1989) 
found that stability and level of self-esteem as measured by Rosenberg's
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Stability Scale and the RSE Scale were important predictors of the 
dispositional tendencies to experience anger and hostility, and that unstable 
high self-esteem was associated with a substantially greater propensity to 
experience anger than was stable high self-esteem.
Kemis et al. (1989) suggest that the unstable individuals have the most to 
lose from a self-esteem threat. Although they possess a positive self-concept, it 
is fragile and sensitive to evaluative information. Unless they react with anger 
and hostility to a self- esteem threat, they may be compelled to negatively 
revise their self-concept in line with information provided in the threat.
Although the Grendon subjects and the local group had a similar level of 
self-esteem, it may well be that the former possessed a more stable high self­
esteem because they were certainly less defensive and more realistic about their 
self-appraisal which is the basis on which self-esteem is enhanced in therapeutic 
communities. The latter, on the other hand, may have been unstable individuals 
who had greater tendencies to experience anger and hostility.
The significance of the above argument is that anger and hostility have been 
implicated in violent crimes such as rape and spouse abuse (Maiuro et al.,
1988). Eysenck (1971) and Halleck (1967) suggest that people committing 
violent crimes, such as homicide, rape, robbery or assault, tend to have many
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more problems with hostility, aggressiveness and repressed anger. Hence, the 
likelihood that the local group would commit further crimes seem to be higher 
than that of the Grendon group because the high self-esteem among the local 
group is not based on realistic selfevaluation.
Of course, this view does not seem to be supported by Gunn and 
Robertson's (1987) finding that the reconviction rate of the Grendon population 
was not significiantly different from the rest of the prison population. However, 
their study certainly needs to be replicated in order to be substantiated. 
Moreover, there are immense problems related to the study of recidivism. In 
fact, recidivism measurements can be arbitrary, imprecise, and biased 
(Gendreau and Leipciger, 1978; Sarri and Selo, 1974). In other words, to infer 
reoffending behaviour fi’om studies of recidivism seems to have a lot of 
methodological problems. It does seem that self-esteem and the stability of it 
are more promising areas in which offending behaviour can be studied.
3. The BDI and the GHQ
The results showed that the three groups' scores on the BDI are significantly 
different. The control group were found to be more depressed than the 
Grendon sample. In other words, the therapeutic community treatment had a 
positive impact on the subjects in terms of their depression. The significance of
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such a finding is that it has lent support to the validity of the RSE scale as a 
measurement of prisoners' self-esteem because depression is expected to be 
theoretically associated with self-esteem. The association of the the two 
variables has already been discussed in Chapter V.
The subjects' scores on the RSE Scale and that on the BDI were highly 
correlated (r = .6707). The strong association between the two sets of scores 
suggests that self-esteem as a construct employed in the present study is the 
same to the one used by Rosenberg (1965) when he constructed his self-esteem 
scale because he has also found such a close relationship between self-esteem 
and depression. Hence, the problem of ubiquity of the term (Robson, 1988; 
Wells and Marwell, 1976) has been satisfactorily dealt with in this study.
However, there was no significant difference in the GHQ scores between 
the three groups although the GHQ scores correlated highly with the RSE 
scores and the BDI scores (r = .5324 and r = .8299 respectively). Again, the 
high correlations have given strong support to the RSE Scale as a valid 
measure of prisoners' self-esteem. The lack of significant difference between 
the three groups can be explained by the fact that one of the built-in constructs 
of the GHQ, namely» social performance, may not be theoretically associated 
with self-esteem. The other three areas covered in the construction of the GHQ 
are depression, anxiety and somatic complaints (Goldberg and Williams, 1988).
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They have been found to have theoretically predicted associations with self­
esteem (Stehouwer, 1985; Rosenberg, 1965). Social performance remains an 
unexplored area with a rather ill-defined nature. Moreover, its application to 
the prison context seems to be much less sure than the other constructs. For 
instance. Question 5 of the GHQ-30 reads: "Have you recently been getting out 
of the house as much as usual?" It becomes quite irrelevant to prisoners who 
can hardly step out of their cells during lock-up time. In fact, many of the 
subjects in the present study have questioned the suitability of that particular 
question.
Nevertheless, judging from the results in Table 6, it does not seem too 
unfair to say that the control group scored much higher on the GHQ than the 
Grendon Group meaning that the latter performed much better in terms of the 
four areas of the GHQ than the former.
There were no significant difference between the Grendon group and the 
local group in the subjects’ scores on the BDI and the GHQ although the 
former did seem to have performed better by referring to their mean 
differences. Again, the subjects in the local group may have been more 
defensive when they were completing the questionnaires. The reasons for that 
have already been discussed in details in the previous section.
376
It is interesting to look at the prevalence of the various forms of disorders, 
particularly depression and anxiety, among the prison population. In fact, the 
mean score of all the subjects in the present study on the BDI was 17.73 
(S.D.= 10.72) and that on the GHQ was 8.83 (S.D.= 8.88). Both are well 
above the cut off points which are 10.9 (S.D.= 8.1) for none or minimal 
depression (Beck, 1967) and 4/5 - the threshold score for an individual’s 
healthy fimctioning (Goldberg and Williams, 1988). In their study of a 
Canadian delinquent sample, Gendreau et al. (1979) also found that the samples 
of young offenders presented psychological symptoms markedly similar to 
those exhibited by persons in outpatient psychiatric treatment.
It seems that any effective and comprehensive rehabilitation programme for 
prisoners has to take into account their psychiatric health. Therapeutic 
communities present themselves as a viable means and process through which 
rehabilitation can be achieved. The results of the present study have provided 
evidence for the above suggestion.
Martin and Fueer (1983) attribute part of the prisoners’ malfunctioning to 
the misery of prison life. They claim that much of the misery stems from the 
fact of incarceration itself; of being locked up in a social and psychological, as 
well as physical sense - a human environment from which there is no escape 
and over which the inmate has no control. It is beyond doubt that such
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dehumanization of prison life can be to a large extent dealt with by therapeutic 
communities because they, but their very nature, are a very humanizing 
experience.
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VIII. Conclusion
Evidence has been found in the present study that the Grendon therapeutic 
community is effective in increasing offenders’ self-esteem. An open and 
democratic system, with an emphasis on social learning, does seem to have 
something to offer in terms of viable and meaningful rehabilitation approaches 
in correctional institutions.
The therapeutic communities at Grendon have proven themselves to be an 
effective treatment for prisoners with a damaged self and a rather high level of 
depression and anxiety. However, it is important that the treatment approach 
can be adapted flexibly to match different types of prisoners and the stages of 
development and social learning reached by individuals within a particular 
therapeutic environment in order to render itself more effective (Righton,
1989). In other words, individual differences have to be taken into account of. 
Delinquent samples have provided ample proof that individual differences are 
strikingly related to treatment outcome (Gendreau and Ross, 1987). Perhaps 
this is a major area which therapeutic communities have yet to work towards.
Having obtained frustrating results from their comparison of the Grendon 
population and other prisoners on their reconviction rate, Gunn and Robertson
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(1987) argue against control-group studies, which they claim are inappropriate 
for the evaluation of institutional care. However, a carefully conducted 
experimental design or quasi-experimental design like the present study can be 
proved to be valuable and usefiil. The results of this study have actually thrown 
light upon Gunn and Robertson's (1987) findings and given support to the 
success of the Grendon experience.
Howarth (1989) attributes the lack of attention to objective assessment of 
psychotherapeutic outcome to the belief that scientific evaluation is not 
appropriate for procedures which deal with existential, rather than factual 
matters. He suggests that this type of argument is flawed because it assumes 
that clients should only be interested in their own perceptions and beliefs and 
not in the reality which is experienced by others or in more objective measures 
of their well-being.
Although the self-esteem level of the subjects in the local group was not 
significantly different from that of the Grendon subjects, it may have been 
defensively high or unstable. Both areas warrant further research if the 
mechanisms underlying the association between self-esteem and offending 
behaviour are to be better understood.
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The significant difference in the level of depression between the Grendon 
group and the control group and the high correlations between the subjects' 
scores on the RSE Scale, the BDI and the GHQ have given support to the 
validity of the RSE Scale as a measure of prisoners' self-esteem.
The scores on the BDI and the GHQ have also indicated that the general 
psychological health of prisoners is much worse than that of the general 
population. In this respect, therapeutic communities seem to be a viable means 
offering a practical solution to the problem by humanizing the prison life and 
enhancing in every individual a positive self-appraisal and a better adjusted life.
All in all, this study has looked into the effectiveness of therapeutic 
communities in bringing about change in self-esteem and has produced very 
favourable results.
Therapeutic communities should not just be seen as a treatment method. 
They are, in a wider sense, associated with the breakdown of the traditional 
authoritarian social structure, decentralization, information sharing, and sharing 
decision-making at all levels of the social organization. They are a democratic 
movement emphasizing respect for individuals, personal growth, and open 
communication, which, ironically, are ofien absent even in democratic 
countries.
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By the crowd they have been broken. 
By the crowd they have been healed.
M.F. Ettin (1988)
382 Appendix 1
Dear
I am a clinical psychology trainee at the University of Surrey. I am doing 
research on the general health and self-esteem of prisoners. It involves three 
questionnaires to be filled in by the prisoners whose names have been picked by 
me through a standard sampling procedure. The whole task takes less than 45 
minutes to finish and the participation in it is totally voluntary. If you have no 
objection, may I invite you to come at on . You will
be informed where to go later.
Your response will remain completely confidential. You will be welcomed to 
raise any questions regarding the task when you come. Please bring your 
glasses if you need them for reading.
Your co-operation will be valuable and very much appreciated.
Thank you for your attention.
Yours sincerely.
Edmond Lau
383 Appendix 2
Date
Tester’s name
Person being tested’s name
I agree to do these tests on the following conditions:
(1) That no publication whatsoever using the information obtained should refer 
to any individual person, or character, in a manner that allows them to be 
identified.
(2) That the information obtained is given strictly on the condition that it is for
research only.
Any breach of the above conditions is liable to prosecution.
Tester’s signature:
Person being tested’s signature:
384 Appendix 3
Rosenberg Self-esteem Seale
Please read each statement and circle the appropriate number.
Strongly Strongly
agree Agree Disagree agree
A) On the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself.
B) At time I think I am no good at all.
C) I feel that I have a number of good 
qualities.
D) I am able to do things as well as most 
other people.
E) I feel I do not have much to be proud 
of.
F) I certainly feel useless at times.
G) I feel that Fm a person of worth, at 
least on an equal plane with others.
H) I wish I could have more respect for 
myself.
I) All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am 
a failure.
J) I take a positive attitude towards 
myself.
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